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Preface
Two events around 1990 marked the beginning of a new era for gay and lesbian 
rights movements around the world. The first was the introduction in Denmark 
in 1989 of a law on registered partnership that granted same-sex couples legal 
recognition nationally. On 1 October 1989, eleven gay couples registered their 
partnerships in the City Hall of Copenhagen and met the world press on the 
City Hall Square ‒ incidentally an old cruising ground for gay men. The second 
event was the application for marriage licences in Hawaii by one gay and two 
lesbian couples. They were rejected, but three years later the Hawaii Supreme 
Court ruled that it was a violation of the state’s Constitution to deny marriage 
licences to same-sex couples.1 Not only did these two actions set the agenda for 
the majority of the gay and lesbian movements in Europe and the United States 
for the next decade, but they also signalled the two paths that the political work 
for gay and lesbian rights would take on each side of the Atlantic. Whereas the 
U.S. gay marriage lobbyists have relied on court decisions and have waged their 
struggle for marriage rights mostly in the judiciary, their European counterparts 
have strived to influence national parliaments and the European Parliament to 
pass laws and recommendations for the recognition of same-sex couples. An-
other difference between the European and U.S. experience is that some U.S. 
jurisdictions have moved directly to full marital rights for gay and lesbian cou-
ples, resulting in strong counter movements that in many cases have managed 
to obtain reverse decisions prohibiting same-sex marriages or civil unions. In 
Europe, the legislators in general first granted limited marital rights to same-
sex couples and then alleviated or abolished one limitation after the other, thus 
paving the road for full marital rights. In a way, the European model has proved 
more successful, in that it has gradually worn down the opposition to same-sex 
marriage, with the ironic result that the Christian Democratic parties that first 
opposed the laws on registered partnership have later defended them as more 
appropriate for same-sex couples.
For various reasons, it was the gay and lesbian movements in Scandinavia 
that first succeeded in introducing the idea of a legal regulation of same-sex re-
lationships in the general political debate, but it was far from self-evident that 
marriage was what the gay and lesbian movements wanted. We will explore the 
ways in which the gay and lesbian communities discussed the issue of gay mar-
riage from the 1970s onward and how mainstream politicians responded to their 
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demands. Personally, I was a bystander to this process and did not take part in 
these discussions. Instead, I was rather heavily involved in activism for the In-
ternational Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA) in the 1980s and did not par-
ticipate at all in the lobbying for registered partnership. When the law on regis-
tered partnership was adopted in Sweden in 1995, I remember I was happy but 
not profoundly moved. It was more like I felt when Sweden won the bronze 
medal at the 1994 world championship in soccer. I had had absolutely no inter-
est in soccer before, but when the unexpected good results of the Swedish na-
tional team affected everyone around me, I found myself cheering in front of 
the TV set. For me, gay marriage became a personal choice when Sweden got 
the law in 1995, and my partner and I discussed whether or not to register our 
relationship. I wanted to do it, because I wanted to have a fun party to celebrate, 
but my partner dismissed the whole thing as “petit-bourgeois rubbish.” After 
two years, I managed to persuade him, and we had a great party. Afterwards, we 
both agreed that the moment in front of friends and families felt more signifi-
cant than we had expected, and that state recognition was not unimportant. To 
register partnership ‒ to marry ‒ was a political action, to be sure. It was demon-
strated by the fact that the advertisement announcing our union that we want-
ed to place in the local newspaper Smålänningen caused the summoning of an 
extra editorial board meeting, or so we heard. They accepted the advertisement, 
but a little later we were reminded by an anonymous letter we received that 
the change of attitudes in society was not complete. The letter contained our 
wedding advertisement, on which someone had scribbled “shame on you both.” 
Even if we smiled at this rather meek protest, it made us aware that the part-
nership registration, just like a wedding, was a public ceremony, and that recog-
nition takes place on several levels. These experiences were part of the process 
that gave me the idea for this study. What did the formal recognition of a cou-
ple mean? And how does state recognition of same-sex couples affect society?
This book is based on research carried out in 2003–2005 for a project fund-
ed by the Swedish Council for Working Life and Social Research (FAS). I 
searched archives and interviewed activists and politicians in all five Nordic 
countries as well as the autonomous areas of the Faroe Islands and Greenland.2 
As I write this preface, the news reaches me that Portugal has become the sixth 
country in Europe to allow marital rights for same-sex couples. So it is about 
time for me to put a stop to my project.
 I want to thank all those who shared their experiences with me, and also the 
volunteers in the gay and lesbian archives in each country, in particular Hanne 
Bielefeldt and Karl Peder Pedersen from LBL in Denmark, Jussi Nissinen from 
SETA in Finland, Þorvaldur Kristinsson from Samtökin ’78 in Iceland, Espen 
Ophaug from LLH in Norway, and Stig-Åke Petersson from RFSL in Sweden. 
In Finland and Iceland, where my language skills were insufficient, Anna Hei-
no and Hrafnkell Tjörvi Stefánsson provided help in finding and interpreting 
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important documents for me. I also want to thank Peter Edelberg and Hans W. 
Kristiansen, who have read the whole manuscript and given me valuable advice, 
and Leif Pareli, who has given me advice on some of the intricacies of Norwe-
gian lesbian and gay history. My dear friends Þorvaldur Kristinsson and Kati 
Mustola patiently explained various aspects of Icelandic and Finnish society to 
me and generously shared their knowledge of queer history in those countries. 
Last, but certainly not least, I thank Glenn Rounds for patiently correcting my 
English. 
The publication of this book has been made possible by a generous grant 
from the Royal Swedish Academy of Science and from FAS, the Swedish 
Council for Working Life and Social Research, for which I thank them. I also 
want to thank the San Michele Foundation, which made it possible for me to 
work with the manuscript during three wonderful weeks of work and leisure on 
the Isle of Capri. 
Finally, I want to thank my life companion since 1984 and registered partner 
since 1997, Martin Loeb, to whom I dedicate this book.
Lund, December 2010

Introduction
When registered partnership was introduced in Sweden, the Justice Department 
distributed an information folder about the new law. Its front page showed two 
male figures, dressed in funny clothes and funny little hats and holding a red 
heart. They had thick red lips and large pants and coats. They were unmistak-
ably clowns. Inside the folder was a list of the new law’s limitations. Registered 
partners were not allowed to adopt children, neither individually nor as a couple. 
They were denied access to insemination or any other kind of assisted fertilisa-
tion, and they could not be appointed as legal trustees or have joint custody of 
under-age children. Furthermore, they had no right to a church wedding, and 
at least one of the partners had to be a Swedish citizen residing in the coun-
try. However, the folder stated that they had the right to carry the same family 
name, and this was illustrated by two female figures in front of a door with the 
arch-Swedish name Olsson on it. Just like their male counterparts they had big 
red lips and large staring eyes. They were blond and conventionally feminine, in 
a grotesque sort of way.1
How the Swedish Government chose to visualise the law on registered part-
nership in 1995 is deeply disturbing. By offering terms similar to those for het-
erosexual couples but with the above restrictions, the state was prepared to in-
corporate homosexuals in the majority culture in ways that would make them 
completely harmless. Who could be afraid of these silly clowns? They posed no 
threat whatsoever to the majority’s children or to the adults’ immune systems. 
Moreover, being pictured as very blond and very blue-eyed Swedish Olssons 
signalled that the law was for Swedish citizens. It can serve as a reminder that, 
ever since they were first introduced, the laws on registered partnership in the 
Scandinavian countries have been connected with national identity. Opponents 
of the laws feared that their home country would be shamed internationally, 
while a growing majority saw it as a source of national pride, as if the perceived 
tolerance and open-mindedness of their Government had in some way worn off 
on themselves.2 
Furthermore, the similarity of the members of each couple in the folder can 
be read as a sign of an ideal internal equality in terms of age, class, ethnicity, 
and race. The modern homosexual couple was thus to be seen as one in which 
the two persons resemble each other in every possible way and whose ultimate 
unifier is their family name. There was no room for children in the picture. Ac-
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cording to the Swedish Justice Department in 1995, the homosexual couple was 
blond and barren.
The decade after the introduction of the law, however, saw a gradual change, the 
abolishment of one after the other of the limitations that made registered part-
nership less than a marriage. The rule that at least one of the partners must be 
a citizen and residing in the country was abolished, so that it sufficed if one of 
the partners was a permanent resident. The restriction that the registered part-
nership was valid only in Scandinavia was lifted, and various forms of religious 
blessing have become incorporated in the national churches’ liturgy. However, 
the most important amendments of the laws ‒ and the hardest to achieve ‒ have 
concerned parental rights. By now, all Scandinavian countries grant the right to 
apply for adoption,3 and all allow lesbian couples in registered partnership ac-
cess to assisted fertilisation. In 2009 both Norway and Sweden introduced gen-
“Law on registered partnership. In force from 1 
January 1995.” The official information folder of 
the Swedish Ministry of Justice. Unknown art-
ist. Print: Norstedts tryckeri, Stockholm 1994.
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der-neutral marriage laws and abolished their existing laws on partnership. Ice-
land followed suit in 2010 thus marking the end of an epoch of special legisla-
tion for gay and lesbian couples in these three countries. 
State recognition of same-sex couples has occurred in two steps. First, le-
gal recognition of childless gay or lesbian couples was introduced, in spite of 
considerable political opposition, between 1989 (Denmark) and 2002 (Finland). 
The second step was the recognition of so-called rainbow families, i.e. granting 
parental rights to same-sex couples with children. This has happened gradual-
ly through changes in the laws on adoption and assisted fertilisation, as well as 
through various adaptations of family law. When Norway, Sweden, and Iceland 
finally introduced full marital rights for both same-sex and different-sex cou-
ples, the differences between registered partnership and marriage were already 
very small. There has been remarkably weak political opposition to these step-
by-step adaptations, and when full marital rights for same-sex couples were in-
Inside, the folder explains that: “Registered partners 
may not adopt children, neither together nor sepa-
rately; be given access to insemination or other artifi-
cial fertilisation; or be appointed as guardians to have 
joint custody of a minor.” However, they may carry the 
same last name. Information folder, Swedish Ministry 
of Justice. Print: Norstedts tryckeri, Stockholm 1994.
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troduced, the debate was limited and the nay-votes in Parliament few. It is this 
two-step development this book is about. We will first explore how the idea of 
legal recognition of same-sex couples was debated within the gay and lesbian 
movements in the Nordic countries and how this idea was adopted by main-
stream politicians. Then we will investigate how registered partnership gradually 
became more and more like “real marriage.” The analysis will concentrate on the 
changing discourses of gay marriage in Scandinavia, from scepticism in the gay 
and lesbian movements and in society at large, to the all-embracing enthusiasm 
of contemporary Scandinavian society.4 
Part of the problem with state recognition of same-sex couples is the regu-
latory benevolence that some say weakens the position of these couples instead 
of strengthening it. In the 1995 leaflet the well-meant concern of the state was 
inadvertently condescending, and much of the pro-gay rhetoric of mainstream 
politicians evolved around a paternalistic will to “help” homosexuals lead a de-
cent life. On the one hand, the official recognition of a relationship is important 
for individual couples in matters of inheritance, loans, pensions, and residence 
permits. For some international couples, it is literally a matter of life and death if 
their relation is not recognised by the authorities. From the perspective of many 
same-sex couples in Scandinavia, the introduction of partnership laws has made 
a world of difference, especially since they allowed for joint custody of children. 
But on the other hand, the price for official recognition is a loss of cultural di-
versity and political significance. The more lesbians and gays become part of the 
majority culture’s value system, the harder it is for them to criticize it. 
Questions raised
The aim of this study is to explore the process leading to legal recognition of 
same-sex relations and the subsequent widening of the scope of the laws. The 
analysis is on two levels, one dealing with the work for and against the laws 
within the gay and lesbian communities and the effects they have had on them, 
and the other with the origins and effects of the laws in Scandinavian society. 
On the first level, we will examine how the activists in gay and lesbian move-
ments have discussed gay marriage and how they have formulated their strat-
egies from the 1970s to the present. A gender-sensitive analysis is necessary to 
understand the dynamics between gay activists and lesbian feminists. Also, we 
will examine how the attitudes differed between activists in different countries 
in the Nordic region. 
On the second level, we will investigate when and why mainstream politi-
cians began listening to the demands of gay and lesbian activists. The political 
processes leading to the introduction of registered partnership laws differ slight-
ly between the countries in Scandinavia, but there are enough similarities to re-
gard these differences as regional variations of a common theme. How did the 
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different political parties respond to gay and lesbian activists’ demands? What 
gender and generational differences determined the ways in which gay marriage 
became a mainstream political issue? Finally, we will put these two discourses in 
their historical context and analyse them in connection with political and dis-
cursive changes during the period. The AIDS epidemic affected the construc-
tion of “homosexuality” both on a local and national level in each Scandinavian 
country. How important was it for the partnership law and how did it influence 
the political work for the law? How did the political landscape and the founda-
tions of the Scandinavian welfare states change in that same period? The politi-
cal spectrum in the Scandinavian parliaments changed drastically in the 1970s 
and 1980s, and the partnership reform took place in an unusually unruly politi-
cal landscape. The question why these reforms came first in Scandinavia and 
not in any other place is perhaps the most difficult to answer, and the analysed 
material does not allow a definitive answer to this question. But by studying re-
gional differences within Scandinavia, the book will open up a discussion that 
is relevant to the question. 
The effects of the laws will also be discussed on two levels. What were their 
effects for gay and lesbian couples, and how have queer people responded to the 
legislation? Again, gender plays an important role. Do the laws carry different 
meanings for lesbian couples than for gay couples? Has this changed since the 
laws were first adopted? It is difficult to give general answers to such questions, 
but I intend to let statistics speak. Are the laws differently viewed in different 
Scandinavian countries? And on the general level, what effects can we spot in 
Scandinavian society as a whole? How have twenty years of existence of the laws 
influenced public attitudes? 
We will see how lesbians and gay men transcend the last barriers of the het-
eronormative majority culture and invade the institutions of the welfare state. 
When parenthood is granted even to same-sex couples, and when gay and lesbi-
an identity is less about sex and increasingly about child rearing and hetero-like 
family matters, will that change the discursive framework around the family? 
How will it affect the sexual landscape of the nation? U.S. anthropologist Gayle 
Rubin has theorised about the “sexual hierarchy” that gives credit to some sexual 
practices and stigmatises others. In what she calls “the charmed circle,” we find 
“good” sexuality: practices within marriage that are intended to procreate. Out-
side the circle are all the variations of sexual expression that are stigmatised by 
society: sex outside marriage, sex for money, sadomasochism, homo- and bisex-
ual practices ‒ all practices for pleasure and not for procreation. What happens 
when this order of things is disturbed, now when homo- and bisexual practices 
have moved inside the “charmed circle” and gays become parents? The practices 
that, according to Rubin, are branded by society as “sick, sinful, ‘way out’” were 
previously conceptually and spatially closely related to the homosexual and the 
bisexual. 5 Will they now be left outside the circle, with less resources and less 
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“semi-decent” friends who can speak for them, or do they profit from the suc-
cessful integration of their more fortunate sisters and brothers?
Theoretical points of departure
It is hard to say what is lost to queer culture when it is integrated in the major-
ity society. The queer criticism of gay marriage has almost exclusively been for-
mulated in a U.S. context, where gay marriage or civil unions are not a reality 
on the national level, and where some of the arguments are strikingly similar to 
those voiced by lesbian feminists and radical gay men in Europe before the laws 
were passed. These arguments focus primarily on the loss of solidarity with oth-
er oppressed groups and criticise gay marriage for being a gay male middle-class 
project.6 One argument is that the political campaign for marriage takes activ-
ists’ time and energy away from other pressing issues such as health care and 
solidarity. Another is that the campaign has provoked a counter campaign that 
now threatens the rights of U.S. lesbians and gays even where they have once 
been granted, as happened in California in 2008, when the right for same-sex 
couples to be married was revoked after a referendum.7 The U.S. context, how-
ever, is very different from the European one, and in societies like Denmark, 
where registered partnership has been a reality for more than twenty years, the 
question is no longer about policy-making. The pros and cons of marriage have 
largely become relegated to private discussions among gay and lesbian couples. 
This book will show that the discussions about alternative lifestyles that were 
common in the 1970s and early 1980s all but disappear toward the end of the 
century. Dreams about collective living and extended families have been re-
placed by ideas of the ideal couple. Alternative lifestyles have clearly suffered a 
setback, but perhaps that would have come even without the partnership laws. 
The symbolic meaning of state recognition of same-sex couples is not to be 
underestimated, but the question remains whether the price for that has been 
a higher degree of regulation when it comes to kinship. As U.S. queer theorist 
Judith Butler has pointed out, “the topic of gay marriage is not the same as that 
of gay kinship,” and it is not good to give one up in order to get the other.8 But 
still, it seems that the changes we have witnessed in marriage law mirror a de-
velopment on a deeper level, a new way of thinking about marriage and fam-
ily. French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss’ theories about kinship presup-
posed and reproduced a heterosexually structured system, based on men’s traffic 
in women, as Gayle Rubin convincingly has argued.9 The incest taboo and the 
prohibition against endogamy are, according to Lévi-Strauss, the basis itself for 
society as it is possible for us to picture it. In fact, the very intelligibility of cul-
ture is built on these structures of kinship. Judith Butler has drawn on that idea 
and used the Greek tragedy Antigone to comment on gay marriage and kinship. 
Traditionally, Sophocles’ play has been read as a symbol of the defiance of power, 
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of the last remnant of kinship-based society, resisting in vain the abstract state 
with its absolute demands on its citizens. 
Butler asks what would happen if Antigone instead of Oedipus had been the 
basis of modern psychoanalytic theory. The catastrophic kinship position of An-
tigone as the offspring of the incestuous relation between Oedipus and Jocas-
ta detaches her from the start from a heterosexual and reproductive normative 
structure. She shuns marriage and even life, when she seeks death in a symbolic 
incestuous act, as she insists on mourning and burying her dead brother who 
is at the same time her nephew. According to Butler, Antigone positions her-
self outside the normative structure that enables us to understand culture and 
causes a catachresis ‒ a misapplication of the words that define kinship. Howev-
er, the catachresis that emerges out of this situation presents a new way of un-
derstanding:
What emerges is a melancholia that attends living and loving outside the liveable 
and outside the field of love, where the lack of institutional sanction forces lan-
guage into perpetual catachresis, showing not only how a term can continue to 
signify outside its conventional constraints but also how that shadowy form of sig-
nification takes its toll on a life by depriving it of its sense of ontological certainty 
and durability within a publicly constituted political sphere.10 
Traditionally, those who choose unconventional ways of constructing their close 
relationships are constrained by the lack of institutional confirmation to live in 
ontological uncertainty, since there are no officially endorsed terms to designate 
their way of living. The gap between what language can describe and a lived re-
ality that escapes simple description forces them to invent their own conceptual 
universe. The catachresis, the usage of a word in a sense contrary to its original 
meaning, is then typical for how people outside the norms of society use lan-
guage to designate themselves and their lives. Queer people will speak about 
“my husband,” “my wife,” or “my family” when society denies their very exist-
ence. At different times they have performed what Canadian historian Elise 
Chenier has called “freak weddings,” staging and sometimes exaggerating the 
paraphernalia of heterosexual wedding ceremonies. By these appropriations of 
the norm they expose themselves to its disciplining mechanisms, but they also 
keep challenging it and proposing new meanings.11 
Registered partnerships, civil unions, and gay marriages thus undo the norm 
just by presenting not one alternative but many. In light of Butler’s analysis, 
however, it is possible that the change in legal ramifications of same-sex rela-
tions that we witness now in Scandinavia ‒ the replacement of the laws of reg-
istered partnership with a unified marriage law ‒ will strengthen heteronorma-
tivity and impoverish the conceptual reality of same-sex couples. The Dutch 
way of keeping a law on registered partnership open to both same-sex and dif-
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ferent-sex couples and to open up traditional marriage for same-sex couples al-
lows greater freedom of choice, but the hegemonic position of the couple is still 
there, and no provisions exist for those who want to join their lives in greater 
numbers than two.
The mild coercive manners of Scandinavian society were perhaps best de-
scribed by French philosopher Michel Foucault, who in a 1978 interview said 
that his early work Histoire de la folie (1961) was written under the influence of 
his experience as a guest lecturer in Sweden and Poland in the 1950s. In the in-
terview, he described Swedish society as “an ‘over-medicalized,’ protected soci-
ety where all social perils were in some ways attenuated by subtle and studied 
mechanisms.” The disciplining mechanisms of modern society that Foucault 
outlines are remarkably visible in Scandinavian society. There is an unusually 
strong loyalty to the state in Scandinavian societies.12 Finnish social historian 
Pauli Kettunen has pointed out that none of the Scandinavian languages makes 
any clear distinction between “state” and “society.” There are different words for 
the two concepts, but according to Kettunen they are most often used synony-
mously.13 This strong loyalty to the state is a prerequisite for the willingness to 
pay high taxes and to accept state intervention in private lives, and it also makes 
public opinion susceptible to attitude changes in accordance with political de-
cisions. 
In Surveiller et punir (1975), Foucault describes how Western society since 
the Enlightenment has deployed increasingly subtle means of control, mak-
ing early modern methods of punishment and coercion obsolete. By developing 
panoptical systems of surveillance, the agents of power do not have to use force 
to discipline the citizens, who instead will internalise the demands put upon 
them and act as “docile bodies” according to the norms laid down for them. 
The acceptance and assimilation of homosexual citizens in Western society can 
be examined in the light of Foucault’s analysis, and questions about the loss of 
agency that a formerly marginalised group suffers when it is incorporated in so-
ciety must be asked.14 Discussions about homonormativity ‒ i.e. the internal dis-
ciplining process exerted by gay activists themselves ‒ will be touched upon, but 
the main focus will be on the political processes leading up to the introduction 
of the partnership laws in Scandinavia, their effects on society, and their trans-
formation from regulating the lives of childless pairs to also including child-
rearing rainbow families.15 
Another theoretical inspiration that has influenced this study comes from 
Nancy Fraser. In Justice Interruptus (1997) and later work she has outlined an 
analysis of political agency in the “post-socialist condition,” after the end of the 
Cold War. There are two kinds of politics, she writes, the “politics of redistribu-
tion,” which attends to the problems caused by uneven distribution of wealth, 
and the “politics of recognition,” which is about the problems that arise from the 
disdain shown to certain groups in society. German philosopher Axel Honneth 
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has claimed that disdain within an ethical community is as detrimental to hu-
mans as institutional discrimination, and together with Fraser he has discussed 
the theoretical foundations for a politics of recognition. In these discussions, 
Fraser has demanded a dual approach in order to meet the needs of a politics of 
justice. Recognition of minority groups and redistribution of wealth would then 
be equally important political projects.16 The relevance to my study is obvious. 
During the 1990s, the same period of time as laws on registered partnership for 
same-sex couples were adopted in one country after the other, politics of rec-
ognition played an increasingly important role in mainstream politics. Much 
of the process leading to legislation concerning lesbian and gay rights is to be 
understood as the effect of an increased emphasis of the politics of recognition, 
and this book will explore the forms this took within the Scandinavian politi-
cal system.
The historical process I specifically want to investigate is thus the develop-
ment toward state recognition of same-sex couples and, subsequently, of rain-
bow families.17 In other words, I want to study how the core of the laws has 
changed from merely codifying the relationship of the barren clowns described 
in the beginning, toward regulating the social life of potential child-rearing 
couples and queer families. U.S. literary scholar Lee Edelman and others have 
discussed queerness in terms of “death” and “life,” claiming that queers, former-
ly inscribed in a discourse of death and sterility, become increasingly “folded 
into life,” to quote Jasbir Puar.18 And indeed, this is exactly what has happened 
within the framework of civil unions and gay marriage. In order to understand 
the discursive change from death to life in the history of gay marriage, we must, 
however, be aware of both temporal and geographical differences. To begin with 
the geographical differences, the access to children, to Edelman’s “reproductive 
futurity,” for same-sex couples, has been less contested in the United States than 
in Europe. While many European states have been willing to grant legal recog-
nition to gay and lesbian couples, they have been much more reluctant to give 
them joint custody over children. In a work on the French Pacs, the unwilling-
ness of French authorities to include children in it was described thus: “It’s all 
about opening the couple to homosexuality, but not the family.” Politicians and 
scientists have united in their efforts to keep children out of the French and 
European versions of legally recognised unions between same-sex couples, but 
on that condition they were willing to let them register.19 In the United States 
the situation has been the opposite. As a general rule, it has been much easier 
for lesbian and gay couples to adopt children than to obtain legal recognition 
for their relationships. Part of the explanation of this difference is probably that 
many more children are up for adoption in the United States than in Europe, 
so while European childless couples ‒ straight and gay ‒ have to depend on in-
ternational adoptions, U.S. couples can easily find domestic children in need of 
parents. Another reason might be the stronger position of the family versus the 
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state in the U.S. compared to Europe. Even though the state’s prerogatives dif-
fer between different countries, European state power as a rule retains a greater 
possessive claim on its future citizens. Finally, European welfare measures are 
directed toward individuals to a much higher degree than in the United States, 
where the family unit remains the prime recipient of welfare. This means that 
legal recognition of same-sex relationships potentially entails much higher costs 
in the U.S. than in Europe.20 A more systematic comparative study of the his-
tory of gay rights in Europe and the United States would provide valuable in-
sights into the different ways these issues have been dealt with. 
The change over time is central for this book. One of the most challenging 
tasks for a historical investigation is to understand the processes that led to the 
acceptance of the partnership laws by the political majority. In order to be ac-
cepted, the laws had to be presented as something other than the radical project 
to abolish marriage that was presented by the left socialist parties in Denmark 
and Sweden in 1968 and 1973, respectively. In the 1980s the law was indeed re-
defined as a social liberal project based on arguments of human rights, equal-
ity, and justice and thus could be fitted into the broad welfare state project of 
Scandinavian social liberalism and social democracy. The other change which is 
of interest for this study is the discursive shift from barrenness to fecundity. The 
limitations listed in the original laws on registered partnership were there to bar 
same-sex couples from full equality with different-sex couples, and the most 
important of these were the different ways same-sex couples were to be denied 
access to children.21 In a debate in the Swedish Parliament in 1976, MP Gunde 
Raneskog from the Centre Party (Centerpartiet) declared that “heterosexual-
ity bears life, development, and future within. Homosexuality harbours steril-
ity, barrenness, and death.”22 In unusually clear language, Raneskog put in words 
what had long been the dominant way of thinking about homosexuals. Such 
comments would now be highly improper within the Scandinavian political es-
tablishment, but the general idea that procreation and the future are reserved 
for the heterosexual majority was not challenged until very recently, when rain-
bow families began demanding recognition at all levels of society ‒ from day-
care centres to career jobs. U.S. literary scholar Judith Halberstam has theorised 
about queer time and space and concludes that the queer time as lived by non-
heterosexual, non-gender-conformative people differs dramatically from what 
is lived by those who follow the heteronormative pattern of marriage, childrear-
ing, grandchildren, and death. We must ask ourselves, she argues, what hap-
pens when queers are more and more involved in a heterosexual matrix through 
marriage and childrearing.23 And it is relevant to see the adaptation of same-sex 
couples to the surrounding norms as something that profoundly changes their 
role in society. To use Lee Edelman’s metaphor, the Child has become attached 
to the image of the happy homosexual couple, and ‒ at least in Edelman’s view ‒ 
homosexuals have ceased to be queer.24 But if not queer, what are they? I would 
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argue, based on empirical research, in agreement with Edelman, that the assimi-
lated homosexual citizen is no longer perceived as a threat to the nation, nor as 
a constructive agent of political change. 
The integrated homosexual couple in Scandinavia has become a symbol for 
the majority’s tolerance. When 80,000 Icelanders celebrate Reykjavík Pride ‒ in 
a nation with 320,000 inhabitants ‒ it is not only the manifestation of a crea-
tive subculture but also of a majority culture staging an impressive example of 
their own tolerance. The well-adjusted lesbian, gay, and transgendered citizens 
parade as symbols, whose main purpose is to be passive recipients of tolerance. 
There is a growing frustration among many queers that they are suffocated by 
understanding and acceptance. Some of the most interesting political agents are 
now to be found among the young, who do not (yet?) live in couples or raise 
children.25 
But that is only part of the picture. For Scandinavian rainbow families, those 
with children to raise and a responsibility reaching beyond their own lives and 
generational concerns, are not only folded into life, but into the networks of 
the welfare state. Everyday in maternity wards, day-care centres, and in meet-
ings with teachers and youth leaders, they encounter the latent homophobia 
that thrives in all layers of society, and in a sense they are the vanguard of so-
cial change. A less flattering factor is the role that some openly gay and lesbian 
politicians play in politics. It is not to be expected that they adopt a progres-
sive, tolerant and humane attitude to other groups in distress. In 2008, self-de-
clared gay and bisexual men in the Swedish Government upheld its refusal to 
grant hospital care to paperless refugees, thereby representing, in Puar’s words, 
a homonationalist lobby that combines a xenophobic discourse with gay rights 
rhetoric. In the Netherlands, the xenophobia combined with pro-gay politics of 
the Pim Fortuyn List is a well-known and notorious example.26 In this book, I 
will map the development of the homosexual construct. I will examine how “ho-
mosexuals” have evolved from a childless minority on the margins of society to 
represent a reproductive segment of the majority culture, sometimes in compli-
ance with xenophobic and neo-conservative nationalist discourses, and some-
times as agents for social change on an everyday level. 
Method, material
Since 1989, the Danish model of partnership has spread to all Scandinavian ju-
risdictions except the Faroe Islands, and to many other countries, in Europe and 
elsewhere. From 2001, however, when the Netherlands opened up their mar-
riage law to same-sex couples, gender-neutral marriage laws have been intro-
duced in several countries and are being prepared in others. Were the laws on 
registered partnership thus only a parenthesis in history, a step toward full le-
gal recognition of same-sex couples on the same terms as different-sex couples?
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This way to frame the question would be to assume that modern queer his-
tory consists of a necessary chain of events that inevitably leads to full recogni-
tion of monogamous same-sex relations that in no way differ from the publicly 
endorsed procreative heterosexual family unit, a much too simplistic interpreta-
tion of history. It is an assumption narrowly centred on the experience of West-
ern culture, whereas in reality the struggles for recognition in a globalised world 
take on different and more complex forms. How is one to understand the cul-
tural clashes between Western gay-friendly liberalism and homophobic govern-
ments in many African countries? And the lack of it in others? A comparative 
study of gay rights in South Africa and Zimbabwe could perhaps shed light on 
some of the most pressing issues in present-day human-rights work.27 In order 
to understand the complexities of the development of gay, lesbian, and queer 
identities in a globalised world, it is necessary to acknowledge the simultaneous 
development of different understandings of same-sex desire. U.S. literary schol-
ar Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick wrote long ago that many sexualities coexist at any 
given time, and that the multifaceted experience of queer life seldom follows a 
set pattern. But historians necessarily study change and operate with a “before” 
and an “after,” and historians, as all researchers, need to generalise their results. 
Before the laws on registered partnership, Scandinavian non-heterosexuals lived 
under different conditions than after their enactment, regardless of whether the 
laws were the cause or result of discursive change.28 
How, then, is one to avoid historical determinism when describing a politi-
cal process of the kind described in this book? If by historical determinism we 
mean the idea that history evolves in a necessary, predetermined fashion toward 
higher and higher stages of perfection, then there are many reasons to avoid it. 
For one thing, it would be bad history, based on a post-factum interpretation of 
past events. Another reason is that such history conveys an image that we now 
live in the best of conceivable worlds and that our just rulers or democratic in-
stitutions have lifted our society from the tyranny and arbitrary power of past 
times. That kind of history has always legitimised power. However, the ambi-
tion to present an alternative history poses methodological problems. Describ-
ing a before and an after makes it hard to avoid the narrative being interpreted 
as a necessary chain of events. The genealogical method developed by Michel 
Foucault leaves us at a loss when we try to formulate an anti-determinist histo-
ry. My main objection to Foucault, as will be clearly demonstrated by this book, 
is that he leaves out historical agency in his analysis. He has masterfully point-
ed out the problems of determinist historical writing, and his analysis of power 
production in modern society is empirically demonstrated again and again. But 
as he does not leave room for historical change as a result of conscious action by 
collective or individual subjects, I find his methods hard to use in a historical ac-
count built on empirical evidence and aimed at explaining change.29
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The kind of historical determinism that downplays the importance of the 
historical actor must be rejected. It is not unimportant who is in power and 
what directions social movements take. Even if material conditions and discur-
sive boundaries limit the ways in which history can evolve, historical agents are 
crucial in understanding it. The main actors in this study are the gay and lesbi-
an activists and the politicians who listened to their demands. Gay and lesbian 
organisations and political parties appear as collective actors in a political arena 
consisting of legislative bodies and mass media. However, they seldom speak 
with one voice, so in order to understand the political process it is necessary to 
point out and analyse internal differences and cleavages within these groups.
The main sources of this study are interviews, official print, documents, and 
newspaper clippings from the archives of gay and lesbian movements in Den-
mark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. The interviews were partly tran-
scribed and the tapes and transcripts are in my possession. They were held in 
Scandinavian languages, except for some of the interviews in Finland and Ice-
land where English was used. The archives of the gay and lesbian movements in 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden have also provided important 
information, such as correspondence, policy documents, and minutes of board 
meetings and general assemblies. Together, these sources give insights into the 
ways gay and lesbian activists thought and discussed at the time, and the docu-
ments and the interviews together offer a comprehensive picture of the debate 
around gay marriage over the last four decades. The gay and lesbian archives in 
each country also contain collections of newspaper clippings. The most com-
plete collections are in Finland, Iceland, and Sweden. A methodical examina-
tion of these long series of clippings has presented a picture of the general de-
bate in Scandinavia during the same time.30 Finally, the official publications of 
the parliaments in all Scandinavian countries have provided information about 
the political process leading up to the partnership laws. 
The interviewees have been selected among key persons within the lesbian 
and gay movements in all Scandinavian countries and their political allies on a 
parliamentary level. I have chosen not to interview conservative opponents to 
the laws on registered partnership, since the focus of the study lies in the debate 
within the gay movements and their interaction with the political establish-
ment. Thus, I have focused on those lesbian and gay activists who were engaged 
in the debate on gay marriage and those politicians who actively worked for a 
law on registered partnership. In order to understand how these laws could be 
adopted so quickly in Scandinavia it is important to study the processes that led 
to more or less unanimous demands from the lesbian and gay movements. For 
this reason, I have interviewed both those lesbian and gay activists who were 
for the law and those who were against it. On the other hand, the politicians 
who worked for the laws can probably provide the best information about the 
process which led to the acceptance of the idea of registered partnership within 
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their respective parties. Interviews with the opponents to the idea of registered 
partnership or gay marriage within the political establishment would provide 
information about the strategies and turnabouts in a dwindling political resist-
ance against these reforms, but for this study I have concentrated on the agents 
of change.
The different types of written material and the interviews supplement each 
other, thus rendering a more complete image of the political process. Interviews 
in a historical study of this type carry with them problems concerning the accu-
racy of memory and the interference of layers of other memories deposited over 
the once fresh and direct experience. Many of the written sources are historical 
remains, i.e. documents generated as an immediate result of an act or a proc-
ess, but others, like the newspaper clippings, are mediated narratives about past 
events. I have carefully evaluated each source and cross-checked interviews with 
remaining documents or contemporary newspaper reports. There is no way of 
reaching a true and complete description of events past, but by a careful analysis 
of different types of sources we can arrive at a plausible version of the lived ex-
perience of the historical actors. 
One important insight from feminist methodology is the importance of the 
researcher’s own subject position. U.S. philosopher Donna Haraway has stressed 
that all knowledge production is a political act and that if the researcher con-
ceals her or his subject position, the reader is deprived of the possibility of eval-
uating the work critically. Though I sympathise with Haraway’s analysis and 
agree with large parts of it, I find it difficult to combine a full-fledged stand-
point theory with queer theory’s project of destabilising identity politics.31 How-
ever, I do agree that the researcher’s position is important. The conclusions of 
this study would be different if they had been reached from a conservative angle 
or from a feminist anti-gay-marriage position. I myself believe that the reform 
of registered partnership furthered a process of increased human rights that has 
strengthened democracy and participation in society for more people. But since 
I also see things from a queer activist position I am aware of many complica-
tions that the process of assimilation has brought with it to the world’s LGBTQ 
communities. The question of what has been lost with increased openness and 
acceptance is important for understanding contemporary society. “Greater sex-
ual freedom has brought immense gains but it has its costs,” says Jeffrey Weeks 
in a 2007 book.32 These costs will be discussed in the final chapter.
Previous research
The first historical accounts of the making of the Scandinavian partnership laws 
were written by activists who had worked hard for them, and they are accord-
ingly inspired by feelings of triumph. When gay activists Bent Hansen and 
Henning Jørgensen wrote about the new Danish law in the 1993 ILGA Pink 
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Book, they emphasised the lobbying efforts of the Danish National Union for 
Gays and Lesbians (LBL). Downplaying the internal differences within their 
organisation, they claimed that the discussions for and against the law within 
the gay and lesbian community were held by a minority, whereas “most gays 
were interested merely in obtaining recognition from society and in having their 
practical, legal, and economic problems solved.”33 By describing the feminist and 
radical opponents to the law as a small and isolated group opposed to a practical 
solution of ordinary people’s problems, they conveyed an impression of internal 
unity, and they avoided mentioning that no lesbian couples were registered dur-
ing the first day’s celebrations. The Norwegian lobbying effort is documented in 
an unpublished report from the joint Partnership Group of Norway’s two na-
tional gay and lesbian organisations. Their 37-page report gives more space to 
the opponents of the law and outlines the different arguments put forth within 
the movement. Among other things, it describes in detail how the Norwegian 
national gay and lesbian organisation’s 1973 decision not to support gay mar-
riage was gradually reinterpreted in order to make it possible for the organisa-
tion to work for registered partnership modelled after the Danish law. It does 
not, however, comment on the personal animosity that some of the debates gen-
erated, and it avoids going into great detail when it comes to the discussion of 
principles within the movement. The chair of the working party, Kjell Erik Øie, 
wrote a chapter in a Festschrift to the former chair of the Norwegian gay and 
lesbian movement, Karen-Christine “Kim” Friele. She was once against the law, 
but understandably Øie does not dwell on the personal conflicts between him-
self as a lobbyist for the law and Friele as an opponent.34 Swedish jurist Hans 
Ytterberg’s account of the history of the Swedish law is also written from a ba-
sically positive perspective, and concentrates on legal issues. From the view-
point of a Member of Parliament, the dramatic history of the Swedish partner-
ship law was described by Liberal MP Barbro Westerholm in an article written 
six years after its adoption, for the fiftieth anniversary of the Swedish gay and 
lesbian organisation. Westerholm was chair of the Government’s Partnership 
Commission and in her article she exposes the foul play that many of the new 
law’s political opponents engaged in to block it. Written from the perspective 
of a gay-friendly liberal politician, Westerholm’s article naturally does not ad-
dress internal differences within the gay and lesbian movement, but it gives in-
teresting insights into the dynamics in her own party and in the corridors of the 
Riksdag. In a similar manner, Kristin Halvorsen, who later became leader of the 
Norwegian Socialist Left Party (Sosialistisk Venstreparti) and Norwegian Minis-
ter of Finance, dedicated a chapter in her autobiography to the law on registered 
partnership. She was one of the young MPs from different parties who in 1990 
signed the first private members’ bill to the Storting demanding a law similar to 
the one already in force in Denmark. In her book she reveals how the fact that 
her brother is gay has been an important factor inspiring her to give priority to 
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the question of gay marriage, and she describes how she and the other signers 
of the bill had to struggle with older and moral conservative forces within their 
respective parties.35
Apart from the memory books and accounts from centrally placed persons 
there soon appeared a number of publications addressing the question why the 
laws on registered partnership were adopted, and why it happened first in Den-
mark/Scandinavia. Norwegian political scientist Ingvill Størksen analysed how 
the attitudes expressed in public debate in Denmark and Norway had changed 
in both countries. Størksen concluded that the concept of homosexuality was 
radically redefined in public discourse from the 1970s on. The political will to 
control homosexuality first declined when sodomy was decriminalised and then 
it increased again with a new emphasis on social engineering within the frame-
work of the welfare state. Without the redefinition of homosexuality, pro-gay 
legislation would not have been possible, she claimed.36
Danish sociologist Henning Bech and historian Wilhelm von Rosen both 
described the Danish law as an effect of a development in which “homosexu-
als” would soon disappear as a category. When Bech enumerated the arguments 
for and against the partnership law in Danish public debate 1987–90, he noted 
that both proponents and opponents of the law evoked Denmark’s international 
reputation. Those who were against the law were afraid that Denmark would be 
shamed internationally and those in favour of it wanted Denmark to be a bea-
con for gay and lesbian rights. The law on registered partnership became pos-
sible, even necessary, in a society where the homo/hetero dichotomy was losing 
its meaning. Even though Bech noted that “lesbians generally may have been 
more reserved towards the legislation than were the gay men,” he did not linger 
on the gender differences in the debate.37 
Danish historian Birgitte Søland also discussed the reasons the law on reg-
istered partnership was introduced first in Denmark. She pointed out the prag-
matism of the arguments from the gay and lesbian movement and the lack of 
substantial arguments from the traditionalist opponents to the law. The argu-
ments in favour of the law emphasised that it was a practical way of solving le-
gal and administrative problems for same-sex couples and they were not neces-
sarily founded on principles of equality and justice. She referred to Bech’s and 
Rosen’s discussions about the disappearance of homosexuals, but unlike them 
she saw the partnership law as a “double-edged sword.” While it is true that the 
law has enhanced the civil rights of lesbians and gays, she wrote, “the political 
construction of homosexuals as fundamentally like heterosexuals and the insist-
ence on conformity and normative gender behavior among homosexuals might 
well prove the ultimate obstacles to liberation for all gay men and lesbians.”38 
According to Danish historian Karin Lützen, the law was possible because 
the status of marriage had been devalued during decades. At the same time, she 
warned against the effects of too much assimilation to society. The original-
27Introduction
ity and innovative lifestyle of lesbians and gay men risked being compromised, 
she wrote.39 Norwegian Sociologist Rune Halvorsen shared this view. The law 
strengthened the heteronormative order, he claimed, since it was specially aimed 
at homosexuals and inscribed homosexuals as the necessary other. (To be sure, 
the Norwegian variety of the law stated that “two homosexual persons of the 
same sex” may register their partnership, thus explicitly forging a homosexual 
identity.) He also pointed out that the low number of couples who had actu-
ally registered as partners in Norway (in 1998) proved that the law was imposed 
from above by an elite of educated middle-class lesbians and gays and their al-
lies. Halvorsen was the only one in the early debate who applied a class perspec-
tive, but otherwise he shared some of the thoughts of the other analysts, like 
the idea that lesbians and gays risked losing their distinctive culture by becom-
ing assimilated in society; that registered partnership was possible to achieve 
only when marriage was devalued; and that the symbolic value of the law was 
more significant than its practical value, in spite of the pragmatic line of argu-
ment from its proponents.40 Norwegian anthropologist Turid Markussen has 
commented on Halvorsen’s discussion and agreed with his criticism of it as fun-
damentally ambivalent. It both excludes and includes homosexuals by defining 
homosexuals as a marginal group and then reaching out for them in a gesture of 
tolerance and solidarity. However, Markussen gives the law credit for also desta-
bilising given norms. “The otherness that the law regulates is at the same time 
made visible, and it may just as well lead to a questioning of heterosexuality as 
a normalising force.”41 
Most male scholars commented on the scarcity of resistance to the law from 
within the gay and lesbian movement, a fact that Rune Halvorsen explained by 
“a kind of self-imposed censorship, and as pronounced realism regarding what 
can be thought, said, told, and done.”42 Henning Bech noted that there was a 
fear homosexuals would be assimilated in society at the expense of their differ-
ence and otherness, but he concluded that “such ‘radical’ views were . . . rare in 
the total amount of public debate, and were mainly put forward by a few les-
bians and gay men.” To explain why there was no resistance against the law 
within the movement, he assumed that “the majority of both gays and lesbians 
simply considered it an extension of their possibilities of choice and social ac-
ceptance.”43 Both Søland and Lützen, on the other hand, commented on the 
absence of lesbian support for the law, and Søland concluded that many lesbi-
ans were put off by a law that did not allow access to adoption or assisted re-
productive technology to same-sex couples. Lützen saw it as an effect of “the 
good girls’” victory over “the bad girls” in the movement and connected it to 
the feminist debate within the U.S. lesbian movement that peaked during the 
1980s. She deplored the good girls’ victory and wrote that she couldn’t help feel-
ing that she was “a member of a lesbian housewives’ league.”44 In a recent study, 
Swedish Gender Studies scholar Anna Adeniji has examined marriage resist-
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ance among women in Sweden. Based on focus-group interviews with women 
who have declared that they do not want to marry, it is constructed as a synop-
sis for a sit-com with five fictional characters representing views ranging from 
liberal feminist to radical feminist. They all have different reasons to resist mar-
riage, and, in the end, discuss the consequences of gender-neutral marriage leg-
islation. In this study of post-modern Swedish feminist women, the resistance 
to same-sex marriage is mainly focused on a critique of the patriarchal foun-
dations of marriage and on the privilege it gives to individuals in two-person 
partner relationships.45 In an unpublished Ph.D. thesis, sociologist Anna Ein-
arsdóttir has mapped the experiences of registered partnership among non-het-
erosexual women in Iceland. Based on interviews, documents, and statistics, she 
traces the historical development that led to the adoption of the law, and evalu-
ates its effects on the non-heterosexual community. She concludes that the law 
has had positive effects on the whole, but that the picture is more complicated 
on the personal level. In spite of positive effects, such as an easier acceptance 
of their family of origin, the official status of their relationship can expose their 
sexuality to the public in an unwanted way. Her findings challenge the notion 
that tradition has a fading importance. Instead, she claims, “same-sex marriage 
both heightens the importance of tradition within non-heterosexual relation-
ship cultures, while also challenging the heterosexual underpinnings of the in-
stitution of marriage.”46
Why did it happened in Denmark first? Henning Bech has evoked the Dan-
ish concept of frisind or “freemindedness,” which he described thus: “In its ide-
alized form, it does not simply denote permissiveness, but enlightened toler-
ance in matters of personal belief and moral conduct, combined with a social 
commitment to establish the conditions for individuals to think and live as 
they prefer.”47 The concept of frisind, inspired by nineteenth-century Christian 
philosopher N.F.S. Grundtvig, shapes much of Denmark’s national self-image, 
but this explanation nevertheless seems a bit far-fetched. In reality, the frisind 
is something that distinguishes Denmark from the other Scandinavian coun-
tries, and since the laws on registered partnership were adopted more or less si-
multaneously all over Scandinavia, it would be wiser to look for explanations in 
what unites the different Nordic countries rather than what separates them. The 
common denominator most obviously suited to explain the political develop-
ment leading to the laws on registered partnership is the structure of the Scan-
dinavian welfare states. With their secular foundation and strong emphasis on 
equality and fairness, they are an ideal ground for the kind of social politics that 
nowadays results in recognition politics aimed at integrating ‒ and assimilating 
‒ various kinds of minorities in society.48 
On the other side of the Atlantic, tensions within the North American gay 
and lesbian movement rose from the end of the 1980s, when conservative ac-
tivists began building the “conservative case” for same-sex marriage. Gay rights 
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lobbyist Andrew Sullivan expressed his conviction that same-sex marriage “har-
nesses” the homosexual minority, and “enlists them in the conservative struc-
tures that liberationists find so inimical.”49 By appealing to conservative values 
like family, monogamy, and children, Sullivan and others provoked a response 
from conservative forces in the United States that had an unexpected impact 
in the general debate about same-sex marriage. Social anthropologist Stanley 
Kurtz seized the opportunity to discuss gay marriage in a conservative context. 
He wrote a number of articles which claimed that the institution of marriage 
was deteriorating in Scandinavia, mainly because of sexual permissiveness and 
the encouragement of non-heterosexual lifestyles. Several scholars have coun-
tered his arguments, accusing him of using available data wrongly and of find-
ing causal links where there were none. The debate soon developed into a bat-
tle of how to interpret Scandinavian marriage statistics. Kurtz’s critics claimed 
that there were no causal links between registered partnership and a decline in 
the number of marriages and an increase in the number of divorces. Moreover, 
they accused Kurtz of misinterpreting data and failing to see that Scandinavian 
marriage statistics in reality show a steady increase in the number of new mar-
riages.50 Kurtz’s arguments were nevertheless picked up by the conservatives in 
the United States and played an important role in the debates about the “de-
fence of marriage” legislation. His articles were widely publicised, and in 2004 
his principal articles were read into the U.S. Congressional Record. Referring 
to Kurtz’s work, a senator claimed that “marriage in Scandinavia and in Hol-
land is dying since the advent of same-sex marriage over the last decade in these 
countries.”51The Scandinavian and Dutch experiences thus had some relevance 
to the U.S. debate on gay marriage, and they have been used as an argument 
both for and against gay marriage in the United States. 
Another type of argument was put forth by progressives within the gay and 
lesbian movement and its academic allies. Already in 1999, Michael Warner 
contested the conservative case for gay rights presented by gay columnists like 
Andrew Sullivan and Michael Signorile, and in his influential book The trou-
ble with normal, Warner warned against conformist politics. Inspired by Erving 
Goffman, he suggested that gays and lesbians embrace their stigma and cel-
ebrate their distinctiveness instead of anxiously seeking recognition from the 
majority.52 Lisa Duggan, professor of American Studies at New York University, 
has also criticised the gay and lesbian movement for putting too much empha-
sis on gay marriage. For almost a decade, she has criticised the lesbian and gay 
movement for buying into a neoliberal economic agenda, and in subsequent ar-
ticles she has discussed homonormativity as a concept for the increasing main-
streaming of lesbian and gay activism and for its complicity in a potentially 
oppressive world order. Not only has the question of gay marriage provoked a 
backlash, which has had detrimental effects on gay and lesbian rights, she wrote, 
but it has also implied a politics that upheld unfair discrimination against single 
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persons and failed to acknowledge the changing patterns of U.S. family life. “If 
pursued this way, the drive for gay-marriage equality can undermine rather than 
support the broader movement for social justice and democratic diversity.” In-
stead, she advocated recognition of various domestic arrangements and seemed 
to lean toward a European model of partial legal recognition in the form of civil 
unions or domestic partnerships. “By treating marriage as one form of house-
hold recognition among others, progressives can generate a broad vision of so-
cial justice that resonates on many fronts,” Duggan wrote together with U.S. 
journalist Richard Kim in 2005, and outlined a strategy that would connect the 
question of gay marriage to the question of social reform.53 According to U.S. 
historian Paul Robinson, the “queer wars” in the United States are a result of 
the establishment of a gay conservative lobby, which in turn is the result of gay 
and lesbian culture’s integration in society. When any manifestation of same-sex 
love was unanimously condemned by society, a conservative pro-gay stand was 
inconceivable, he argues, but when gays and lesbians become more and more 
accepted, it is possible to combine a homosexual lifestyle with opinions to the 
right. And, together with gays in the army, the question of gay marriage has be-
come a shibboleth of new gay conservatism.54 
George Chauncey’s Why marriage? is a history of gay marriage in the United 
States. Chauncey puts the debate in a U.S. historical context and draws paral-
lels to the civil rights movement and to the ban of interracial marriages. In his 
analysis, he shows how the idea of gay marriage is not alien to U.S. history but 
follows as a logical step on the striving for equality between different groups in 
the multi-cultural and multi-racial U.S. society.55 The polarised debate on gay 
marriage within the U.S. gay and lesbian movement is probably an effect of 
gay marriage’s being so strongly contested by the traditional right in the Unit-
ed States. If we compare it with the situation prior to 1989 in Scandinavia, the 
arguments and the political positions are remarkably similar, with an anti-gay 
marriage grouping consisting of lesbian feminists and politically radical gays 
propped up against a moderate or conservative group of gay men. 
In their book For better or worse, U.S. legal experts William Eskridge and 
Darren Spedale have the explicit aim of describing the Scandinavian experience 
of registered partnership laws in order to demonstrate to a U.S. audience that 
the regulation of same-sex relationships does not lead to any harmful effects for 
society. Based on a great number of interviews, newspaper clippings, and ar-
chival material, their book offers to date the most comprehensive discussion of 
Scandinavian laws on registered partnership. Step by step, Eskridge and Spedale 
trace the history of the laws, demonstrate their beneficial effects for the indi-
vidual couples and for society at large, and describe the changing nature of the 
debate and the legal contents of the laws since they were first adopted. In a final 
chapter they outline the lessons to be drawn from the Scandinavian experience 
for the U.S. debate on gay marriage.56 What they don’t do, however, and which I 
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want to do, is to discuss more in detail the political and historical contexts that 
have made the laws possible in Scandinavia and the effects they have had on 
Scandinavian society. Eskridge and Spedale’s book is a contribution to a North 
American discussion of gay marriage, thus the historical and geographical con-
texts are limited. Inspired by Kees Waaldijk’s theory of small change, which will 
be presented below, they describe the historical development as following a set 
path, thus leaving aside the political dynamic that has resulted in the Scandina-
vian laws on registered partnership. Also, its clear-cut tendency omits the pos-
sible alternatives to registered partnership or gay marriage that were an impor-
tant part of the debate in Scandinavian gay and lesbian circles. They contend 
that “as gays and lesbians have been integrated into the mainstream, average 
citizens have become aware that gay people are just as variegated a group as any 
other, and most gay people are rather normal in most respects.”57 Without fur-
ther questioning the concept of “normal,” they do not discuss the normative and 
normalising dynamics in society and the possible role of partnership laws in the 
strengthening of heteronormativity. 
Within legal studies, Israeli jurist Yuval Merin’s 2002 comparison of U.S. 
and European legal initiatives to recognise and regulate same-sex relationships 
is one of the best sources for understanding the structures and legal effects of 
the laws on registered partnership. It lacks a historical perspective, but it offers 
the best comprehensive study of various legal constructions of the regulation of 
same-sex couples.58 U.S. theologian Mark D. Jordan questions the will of gay 
couples to marry, as well as the conservative resistance to their demands. “The 
traditional Christian wedding” is not traditional at all, he claims, but only ac-
cidentally Christian. Jordan shows that what are most often interpreted as be-
longing to a Christian tradition were just secular traditions appropriated by the 
Church, and that the confusion of what marriage actually is inevitably makes it 
difficult to argue about it in other than emotional terms.59 
U.S. economist M. V. Lee Badgett has conducted various research projects 
on the economy of lesbians and gay men, in which she has challenged myths of 
gay affluence and shown how discrimination in the work market has effects on 
the economic situation of queer people. In her recent book, When gays marry, 
she makes a broad survey of the consequences of the partnership laws in Eu-
rope and possible outcomes of such reforms in the United States. By means of 
interviews, mainly conducted in the Netherlands, as well as statistical data, she 
investigates the impact of these laws on the heterosexual majority culture and 
on the lesbian and gay community. Her conclusion is that even if “the right to 
marriage comes at a cost,” the overall result of registered partnership laws has 
been beneficial to lesbians and gays, and indeed to the whole of society.60 In 
that process, heterosexual marriage does not seem to become less popular in any 
way. In the heated U.S. debate, her aim is to find common grounds for a dis-
cussion of the potential benefits and dangers of gay marriage reform. Moreover, 
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she presents a large-scale comparison between a number of countries divided in 
a first and second wave of recognition of same-sex unions, and one group that 
does not recognise such unions, and concludes that three factors seem impor-
tant for a country’s willingness to introduce laws on registered partnership or 
gay marriage. A high proportion of cohabiting heterosexual couples, a low per-
centage of evangelical adherents and a high overall tolerance of homosexuality 
are factors that facilitate gay marriage reform. That way, Badgett can also pre-
dict which jurisdictions are probably next in line to introduce legal recognition 
of same-sex couples. The weakness of such a large-scale comparison is obviously 
that some of the factors found seem rather obvious, but it nevertheless gives a 
good overview of the development in a large number of countries. It also links 
the European and U.S. development together in a way few other studies have 
done. In my book, I intend to present a more in-depth analysis of the develop-
ment in just a few countries, but my results are on the whole in harmony with 
Badgett’s.61
The most impressive collective contribution to legal research about same-
sex partnerships was the result of an international conference of legal experts 
in London in 1999. Legal recognition of same-sex partnerships is a collection of 
forty-two articles analysing, discussing, and presenting proposals and existing 
laws regulating same-sex relationships in twenty-three countries on all conti-
nents. The first section discusses theoretical questions and philosophical and le-
gal foundations for the regulation of same-sex relationships, and the following 
sections treat national, European, and international law. In the foreword, Rob-
ert Wintemute declares that the book offers no space for traditionalist argu-
ments against this kind of legislation, since the traditional view, “largely derived 
from the doctrines of dominant religions . . . has powerful exponents who have 
no trouble making their voices heard.” On the other hand, the book offers some 
discussion of diverging views coming from the gay and lesbian community, but 
since most of the articles are written by jurists who have argued for legal recog-
nition of same-sex relations, it is safe to say that the feminist and radical criti-
cism of gay marriage is underrepresented. Some scholars who contribute to it, 
like Davina Cooper and Janet Halley, express their understanding of the femi-
nist critique but conclude, nevertheless, that gay marriage is fully compatible 
with a feminist view.62
In a theoretical essay, Kees Waaldijk has formulated the “law of standard se-
quences,” meaning that in general each jurisdiction proceeds with a gradually 
increased recognition of homosexuals in society, beginning with the decriminal-
isation of homosexual acts, usually accompanied by a higher age of consent for 
homosexual than for heterosexual sexual acts. The following steps are, according 
to Waaldijk, 1) to equalise the ages of consent, 2) to enact various kinds of leg-
islation prohibiting discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, and 3) to 
introduce laws recognising same-sex relationships and parenting. Furthermore, 
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Waaldijk proposes a “law of small change,” which he formulates thus: “Any leg-
islative change advancing the recognition and acceptance of homosexuality will 
only be enacted if that change is either perceived as small, or if that change is 
sufficiently reduced in impact by some accompanying legislative ‘small change’ 
that reinforces the condemnation of homosexuality.”63 
Seemingly unequivocal empirical evidence sustains Waaldijk’s first law, at least 
regarding the countries in Northern Europe. Homosexuality was decriminalised 
in all Scandinavian jurisdictions between 1933 (Denmark) and 1972 (Norway). 
The higher age of consent for homosexual relations was abolished between 1972 
(Norway) and 1999 (Finland), and anti-discrimination laws have been enacted 
between 1981 (Norway) and 2006 (Faroes).64 The “law of small change” holds 
true for Scandinavia and most of Europe, and the introduction of the laws on 
registered partnership is a history of negotiating various limitations of their 
scope and a gradual narrowing of the gap between registered partnership and 
“real marriage.” However, it does not fit in to the development in many countries, 
like the United States and some others, where backlash is mixed with sudden 
improvements in legal conditions for lesbians and gays. The assumption that 
the development follows set patterns and evolves due to historical necessity is 
a rather simplified interpretation of seemingly interconnected facts. Waaldijk’s 
laws are valid in Europe, not as determinants of a path that history must follow, 
but as reasonable historical generalisations.
However, Waaldijk’s observations highlight the difference between the Eu-
ropean experience and that of the United States. The “step-by-step” tactics that 
European lobbyists for gay marriage have chosen have been successful, whereas 
the “all-or-nothing” policy that large parts of the U.S. gay and lesbian move-
ment adopted has been counter-productive, at least at this moment in history. 
Rather than formulating a “law of small change,” one would be better advised 
to talk about recent developments in terms of “path dependency.” Welfare state 
research confirms that choices in the past have a determining effect on possible 
outcomes of social politics. Thus the road chosen by the Danish gay and lesbi-
an movement has probably had a decisive influence not only on Danish poli-
tics, but also on those of neighbouring Scandinavian countries, and probably on 
Dutch, German, and French politics as well.65 
In Europe, the crucial difference between a northern, corporatist, way and 
a southern, universalist, way of dealing with registered partnership, stems from 
traditions of particularism and universalism. In Scandinavia, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom, the laws on registered partnership and civil unions were spe-
cial laws, created for a minority of same-sex couples only. In contrast, when the 
Netherlands and France introduced the law on registered partnership and the 
Pacte de solidarité civile (Pacs), respectively, they opted for laws that were open 
to both different-sex and same-sex couples. Since the Netherlands opened civ-
il marriage for same-sex couples in 2001, Dutch legislation applies universalist 
34 Odd Couples
principles to both kinds of legal regulation of the couple. Both the marriage law 
and the law on registered partnership are open to same-sex as well as to differ-
ent-sex couples. In France, however, the universalist principle only applies to 
the Pacs. Civil marriage is closed to same-sex couples, and is thus a particularist 
law, designed only for one type of couple, the heterosexual. Sociologist Laurent 
Chambon has discussed this and a number of other problems with the idea of 
universalism in France, which he describes as a universalist particularism that 
submerges alternative lifestyles in the majority. He is especially concerned with 
the fact that so few French politicians have come out as lesbians or gays, and he 
attributes that fact to the pressure from the majority and the absence of visible 
institutions for the lesbian and gay minority.66 French jurists Daniel Borrillo 
and Pierre Lascoumes have shown how the French Left have had problems to 
come to terms with the idea of a law for same-sex couples. As it was finally con-
ceived, the homosexual remained inferior to the heterosexual. Also on a practi-
cal level, the universalist principle, as it was applied to the Pacs, in reality had 
the effect of rendering invisible the lesbian and gay minority. For years, it was 
impossible to obtain data from French Statistics on the number of same-sex 
couples who registered and compare it to corresponding data for different-sex 
couples, something which provoked irritation among demographers.67 The Pacs 
has been further discussed by sociologist Eric Fassin in a collection of essays 
dedicated to l ’inversion de la question homosexuelle. In this collection, he offers a 
somewhat brighter picture, calling attention to how the “homosexual question” 
has indeed become a majority issue, as it successfully puts homophobia and het-
eronormativity under scrutiny. The French republican institution of Pacs, he 
claims, which has been opened to (childless) gay couples, is one of the best ex-
amples of how society’s institutions are forced to question its own normativity.68 
German research on registered partnership (eingetragene Lebenspartnershaft) 
has been extensive, but with few exceptions it consists of legal studies, and the 
historical perspective has been largely absent. However, Roland Schimmel and 
Stefanie Heun’s contribution to Wintemute and Andenæs’ anthology on legal 
recognition of same-sex partnerships in Germany, also contains an update on 
the work for legal reform until 2000.69 And in 2001 five authors from as diverse 
fields as sexology, theology, sociology, and law published a study which provid-
ed a comprehensive scholarly discussion about same-sex relationships in a Ger-
man context. In this volume, sociologist Rosemarie Nave-Herz presented the 
historical roots of marriage and the legal regulation of cohabitation, but she did 
not discuss the political process behind the decision. Mareike Dittberner’s 2004 
study of registered partnership and children’s rights provides a rich legal discus-
sion of different aspects of registered partnerships in Germany, but also fails to 
give the full historical perspective. The legal-historical perspective is perhaps 
best covered by Kirsten Gerhard, whose comprehensive study of the German 
partnership law also provides an analysis of its legal history.70 Die Homo-Ehe 
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from 2001, written by journalist and gay activist Stefan Mielchen, summaris-
es the historical development toward registered partnership, and also provides 
a rich documentation in the form of law texts and speeches in Parliament. His 
historical account, from the failed but highly publicised litigation campaign of 
1992, via the local Hamburg partnership provisions, to the final decisions in the 
Bundestag is to date the best historical account of a dramatic moment in the his-
tory of lesbian and gay rights in Germany.71
The overall European development has been studied by sociologists Maks 
Banens and Rommel Mendès-Leite. In a 2008 report to the French Minis-
tries of Employment and Health, they investigated similarities and differences 
between various European laws and also offered a historical background. The 
similarities lie in the kinds of restrictions imposed, compared to marriage laws, 
and that these restrictions are in the process of gradually being lifted. The dis-
similarities lie above all in the frequency of partnership registrations per capita 
in each country, with Sweden at the bottom of the list and the Netherlands and 
U.K. at the top. Banens and Mendès-Leite do not apply a gender analysis to 
their data, which in my view gets in the way of a thorough analysis of the part-
nership dynamics.72
At a conference in Stockholm in 2003, Henning Bech warned against some 
of the effects of the partnership laws. An army of “greedy sociologists” stands 
ready, he said, to present research on the new category: officially registered gay 
and lesbian couples. He urged the scholars in the audience to stay away from 
these couples, to leave them in peace, and instead write new stories of love and 
jouissance.73 But it seems that his words were in vain. There is indeed a growing 
body of research on registered gay and lesbian couples from a sociological and 
demographical point of view. Gunnar Andersson and Turid Noack have studied 
demographical patterns of partnership registrations and dissolutions in Norway 
and Sweden, and established that same-sex couples have a much higher divorce 
rate than different-sex couples, and ‒ which seems to go against common belief 
‒ that lesbians divorce twice as often as gay men. On the other side of the 
Atlantic, Esther Rothblum, Kimberley Balsam, and Sondra Solomon have 
studied same-sex couples in Vermont, Massachusetts, and California and found 
that the gender differences include that the men are older and have waited 
longer to legalise their relationship, and the women more often have children 
from previous different-sex relationships. Demographic studies use available 
data to provide profiles of the lesbian and gay population. In a nationwide U.S. 
study from 2000, the authors show that the same-sex cohabiting population 
is highly concentrated in big cities, that the men have served in the army less 
frequently, but the women more frequently, than in the general population. 
Moreover, gay men earn less than other men, whereas lesbians earn more than 
other women. A California demographic study from 2008 suggests that 37–46 
percent of gay men and 51–62 percent of lesbians aged 18–59 are in cohabiting 
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partnerships. This is slightly less than the 62 percent of heterosexuals in the 
same age-span who live together. This kind of research can indeed be seen as 
part of the legitimising dynamics and, since it concentrates on family structures, 
it is in itself a sign of the paradigm shift that has resulted in same-sex couples 
and families being considered a part of life rather than associated with “sterility, 
barrenness, and death.”74 
The restructuring of the family was the topic of much research toward the 
end of the twentieth century. Apart from studies that explicitly have dealt with 
same-sex family constellations, like Kath Weston’s Families we choose (1991), 
many studies have analysed the changing patterns of intimacy on a broader 
scale. Anthony Giddens, Jeffrey Weeks, and others have theorised about the 
transformation of families and its effects on society. Most researchers of fam-
ily patterns agree that the establishment of socially recognised same-sex family 
constellations is one of the most important factors in contemporary society that 
contribute to the redefinition of the family concept. However, it is also gener-
ally accepted that the concept of family is in constant flux and that we are not 
witnessing a historical change of apocalyptic proportions, as some conservative 
commentators would have it. Rather, the ideal of a nuclear family could be seen 
as a historical parenthesis.75 The recognition of same-sex parents has generated 
sociological and psychological research since the 1970s, when a series of trials 
concerning lesbian mothers’ right to their children created a demand for knowl-
edge about the well-being of children with same-sex parents. In 2001, U.S. soci-
ologists Judith Stacey and Timothy Biblarz claimed that much of the research 
that was aimed at testing the suitability of gay parents would downplay the dif-
ference between them and different-sex parents, out of fear of strengthening 
the political argument against gay parenting. This sparked a debate about the 
research question itself, and British sociologist Stephen Hicks dismissed Stacey 
and Biblarz as reinforcing essentialist notions of homosexuality and heterosex-
uality. Instead, he emphasised the need for a more open-ended research about 
rainbow families. Partly as a response to such a demand, Swedish sociologist 
Karin Zetterqvist Nelson has presented a qualitative study comprising forty-
nine rainbow families in different constellations with one to four parents. Their 
common denominator was that the parents defined themselves as homosexuals 
and that they had chosen to live with their children. Their life stories proved to 
be very diverse, but the overall impression was that it had been easier than most 
of them had expected to obtain recognition for their unusual family constella-
tions.76 Irish-Swedish sociologist Róisin Ryan-Flood has studied discourses on 
fatherhood and anonymous versus known sperm donors in Ireland and Swe-
den and found that Swedish lesbian mothers to a much higher degree preferred 
the donor to be known and wanted different degrees of involvement of the bi-
ological fathers, whereas Irish lesbians generally preferred anonymous donors. 
It seems that discourses on gay parenting and assisted reproductive technology 
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vary between countries. For example, Danish law explicitly forbids the storing 
of identifying data on sperm donors, while Finland, Norway, and Sweden re-
quire the donors to be identifiable so that the child can contact its father after 
its eighteenth birthday.77
This study aims to supplement the rich discussion about partnership laws 
and the redefinition of the modern family by situating the creation of the laws 
in time and space, thereby providing a solid ground for conclusions about gen-
der, sexuality, and the recognition of the same-sex couple in contemporary soci-
ety. It is a study about political and discursive change in Scandinavia with bear-
ings on the international scene. For in the rapid globalisation process that has 
taken place since Denmark first introduced a law regulating same-sex relation-
ships, the experience of official recognition of non-heterosexual lifestyles has 
become a concern not only for Western society but also for all countries and 
legislatures.
Outline
Chapter One serves as a chronological overview for the period leading up to the 
introduction in each Scandinavian country of the law on registered partnership. 
In addition to that, the failure to introduce such a law in the Danish depend-
ency of the Faroe Islands will be presented, and a comparison will be made with 
Greenland, where the Danish law was introduced without much debate in 1996. 
Chapter Two will analyse the internal debate in the Scandinavian gay and les-
bian movements until the law was in place. It will demonstrate why the discus-
sion was sometimes heated and how there was an almost unanimous rejection 
of separate laws for homosexuals ‒ the very model that was subsequently intro-
duced. Lesbian feminist resistance to gay marriage will be presented, as well as 
the Danish Gay Liberation Front’s disdain for this kind of legislation. Chapter 
Three raises the question of why and when mainstream politicians began taking 
gay and lesbian demands seriously and also what significance the AIDS crisis 
had for gay and lesbian rights in general and gay marriage in particular. Chap-
ter Four will discuss the implementation of the partnership laws, as well as their 
immediate effects on Scandinavian society as a whole. Chapter Five presents 
a statistical overview of the number of registered partnerships in each coun-
try and discusses the ratio of male/female couples and the overall tendencies 
in each country. Chapter Six will discuss the development from partial to full 
marital rights, and it will trace the various changes of the registered partnership 
until it more and more has come to resemble “real” marriage, finally to be con-
verted into gender-neutral marriage laws in Norway and Sweden. A concluding 
chapter summarises the results. 
Since the chronological overview in the first chapter lays out the main fea-
tures of the process and the following chapters go deeper into the analysis of 
it, some repetitions are unavoidable. I have chosen this thematic plan in order 
to bring out and highlight the main questions of the book since I believe that a 
chronological arrangement would have obscured some of the results. 
Chapter One:  
The road to registered partnership
The laws on registered partnership were revolutionary in that it was the first 
time the state recognised individual same-sex couples as legitimate. That is not 
to say that they lacked legitimacy in a number of other respects before the laws 
were adopted. Long-term relationships between persons of the same sex were 
seen and acknowledged as part of social life long before that, and even dur-
ing periods of pronounced anti-homosexual campaigns, such couples could live 
and thrive among friends. In 1963, two lesbians who had a central position in 
Stockholm’s lesbian and gay subculture arranged a wedding ceremony. Vivi As-
troy, better known as Jerry, and her wife Märta hosted the popular Jerry’s Ladies 
Clubs (Jerrys damklubbar) in the 1960s and many lesbians have testified how im-
portant that was for them when they were young. When Jerry and Märta de-
cided to get married, they invited some fifty people to Druvan, an old and well-
known restaurant with large banquet halls. Sven, who was a guest, has described 
how everything was like a “real wedding.” Jerry wore a tailcoat and Märta a 
wedding gown. There were bridesmaids and an altar and candles. A gay man, 
who had some authority as a priest or a deacon, officiated. Sven remembered it 
as a very nice occasion, with speeches and gifts and dancing. “But I guess many 
frowned at it and thought that it was extravagant. It was rather daring for the 
time.” There were others who arranged weddings like that back then, Sven said, 
also men, but mostly on a smaller scale and among an intimate circle of friends. 
“They would promise eternal fidelity in front of us witnesses and exchange rings, 
and then we had dinner.”1 
Sven’s story shows that there were gay weddings well before the authorities 
began pondering whether to recognise them or not. In the circle of friends and 
in the midst of supportive networks, same-sex couples sought recognition from 
those who were important to them, and did not yet expect the state to grant 
them any rights. It also demonstrates how lesbian and gay networks had begun 
to interlock in the post-war period. Before the war, there were very little con-
tacts between lesbians and gay men in the Scandinavian subcultures.2
Recognition by friends and community is one fundamental aspect of mar-
riage (others being the recognition by God through a religious ceremony or by 
one’s family of origin if they come to the wedding) but the recognition by the 
state is also important. The Scandinavian states were not ready to acknowledge 
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the legitimacy of same-sex couples until the late twentieth century. This was 
preceded by a long process of redefining marriage, in which Scandinavian leg-
islators were more apt to change than in many other parts of the world. Brit-
ish legal historian David Bradley has characterised Scandinavian marriage law 
reform in the beginning of the twentieth century as different from other West 
European countries:
From a comparative perspective, the Scandinavian family laws enacted in the peri-
od 1909 to 1927 were progressive. In rejecting the concept of Christian marriage to 
the extent of recognising divorce for incompatibility and confirming sexual equal-
ity to the extent of providing women with rights to deferred community proper-
ty, the new laws in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark differed from those in force in 
most other West European countries in the early twentieth century.3
In all Scandinavian countries, important changes were made in marriage legis-
lation between 1915 and 1927, giving women more rights and a more equal stand-
ing in marriage.4 At this time, there was a high level of cooperation concerning 
family law between the Nordic countries, but it was mainly a question for ju-
rists. In the mid-1950s, however, family law became increasingly politicised, and 
the politicians did not want to leave it up to legal experts to decide. The Nordic 
Council recommended that its member countries investigate the prerequisites 
for a reform of the marriage laws, and in 1956–57 marriage-law commissions 
were appointed in all the Nordic countries.5
The task to reform an institution like marriage was formidable, and the com-
missioners trod cautiously as they tried to narrow the gap between the old laws 
and real life. But as the marriage-law commissions slowly proceeded with their 
work, the world around them began changing. A wave of protest rolled over the 
world in the 1960s, a world that, with TV and faster communications, was rap-
idly shrinking. The Vietnam War, the U.S. civil rights movement, democracy 
in universities, sexual liberation, rock music, and protests against formal dress 
codes ‒ all these became issues shared by young generations all over the world, 
including Scandinavia.6 
Though marriage was one of the key institutions of traditional society, the 
1960s saw many other forms of living together, including unmarried couples, 
groups, and openly gay and lesbian couples. This also influenced the ongoing 
process of marriage reform. When the Danish Ministry of Justice presented 
a law proposal on marriage and divorce in 1968, the Socialist People’s Party 
(Socialistisk Folkeparti, SF) presented a more radical alternative. Instead of the 
Government’s suggestions, which they deemed too conservative, they wanted 
an entirely new marriage law that would simplify divorce, establish eighteen 
years as the lowest age for marriage for both women and men, and abolish the 
institution of betrothal. According to party leader Poul Dam, there was a need 
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for radically new thinking in these matters, and their proposal was meant to 
open up debate. 
The leftist proposal contained even more radical suggestions, such as allow-
ing marriage between siblings and making it possible for steady relations to 
be “recognised by the authorities” if either one of the persons involved in it so 
wished. This possibility would also be open for same-sex couples. Finally, it sug-
gested a statute concerning “extended families” (storfamilier), the type of com-
munal living then becoming increasingly popular in Denmark. It would allow 
the members of such communes to have their group relation “registered by the 
authorities” and to get help to regulate their internal affairs if there was a con-
flict.7 
In Sweden, the Government’s Family Law Commission (Familjelagssakkun-
niga) presented its report in 1972, proposing that the obligatory marriage cer-
emony should be replaced by a simple act of registration. Divorce should be fa-
cilitated and a number of restrictions to marriage abolished, but there were no 
provisions for same-sex couples or alternative lifestyles in the proposal.8 The 
Swedish National Union for Sexual Equality, the RFSL (Riksföreningen för Sex-
uellt Likaberättigande), severely criticised the commission for that, and wrote 
letters to all political parties and all Government agencies involved in the leg-
islative process, complaining about the lack of initiatives to help and support 
same-sex couples.9 In Parliament, the Left Communist Party (Vänsterpartiet 
Kommunisterna, VPK) presented a counterproposal to that of the Family Law 
committee. It was more radical than that of its Danish sister party five years 
earlier in that it suggested that marriage as an institution be abolished and re-
placed by “registered cohabitation” (registrerad samlevnad). This simplified form 
for regulated bonding should be open also to “sexual deviants” ‒ a wording that 
the Standing Law Committee later criticized as too vague.10 When it came to 
extended families, the Swedish motion was more cautious, saying that it was 
too early to evaluate their significance and to legislate about them. The Swedish 
Parliament turned down VPK’s proposal but issued a statement that homosexu-
al cohabitation was a life form fully acceptable to society. Since then, this state-
ment issued by the Swedish Parliament was quoted by the RFSL in all possible 
situations where gay and lesbian rights were discussed.11 This proposal marked 
the beginning of VPK’s commitment to gay and lesbian rights, and especially 
that of its MP Jörn Svensson, who dedicated himself to gay and lesbian rights 
issues. Svensson was considered one of VPK’s most important ideological theo-
rists, and one who sharply criticised the new pragmatism of the party. For him, 
the question of gay and lesbian rights was fully compatible with a firm commit-
ment to its Marxist foundations.12
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Gay and lesbian rights in the 1970s
The Stonewall rebellion in 1969 was an important source of inspiration for the 
new generation of gay and lesbian activists in Scandinavia. News about the riots 
on Christopher Street in New York spread quickly through the gay media, and 
even if they were the result, rather than the cause, of an international radicalisa-
tion of the demands for sexual equality, they were quickly adopted as a symbol 
for gay rights.13 Already in 1970, the Danish organisation discussed whether to 
celebrate Christopher Street Day, but instead they chose to make their presence 
known at the May Day celebrations of the national trade unions’ movement. 
The next year, however, The Society of 1948 celebrated Christopher Street Day 
Men’s on June 25 by organising a party in Fælledparken park in Copenhagen, 
thereby marking their adherence to the international gay and lesbian movement 
rather than to the national left. It was on that occasion, in 1971, that the Dan-
ish Gay Men’s Liberation Front (Bøssernes Befrielses Front, or BBF) was created 
and has ever since functioned as a radical wing of the Danish gay movement. 
With its rather anarchistic ideology, however, it never aligned itself with the es-
tablished left-wing parties.14
The homophile movements in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden had stagnat-
ed by the end of the 1960s, and a new generation wanted to address the inequal-
ities in legislation and society. Inspired by new currents in the political debate, 
the highest priority of the new generation of activists was to fight the higher 
age of consent for same-sex relations in Denmark and Sweden, and the gen-
eral ban on sex between men in Norway, but there was insufficient support for 
the change in most Scandinavian parliaments.15 A proposal to lower the age of 
consent to fifteen in Sweden was rejected by the Riksdag in 1972. When it had 
been time to be voted on, the younger members of the RFSL had staged a hun-
ger strike ‒ a rather new kind of action in Sweden, clearly inspired by the civil 
rights movement in the United States. In Norway, the activists of The Norwe-
gian Society of 1948 (Det Norske Forbund av 1948, or DNF ’48) lobbied against 
the prohibition of male homosexuality but were cautious, fearing the new law 
might include a higher age of consent for both women and men. Following a 
campaign from DNF ’48, Norway decriminalised same-sex sexuality in 1972 and 
also set an equal age of consent for homosexual and heterosexual relations.16 In 
Denmark, the age of consent was made equal in 1976 and in Sweden in 1978. 
Similar reforms occurred in Iceland in 1992 and Finland in 1999.17
While the policy of the gay and lesbian movements in Denmark and Swe-
den was to demand marriage for homosexuals, the Norwegian movement chose 
another way. After the decriminalisation of male homosexuality in 1972, The 
Norwegian Society of 1948 had to decide on its future priorities, and in March 
1973 its chair Kim Friele sent out an invitation to the leaders of the gay and les-
bian movements in Scandinavia and the Netherlands to a discussion in Oslo. At 
the meeting, it turned out that the Swedes wanted some kind of gay marriage, 
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the Danes concentrated on practical issues in connection with housing, inher-
itance, pensions, and adoption, and the Norwegian and Dutch delegations said 
no to traditional marriage and yes to other forms of legal regulation of different-
sex, same-sex, and multi-partner relations.18
After the international conference, the annual meeting of the DNF ’48 de-
cided that it should reject the idea of homosexual marriages because it would 
grant privileges to couples at the expense of those who could not or did not 
want to live in steady relations, a decision that would determine the Norwegian 
movement’s policy on the matter for almost two decades. 
As a result of this anti-marriage policy, other questions dominated the move-
ment. In the 1970s the Norwegian movement split in two following fierce ide-
ological battles. The history of the lesbian and gay movements in Norway has 
been profoundly marked by this conflict, something which requires a somewhat 
detailed account of it. 
Politically, most of the Norwegian activists sympathised with either the So-
cialist Left Party (Sosialistisk Venstreparti) or with the Maoist Marxist-Leninist 
Workers’ Communist Party (Arbeidernes Kommunistparti [marxist-leninistene], 
AKP [m-l]). For gays and lesbians who sympathised with AKP it was a great 
disappointment when the draft of a “Declaration on homosexuality” (Fråsegn 
om homofili) from the party’s Central Committee became known in 1975. The 
The first Christopher Street Day celebrations in Co-
penhagen occurred in 1971. Source: PAN-bladet, Co-
penhagen, no. 4 (1971).
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declaration claimed that “homosexuality is essentially a sexual deviance with its 
roots in societal and social conditions,” and that “it is not the business of com-
munists to promote homosexuality or propagate that homosexuality is ‘desir-
able’.” Moreover, it supported wholeheartedly the anti-homosexual politics in 
China and Albania. It was a document meant for internal discussion, but it 
leaked out and caused sharp reactions from other leftist activists for lesbian and 
gay rights.19 For those lesbian and gay activists who were party members it was 
a dilemma since they were unable to criticise the party publicly. Some of them 
repudiated parts of the document, some chose not to comment on it outside the 
party discussions. The conflict between AKP and the national board of DNF 
’48 grew when two lesbians looking for an apartment were refused an advertise-
ment in AKP’s publication Klassekampen with the explanation that “we cannot, 
as Marxist-Leninists, based on Marxism-Leninism and centuries of experience, 
regard homosexuality as a desirable condition.”20 In October 1975 an issue of 
DNF ’48’s publication Fritt Fram was seized by the national board of DNF ’48 
and the whole editorial board was dismissed because the national board claimed 
that the issue contained “unsigned Marxist-Leninist material.”21 The methods 
were deemed by many as too harsh and undemocratic, since the DNF’48 leader-
ship refused to enter into any discussions with the dissenters.22 In May 1976 the 
opposition left the DNF ’48 in order to found a new organisation, the “Work-
ing Groups for Homosexual Liberation,” or AHF (Arbeidsgrupper for Homofil 
Frigjøring). The Marxist-Leninists, who for political reasons regarded the So-
cialist Left Party as their main “tactical enemy,” initially opposed the founding 
of the new organisation and most of them remained within the DNF ’48. Grad-
ually, however, Marxist-Leninists joined the AHF too ‒ often as “double mem-
bers,” keeping their membership in DNF ’48 ‒ with the aim to take over the or-
ganisation. Their method was to obstruct the meetings with endless ideological 
discussions and sophisticated Marxist-Leninist arguments. By early 1978, many 
AHF members who sympathised with the Socialist Left Party had tired of the 
polarised atmosphere and endless debates and they abandoned the AHF, which 
thus became completely dominated by Marxist-Leninsts. The Socialist Left 
Party sympathisers went on to found a new organisation, the “Group Lambda” 
(Gruppe Lambda), but most activists were now disillusioned after having lost in 
two bitter conflicts, and the new group remained insignificant.23
Meanwhile, opposition against the national board continued to grow with-
in the DNF ’48, especially in Bergen, where both AKP supporters and Social-
ist Left Party sympathisers had remained inside the national organisation, and 
only a few had joined the Oslo-based AHF. In November 1978, the DNF ’48 
leadership decided to exclude all “double members,” those who were also mem-
bers of the AHF. In Bergen most board members were excluded or suspended 
and the Bergen branch of DNF ’48 was put under direct administration from 
Oslo. During the following months, however, most Bergen activists left the 
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DNF ’48 and founded “The Gay Movement of Bergen,” or HBB (Homofil Bev-
egelse i Bergen). Similar situations occurred in Stavanger and Tromsø, where the 
local DNF ’48 branches were dissolved and replaced by independent organisa-
tions. In the autumn of 1979, these new groups, together with AHF and Group 
Lambda founded the FHO, The Joint Council for Homosexual Organisations 
in Norway (Fellesrådet for Homofile Organisasjoner i Norge). For the next dec-
ade, this loose network of local organisations and the DNF’48 both worked for 
roughly the same political goals, first in a situation of rivalry and competition, 
but as the political differences gradually lessened, the two national organisations 
began cooperating on many issues.24 
Neither of the two organisations worked for gay marriage or registered part-
nership. Instead, the main issue for both during this period was the work for a 
law against discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. Their efforts were 
successful, and in 1981 Norway became the first country in the world to include 
such a statute in its Criminal Code.25
In Finland, organised homosexuality came later than in Denmark, Sweden, 
and Norway. In this East Nordic country, both male and female homosexual-
ity were outlawed until 1971, and the law was enforced rigorously. In the 1960s, 
an average of fifty men and one woman were convicted each year for same-sex 
sexual acts between adults. When homosexuality was finally decriminalised, a 
higher age of consent was imposed, as well as a law prohibiting “encouragement 
of homosexuality.” Finnish society in the 1970s was thus very far from discussing 
gay marriage, and a number of articles in Finnish media highlighted the plight 
of gays and lesbians who moved to Sweden as “sexual refugees.”26 From the early 
1970s there were two major gay and lesbian organisations in Finland: the Dis-
cussion Club Psyche (Keskusteluseura Psyke / Diskussionsklubben Psyke, founded 
in 1968), which became more of a social club, and was spread all over the coun-
try, and Helsinki-based “Sexual Equality” (Seksuaalinen Tasavertaisuus / Sexuellt 
Likaberättigande, SETA, founded in 1974). SETA was a political group that was 
founded by radical members of the Psyche, when they saw that they remained a 
minority within the older organisation. The two organisations merged in 1988 as 
SETA took over Psyche’s local chapters. In the homophobic climate of Finland 
in the 1970s, the priority of SETA was to combat discrimination and prejudice. 
The Finnish lesbians became more radical in the 1980s and did not give prior-
ity to a partnership law, which was seen partly as something utopian (given the 
social climate in Finland) and partly as something undesirable, since it repro-
duced patriarchal structures.27
In Iceland, a gay and lesbian group was first founded in 1978, and, follow-
ing the Danish example, it was named after the year it was founded. During its 
first years of existence The Society of ’78 (Samtökin ’78) gave priority to social 
work in order to help its members survive in the homophobic climate. Oppres-
sion was felt in language itself, and the approved word “kynvillingar” for ho-
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mosexuals was seen as an insult by the lesbian and gay activists, since it means 
“sexual erratic” and has connotations to “trúvillingar,” heretics. In March 1978, 
the National Radio refused to let Samtökin ’78 publish an advertisement about 
a meeting, using the words “lesbíur” and “hommar,” which were their preferred 
words for “lesbians” and “gays.” This sparked a prolonged fight for their right to 
choose their own words to describe themselves. In April 1978 they wrote to the 
official Icelandic Language Commission (Íslensk málnefnd) and asked for better 
words for all things relating to homosexuality. They received a rather reserved 
reply, saying that the commission had discussed their request, but that it could 
not come up with any recommendations.28 With such attitudes, a small popu-
lation, and tight family ties, Iceland was known in gay circles in the 1980s to be 
the most homophobic of the Nordic countries, and many gay and lesbian Ice-
landers chose exile.29 
Gay and lesbian movements in Scandinavia have been compared to strong 
and well-structured trade unions, and it is true that they all work in a reform-
ist rather than a revolutionary tradition. Symptomatically, ideological shifts in 
the struggle for gay and lesbian rights, like the radicalisation after Stonewall, or 
the impact of queer activism, generally took place within the established move-
ments.30 The exception to that rule is a period of lesbian separatism in the 1980s, 
especially in Finland, Iceland, and Sweden. As so often, lesbian feminists were 
split between the women’s movements, which many times were insensitive to 
lesbian demands, and male-dominated gay movements. But the degree of influ-
ence that could be exerted by women in the national gay and lesbian associa-
tions varied greatly over time and also among the different Nordic countries.31
The main arguments put forth by many lesbian activists were founded on the 
criticism of marriage as the cornerstone of patriarchy. Since second-wave femi-
nists in the 1970s developed theories on the subordination of women in patriar-
chal society, the question of marriage was not just any political issue, but one of 
the core questions for the feminist struggle. Thus it is perhaps no wonder that 
tensions between women and men in the gay and lesbian movements grew in 
the 1970s, which were characterised by an ideological conflict between social-
ist and liberal forces and between male and female interests within the move-
ments. A new generation of radicalised gay men approached gay liberation as 
a question of openness and human rights, and in this context the recognition 
of same-sex relationships ‒ as well as polyamorous relationships ‒ was high up 
on the agenda. The new generation of lesbian feminists, on the other hand, de-
veloped a woman-identified lesbian separatist ideology, in which the struggle 
against marriage as an institution was one of its most important points. Scandi-
navian lesbians found new ways to create networks in the 1970s and 1980s, and 
they staged a number of cultural and political protests. Among them, their op-
position to the exploitation in the porn industry provoked angry reactions from 
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the men in the movement, who sometimes accused them of being sex-negative 
puritans.32 
The AIDS crisis
There were big differences in the ways that the gay and lesbian movements and 
the governments in the different Nordic countries handled the AIDS crisis. The 
Danish gay and lesbian movement declined to recommend that its members 
stop donating blood, for fear of further stigmatising gay men.33 The Norwegian 
and Swedish movements, however, asked men who had sex with men to stop 
giving blood early in 1983, well before their respective governments had devel-
oped any standpoint on blood donations from various risk groups.34
In Sweden, the AIDS question was highly politicised. At the outbreak of the 
epidemic, the Government created an ad-hoc AIDS Delegation (Aidsdelegatio-
nen), directly under the Minister of Social Affairs. The Minister in the 1980s was 
Gertrud Sigurdsen, who took a personal interest in the question, and the differ-
ences between the Government and the gay activists soon grew. It was particu-
larly the RFSL’s insistence that unprotected oral sex was to be considered safer 
sex, and its reluctance to recommend testing for its members that caused con-
flicts and made Sigurdsen regard them as irresponsible.35 On the other hand, the 
coercive methods adopted by the Swedish Government made the RFSL repre-
sentatives leave the AIDS Delegation. Sigurdsen’s harsh AIDS politics also led 
to tensions between the Ministry of Social Affairs and the National Board of 
Health and Social Affairs. In 1985 Barbro Westerholm, who was Director Gen-
eral for the National Board of Health and Social Affairs (Socialstyrelsen), re-
signed because of difficulties cooperating with the Minister.
In Denmark, the situation was the reverse. Two Ministers of Health in a row, 
Torben Lund and Yvonne Herløv Andersen, were gay and lesbian themselves, 
and consequently listened carefully to the demands of lesbian and gay activists. 
The Director General of the National Health Board did not share their positive 
view of gay activism, and was forced to resign in 1995, later accusing both Min-
isters of giving the National Union for Gays and Lesbians “an extraordinary 
positive treatment.”36 Danish-Swedish historian of medicine Signild Vallgårda 
has argued that the dramatic difference in Danish and Swedish AIDS politics 
is best explained as a result of path dependency and different emphasis in the 
focus of the AIDS discourse. In Denmark, AIDS was defined as predominant-
ly a problem for men who had sex with men, and the difficulties in reaching 
that group with information was highlighted. Since attitudes to homosexual-
ity were liberal, this resulted in liberal AIDS politics, and much energy was in-
vested in reaching out to men who had sex with men. In Sweden, on the other 
hand, AIDS was defined as a problem concerning various risk groups, and in a 
militant language the necessity of preventing the disease from spreading from 
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these groups was underlined. In particular, intravenous drug users were identi-
fied as potentially “dangerous” and irresponsible. And since there was a tradition 
of coercive means in dealing with drug abuse in Sweden, this was also the way 
in which AIDS was dealt with.37 
As for the other Nordic countries, HIV prevention work was carried out on 
a lower level in the bureaucracy, which allowed for a relatively trustful coopera-
tion between gay activists and the civil servants in the National Health Boards. 
While Sweden based its AIDS policy on control and coercion and Denmark 
adopted a policy characterised by trust and information, Norway chose a middle 
way. A telling example is that when Sweden and Norway added HIV infection 
to the list of contagious diseases covered by the law, Denmark abolished its cor-
responding law, arguing that it had no effect on the prevention of disease. And 
whereas Swedish authorities outlawed gay saunas, they remained open in Den-
mark and Norway. The relations between the Norwegian health authorities and 
the lesbian and gay movements was trustful, and the authorities seldom failed 
to listen to the gay and lesbian HIV-prevention agency.38 Kjell Erik Øie was the 
leader of Norwegian DNF ’48 from 1987 to 1991. In an interview in 2004 he ex-
plained why he thought the DNF ’48 had better cooperation with the authori-
ties than their Swedish counterparts. The gay and lesbian movement in Norway, 
he said, could have a serious dialogue with the health authorities about reducing 
the number of sex partners. “We had a reputation of being ‒ contrary to you in 
Sweden ‒ very responsible. That’s the reason I think they didn’t shut down our 
sauna clubs.”39 
In Finland, SETA had had preliminary contacts with the National Medi-
cal Board (Lääkintöhallitus / Medicinalstyrelsen) and urged them to issue advice 
and regulations concerning AIDS before the first cases were even reported, but 
to no effect. Jorma Hentilä was chair of SETA from 1983 to 1991, and he had 
to begin his office with coping with the AIDS crisis. When the first two cas-
es were reported in Finland in 1983, information about them was leaked to the 
tabloids and a national panic quickly grew, but there was no initiative from the 
Government. “The National Medical Board gave no advice or anything. No 
guidelines whatsoever,” Hentilä complained. Instead, SETA’s office was turned 
into a medical advice centre. In the summer of 1983 its small office was crowded 
with anxious people. “We offered counselling,” Hentilä said. “There was a doc-
tor and a psychologist . . . We made an agreement with The Institute for Popu-
lar Health (Kansanterveyslaitos / Folkhälsoinstitutet) that they would analyse our 
tests. And we agreed on anonymity. That was important.” The Finnish AIDS 
activists managed to avoid the kind of coercive legislation that they saw in Swe-
den by building up a close cooperation with health agencies at an early stage.40 
Finnish sociologist Kati Mustola has described these years as transformative for 
SETA and the established lesbian and gay movement: “Through its AIDS ac-
tivism, SETA became an important social actor, and the organization’s image in 
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the eyes of both officials and the general public changed from that of a club for 
freaks to a responsible civic organization among other civic organizations,” she 
wrote in a 2007 study.41
The effect of AIDS in terms of rendering more visible the gays and lesbi-
ans in society is perhaps even more striking in a small country like Iceland. In 
the Icelandic press, as elsewhere in Scandinavia, the first reports about AIDS 
described it as a foreign “gay plague,” but as soon as the first domestic cases be-
came known, the tone in the media changed. Gay men were now depicted as a 
vulnerable group in need of society’s help. In a small society with tight family 
bonds like the Icelandic, every case meant that a large number of friends and 
relatives became directly affected by the disease. The first battle to be fought, 
however, was the predictable and quintessentially Icelandic one of what to call 
the epidemic. The strongly negative term eyðni, which means “devastation,” was 
proposed and rejected. Finally the word alnæmi, which means something like 
“hypersensitivity,” was chosen. The Icelandic AIDS epidemic has been limit-
ed to 60 cases and 37 deaths out of a population of 320,000 (in 2008), but each 
AIDS patient has a wide network of friends and family who are affected. All in 
all, the AIDS epidemic led to radically more visibility and a greater acceptance 
of homosexuality in Iceland.42 
In Greenland and the Faroe Islands, the AIDS epidemic has displayed pat-
terns very different from the rest of Scandinavia. In the absence of a local gay 
subculture and health care facilities for gay men, the recorded cases consist al-
most exclusively of heterosexually transmitted infections. Moreover, the tradi-
tion of gay exodus has resulted in a situation where HIV-positive gay men from 
these areas most often have contracted the virus in metropolitan Denmark or 
elsewhere. In the 1980s, for instance, a gay man living on the smallest Faroese 
island of Mykines, with less than twenty inhabitants, suddenly became ill and 
moved to Denmark where he could get better care. When he died, he willed his 
house to the Danish AIDS Fund (AIDS-fondet), but he never came out to the 
local community.43 In Greenland, when the law on registered partnership was 
first discussed in 1994, thirty-year-old Tom Semionsen appeared in the nation-
al press and revealed that he was gay and HIV-positive. Like many other gay 
Greenlanders, he had lived in Copenhagen to be able to experience a gay sub-
culture, and it was there that he had contracted the virus. Since then, he moved 
back to Greenland, where he could be close to his family and to Greenlandic 
nature, even though he was aware that he might get better care in Copenhagen. 
After Semionsen’s coming out, it was not until 2003 that more gay or lesbian 
Greenlanders came out in public.44
All over Scandinavia, the AIDS crisis brought with it a new need for a dia-
logue between the gay and lesbian movement and the authorities. And even if 
the contacts at a central level in some cases were hostile, the contacts at a local 
level could lead to new insights and a fruitful dialogue. All over Scandinavia, lo-
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cal politicians met for the first time with gay and lesbian activists and discussed 
AIDS-preventive measures, offering financial support and cooperation when 
planning the information campaigns. This way, local politicians were confront-
ed with a hitherto invisible section of their town, and gay and lesbian activists 
got access to a political arena they had previously been barred from. The wish to 
control gay men’s sexual behaviour necessarily brought forth a new understand-
ing from the majority culture, and homosexuality as such became more visible 
in all Scandinavian countries. 
Government commissions in the 1980s
As we have seen, the increased official acceptance of homosexuality in Scandi-
navia began well before AIDS, and, indeed, well before the Stonewall rebellion. 
The discussions at parliamentary level about legally regulating same-sex rela-
tions were initiated by a proposal to Parliament in Denmark in 1968, followed 
by a similar proposal in Sweden in 1973. Following the success when the Swed-
ish Parliament declared that homosexuality was a fully acceptable life form, the 
small Left Communist Party (VPK) continued to promote gay rights in the 
Riksdag. Following motions from Left, Social Democratic, and Liberal MPs, 
the Government appointed a commission in 1978 with the task to “compile and 
give an account of available scientific documentation about homosexuality” and 
to “propose the necessary means to remove any remaining discrimination of ho-
mosexuals.”45 
The so-called Homo Commission (Homosexutredningen) worked for six 
years, and it was, to date, the largest investigation of homosexual life in Scan-
dinavia. The proposals in its 1984 report were rather far-reaching, and proposed 
1) constitutional amendments to protect homosexuals from discrimination and 
defamation in general terms; 2) an amendment to the criminal code to make 
discrimination and defamation of homosexuals punishable; 3) refugee status for 
persecuted homosexual foreigners; and 4) a new law regulating same-sex rela-
tionships.46 The proposal was to let same-sex couples benefit from the same legal 
protection that different-sex couples already had according to the “Unmarried 
cohabiting couples’ mutual home act” (Lagen om ogifta samboendes gemensamma 
hem), in force since 1973. It took considerable time for the Government to issue 
a law proposal. When it was finally presented in 1987 it was rather bleak. Out of 
the four main proposals set down by the Homo Commission in 1984, only two 
resulted in legislation. There were no amendments to the Constitution and there 
were no changes in the law giving homosexual refugees the right to asylum. But 
the criminal code was amended to include a prohibition against discrimina-
tion and defamation of homosexuals, and a homosexual cohabitation law regu-
lated the rights of the persons involved in same-sex relations in case of separa-
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tion. The Law on Homosexual Cohabitation was probably the first law that any 
country passed concerning homosexual relations.47 
In 1982 the Danish Society of 1948 changed its name to The National Union 
for Gays and Lesbians (Landsforeningen for Bøsser og Lesbiske, LBL). The follow-
ing year it invited politicians from the four gay-friendly parties in the Folketing 
to a debate in Århus on gay and lesbian rights.48 During the meeting, it occurred 
to LBL’s chairman Henning Jørgensen that there was a consensus among the 
four representatives on a number of pro-gay measures. Furthermore, he realised 
that these four parties together had a majority in the Folketing, against the con-
servative minority Government. He quickly asked them if they could go back to 
their parties and get them to present a bill to the Parliament, demanding that a 
commission be appointed to investigate the situation for homosexuals in soci-
ety and propose measures to remove discrimination. After all they had agreed 
on during the debate, they could not really say no, and gay activist Bent Hansen 
remembers how he and other LBL activists hurried to send out a press release 
about the historic pledge, thus making sure that the politicians could not back 
away from their promise when they came back to Copenhagen.49
So there was no way back for the four parties, and in March 1983 a major-
ity in the Folketing carried the four-party proposal to appoint a commission to 
“throw light on homosexuals’ situation in society.” Its instructions were to pro-
pose measures to remove remaining discrimination within all sectors of society, 
“including proposals for regulating steady relationships.”50 Since the conserva-
tive minority Government was against the commission, but was forced by the 
Parliament’s majority to appoint it, they showed little interest in what it was 
doing. 
The work in the commission dragged on, and instead of waiting for its re-
port, the LBL persuaded their political friends in Parliament to present con-
crete proposals to be voted on. Thus, already in 1986, the Folketing decided to 
grant the same inheritance tax to same-sex couples as to married couples, and in 
1987 it voted on an amendment to the statute against discrimination, so that it 
explicitly covered sexual orientation.51 This initiative and others put pressure on 
the commission, and finally it presented its report in 1988, which, however, did 
not endorse the idea of registered partnership. Its chairman, Poul Dam, who in 
1968 had presented the Socialist People’s Party’s radical marriage law proposal, 
now did not favour the idea of registered partnership. He used his casting vote 
to prevent the commission from including it in its proposal. The four homosex-
ual representatives wrote a differing opinion, and again the initiative for lesbian 
and gay reforms belonged to the Parliament.52 
The Icelandic Homo Commission came later than in Sweden and Denmark, 
but when politics began to change, they changed fast. In a small society like Ice-
land it was not difficult for the lesbian and gay movement to establish contacts 
with members of the Alþingi, provided they were prepared to listen. Also, the 
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strong feminist movement had paved the way for changes concerning homo-
sexuality. The 1992 initiative to appoint a Homo Commission in Iceland came 
from the Women’s List, which had a stable representation in Parliament. It did 
not seem that any anti-homosexual sentiment was represented in the Alþin-
gi at this point in history. The multi-party proposal initiated by the Women’s 
List went through without much discussion, and an Expert Commission was 
formed with two representatives from Samtökin ’78. It presented its report in 
1994, with three main proposals: 1) Prejudice should be fought by disseminat-
ing positive information about homosexuality in the Icelandic educational sys-
tem, and by economic support to the lesbian and gay movement. 2) Discrimina-
tion and harassment of homosexuals should be outlawed. 3) A law on registered 
partnership, modelled after the ones existing in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, 
should be adopted. A dissenting minority, consisting of the two representatives 
from Samtökin ’78, wanted to go one step further and introduce legislation that 
would allow same-sex couples to enjoy a legal status fully comparable to that 
of different-sex couples.53 Their demands for a law that would include adoption 
rights and joint custody over children was different from the pragmatic attitude 
of the Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish movements, which accepted the re-
strictions in order to get the laws passed.
Breakthrough in Denmark
In the Danish elections of 1987, the Left Socialist Party (Venstresocialisterne, VS) 
lost their five seats in the Folketing, but the three remaining “gay-friendly” par-
ties could still muster a majority over the conservative minority Government. 
In January 1988, even before the commission had presented its report, they pro-
posed a registered partnership for same-sex couples. The bill was based on the 
detailed proposal that LBL had drawn up in 1981, and its first article read: “Two 
persons of the same sex can have their partnership registered.” The rest of the 
short law referred to the existing marriage law, and then enumerated three ex-
ceptions compared to marriage: 1) registered partnership could only be granted 
if at least one of the two persons was a citizen and lived permanently in Den-
mark, 2) the Adoption Act was not applicable, and 3) the new law did not in-
terfere with the parts of the marriage law that regulated church weddings. Like 
most new Danish laws, it would not automatically be in force in the Faroe Is-
lands or Greenland but could be introduced there by means of a Royal Decree 
after an initiative of the local Parliament. This provision gives the local parlia-
ments in these autonomous Danish areas the possibility of accepting or reject-
ing Danish laws, and, as we will see, they went separate ways regarding the law 
on registered partnership.54 
The law proposal had a comfortable majority in the Folketing, with the sup-
port of the Social Democrats, the social-liberal Radical Left Party, and the So-
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cialist People’s Party. But then the Prime Minister dissolved Parliament ‒ on a 
whole other issue ‒ and called for new elections. During the electoral campaign, 
the small Christian People’s Party (Kristeligt Folkeparti) vowed to stop the pro-
posed partnership law. Its attempt to attract conservative votes by opposing the 
law inspired a newspaper to order an opinion poll. The result was a surprise 
to both those who were in favour of the law and those who worked against it, 
since it showed that 58 percent of Danes supported the idea of a law on regis-
tered partnership, whereas only 20 or 25 percent were clearly against it. This re-
sult strengthened those in favour of the law and the Christian People’s Party got 
only 2 percent of the votes and four seats in Parliament. After the elections, the 
Radical Left Party entered a coalition government with the Conservatives and 
the right-of-centre liberal Left Party (Venstre).55 Now they were bound to the 
Government’s politics and its ministers could not vote for a law on registered 
partnership even if they wanted to. However, there seemed to be enough votes 
in Parliament to get the law through, as the Social Democrats had decided to 
support it.56 
On May 26, when the law was to be voted on in the Folketing, Social Demo-
cratic MP Pia Gjellerup had reserved seats in the gallery for the LBL activists, 
and they were told how to act. “You have to behave in such a place ‒ you can’t sit 
there and shout and cheer, you know,” gay activist Bent Hansen explained in an 
interview in 2005. “So we had agreed with everybody who showed up that when 
the proposal was carried ‒ and we were 99.9 percent sure it would ‒ we would 
rise and bow to the Folketing and walk out. A silent but remarkable reverence 
to them all.”57 Moreover, the LBL gave a rose and a printed card showing the 
painting “Summer night on Skagen Beach” by Peder Severin Krøyer to all the 
members of the Folketing to thank them for the law. Though not everybody had 
voted for it, the LBL wanted everybody to have a memory of the day. When the 
law was voted on after a rather fierce debate, it was carried by 71 votes against 
47 and 5 abstentions, a 58 percent majority. When the voting was over, the LBL 
people in the galleries silently rose and bowed, and left the building. And in the 
afternoon everybody was invited to the LBL Centre in Knabrostræde. It was a 
beautiful summer day, and the owner of the Centre’s restaurant served every-
one free beer from the tap. “It was wonderful,” Bent Hansen remembers. “That 
day you thought it was worth the effort of all these years. It was a tremendous 
success.”58
The Danish success had come quickly and smoothly, and it sent shock waves 
to gays and lesbians, as well as to their foes, all over the world. When the law 
became effective, on 1 October 1989, the world press was there, and the first gay 
couple in the world to be registered in accordance with national legislation was 
Axel Axgil, the founder of The Society of 1948 and his longtime companion 
Eigil Axgil. The LBL had arranged the ceremony and the ensuing party and 
made sure it looked like a lavish wedding, with horse-drawn carriages and all 
The Danish LBL wanted to give all members of the Folketing a memory of the day, even those 
who had voted against the partnership law. When the MPs left the building, they got a rose and 
a card with this painting. Peder Severin Krøyer, “Summer night on Skagen Beach” (1893). Courtesy 
Skagen Museum.
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the usual matrimonial festivity. There were eleven male couples who were reg-
istered that day in Copenhagen, but no female couples, a fact that will be dis-
cussed in Chapter Two.59
Domino effect in Central Scandinavia
Before 1989, there was no consensus in the Norwegian and Swedish gay and les-
bian movements regarding the need for a law on registered partnership. In Nor-
way there was an outspoken resistance to such a law, ideologically founded in 
the conviction that the legal regulation of same-sex relations must not give priv-
ilege to couples at the expense of those who live outside steady relationships.60 
However, the spark produced by the adoption of a partnership law in Den-
mark coincided with a generational shift in the Norwegian gay and lesbian 
movement. Karen-Christine Friele, who had been the chair of DNF ’48 since 
1966, and its employed secretary general since 1970, was fiercely opposed to the 
politics of the new activist generation. With the advent of AIDS, the conditions 
for gay and lesbian politics changed profoundly, and in her furious autobiogra-
phy from 1990, Friele argued that the AIDS prevention work was carried out 
at the expense of traditional information and sex education, and lesbian inter-
ests were altogether neglected. “Instead of meeting the needs and interests of 
lesbians, elected lesbians flew to ‘safer-sex’ meetings and learned how to put on 
condoms!”61 
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Friele also accused the movement of using the AIDS crisis to get rid of an 
older generation of activists, a trend that she said was not exclusively Norwe-
gian. “The threat of AIDS demanded ‘modern’ homo politics carried out by 
young colleagues,” she wrote. “In country after country, old oppositional activ-
ists were dismissed. Hundred-thousand-crown computers, white desks, and sets 
of green plants witnessed to the truth of the old saying, ‘Nothing is so bad that 
it isn’t good for something.’”62 What Friele saw, and reacted so violently against, 
was the professionalisation of the gay and lesbian movement in the wake of the 
AIDS crisis. Money was pumped into the national movements, which suddenly 
could afford paid staff with all that that involved of workplace regulations, sal-
ary negotiations, and stability of the organisations. The conflicts between unpaid 
activists and paid staff of the organisations sometimes became acute, and often 
involved strong feelings of frustration from many activists who thought that the 
movement sold out its ideals and became too dependent on public funds. 
The new chair of The Norwegian Society of 1948, Kjell Erik Øie, was in fa-
vour of a partnership law and there was an ongoing conflict between his work-
ing group for partnership law and Friele. “The first time Gro Lindstad, who was 
vice chair at the time, and I decided that we wanted to challenge DNF’s stand-
point, that we mustn’t work for marriage, Kim mobilised against us and there 
was a lot of infighting, and it all ended with a decision that we should work for 
all who lived together for different reasons.”63 Friele’s main argument that the 
law favoured couples over individuals was difficult to sustain in the presence of 
the enthusiasm of the younger activists, and finally she stuck to the argument 
that it was a second-class marriage, since adoption and insemination were not 
open to same-sex couples.According to Kjell Erik Øie, Friele could not specify 
what it was in the marriage law that she did not want and that she thought had 
discriminatory effects. “It is one thing to be ideologically against something, but 
when you have to determine what it means in practice, it becomes more diffi-
cult.” From then on, says Øie, Friele concentrated on the argument that DNF 
’48 did not demand the right of adoption when they argued for the law.64
Under Øie’s leadership, the Norwegian gay and lesbian movement set up a 
working group to lobby for a law on registered partnership similar to the Dan-
ish law. They were remarkably successful in their lobbying efforts, targeting key 
persons and members of Parliament whom they thought were possible to reach 
with their arguments. “There was no reason to waste our energy on the Chris-
tian People’s Party. There were some in the Progress Party [worth talking to], but 
the rest we tried to influence,” Øie explained. According to Socialist MP Kris-
tin Halvorsen, they gained a reputation of having good answers to all questions 
and being reliable when it came to facts.65 After a long debate, the Norwegian 
law was finally passed by the Storting at 9 p.m. on 29 March 1993, with 58 votes 
in favour and 40 against. As a sharp contrast to the silent bow of the activists in 
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the Danish Parliament four years earlier, there were wild cheers from the gallery, 
and the Speaker had to silence the crowd twice.66 
The law took effect on August 1, but it took four days to issue marriage li-
cences, and on August 6 a big wedding celebration was staged by the National 
Union for Gay and Lesbian Liberation, the LLH, as the joint gay and lesbi-
an movement in Norway was now called. The partying and the press coverage 
resembled that in Denmark four years earlier, with one important difference. 
Whereas only male couples had registered on the first historic day in Den-
mark, there was now a mixture of gay and lesbian couples. Indeed, one of the 
first couples to register in Norway was Kim Friele and her companion of many 
years, Wenche Lowzow.67 The official celebration was in Oslo on August 6, but 
two gay men, who preferred to remain anonymous, registered in Skien the day 
before. This was considered by some activists as somewhat disloyal, or as an at-
tempt to become historic and steal the moment from those who had actively 
worked for the law.68 
Nobody had really expected Norway to beat Sweden in the “partnership 
race,” considering the preparatory work that had already been done in Sweden 
and the strong Christian conservative lobby in Norway. But whereas the process 
seemed to stagnate in Sweden, the Norwegian lobbyists managed to influence 
people surprisingly quickly and thus created the necessary majority for the law. 
This can evidently be attributed to several factors, most important, perhaps, the 
readiness of the political parties to listen to gay and lesbian demands for equal-
ity, and the day-to-day balance in coalition politics. 
In Sweden, the official stance of the gay and lesbian movement had been to 
reject the thought of a separate registration for same-sex couples, but all such 
reservations were swept away when the events in Denmark showed that it was 
politically possible to get a law with only a few exceptions to the heterosexual 
marriage law. The Swedish gay and lesbian movement began to work harder for 
a partnership law and got the backing of some prominent politicians. In 1990, 
the National Board of Health and Social Affairs (Socialstyrelsen) presented a 
draft proposal of a Danish-model partnership law to the Government. It was 
not the usual procedure that a Government agency produced law proposals, but 
as a result of the report of the Homo Commission, the Government had com-
missioned the Socialstyrelsen to work for the well-being of homosexual citizens. 
Their proposal received wide media coverage, but it did not lead to any Govern-
ment initiative.69
The conservative resistance to the law proved stronger than expected in Swe-
den. The question was perceived as sensitive by party leadership across the polit-
ical spectrum, but it seems that the grassroots in some cases were more open to 
the new ideas. At the Social Democratic Party Congress in 1992, the party’s na-
tional board recommended a wait-and-see policy and called for further investi-
gation.70 However, lesbians and gays within the party had managed to influence 
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grassroots members, and a majority of delegates carried a binding resolution, in-
structing the party’s steering committee to work actively for a law on registered 
partnership. Instead of presenting a Government proposal, however, the Social 
Democratic Government appointed yet another commission of inquiry. This 
was not appreciated by the gay and lesbian movement. “We were against it,” 
former RFSL chair Tobias Wikström said in an interview, “because we thought 
it was a way to bury the question. And we went crazy when we heard that Bar-
bro Westerholm had agreed to chair it. It is unusual that a Social Democratic 
government appoints a commission with a chair from the bourgeois block, and 
we thought it was a dirty trick. She was one of those who had fought hardest 
for this thing in Parliament and now she would be chained to a commission as 
its chair, and she would have to be diplomatic and, so to say, disconnected from 
politics.”71 Westerholm herself has interpreted it another way. The reason she ac-
cepted the task was that she thought it would provide continuity. Opinion polls 
indicated that there would be a right wing government after the next election, 
and with a chair from the People’s Party, this commission stood a better chance 
of surviving into the next electoral period.72 In hindsight, it seems obvious that 
it was, in fact, a way to stall the question. Influential people in the Social Demo-
cratic leadership were against the new law, and despite the decisions of the Party 
Congress, the steering committee had no wish to hasten the process.
The Commission on Registered Partnership was to exist for two years, and 
its work was marked by conflict and obstruction. When it finally presented its 
report in 1993, it was split on the question and it was only the decisive vote of 
the chair that made it tip over in favour of a law on registered partnership.73 
The Social Democrats had lost the elections in 1991, and there was now a coali-
tion government of the conservative Moderates (Moderata Samlingspartiet), the 
Centre Party (Centern), the liberal People’s Party (Folkpartiet), and the Chris-
tian Democrats (Kristen Demokratisk Samling). The new Government could not 
agree to present a proposal, but there was a majority for a partnership law in the 
Riksdag. Thus the new law was prepared entirely by the Parliament’s Standing 
Law Committee (Lagutskottet). It was the first time in the history of Sweden’s 
1971 Constitution that a law was prepared without passing the Government’s 
office, and some of its critics claimed that the procedure was unconstitutional.74 
When the law finally was voted upon, on 7 June 1994, it caused a six-hour 
debate, in which its opponents practiced a mild form of filibustering. In the end, 
however, it was carried by a majority of 30 votes, and just as in Norway three 
years before, there was cheering from the gallery. RFSL activist Eva Ahlberg, 
who had worked hard for the law, was there, and at a seminar ten years later she 
told the audience: “When the voting was over and I saw the numbers on the 
electronic board, I was so moved that I cried. Feverishly I wrote down the re-
sults, because I had to bring them back to the office. And in the middle of this 
emotional chaos, Jeanette proposed to me!” Eva and her partner Jeanette Öberg 
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chose not to be in the first group who were registered at the official ceremony 
staged by RFSL, but they registered a little later in a private ceremony.75 
The law became effective on 1 January 1995. As in Norway there would be a 
delay of a couple of days while the wedding licences were issued. In some in-
stances, however, local governments granted exceptions, and on the first work-
day after New Year’s, on January 2, a gay couple was registered in Östersund. The 
partnership registrar was Jörn Svensson, the Communist MP who had worked 
for gay and lesbian emancipation for many years. On the same day, two gay cou-
ples were registered in the Stockholm City Court by Judge Carl-Anton Spaak, 
and one lesbian and one gay couple were united by a joint ceremony in the lit-
tle town of Tidaholm.76 Typically, the local newspaper in Tidaholm published a 
photo of the male couple only on its front page, with the heading “First couple 
out”. Inside the newspaper, however, there was a picture of both couples. The 
partnership registrar, Birgitta Svahn, was a young woman working in the mu-
nicipal office who had stepped in because the usual registrar refused to perform 
the ceremony.77
At the official ceremony in Stockholm City Hall on 6 January 1995, arranged 
by the RFSL, the chair of Stockholm’s City Council registered three lesbian and 
four gay couples. After the ceremony they rode to the RFSL Centre in horse-
drawn carriages, and there was a grand wedding party. The forms of partnership 
registrations were becoming established and in every single detail followed tra-
ditional weddings.78
To sum up, the process leading to gay marriage in Norway and Sweden dis-
played many similarities. Both countries had reluctant gay and lesbian move-
ments that did not begin lobbying for partnership until they were electrified by 
the Danish experience. Also, they both had a strong Christian opposition in 
the countryside, as well as shifting coalition politics that made it necessary to 
count each vote in the Parliament. In both countries there was a heated debate 
in the newspapers, bringing out the most vehement anti-homosexual arguments 
alongside a passionate defence of the rights of same-sex couples. By contrast, 
the situations differed considerably in the western periphery of the Nordic area. 
Iceland, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands displayed, among them, completely 
different reactions to the Danish partnership law, as the concept of homosexual 
couples spread to these sparsely populated nations.
The North Atlantic
Toward the end of the 1980s, attitudes to homosexuality in Iceland changed 
dramatically. As more and more lesbian and gay Icelanders decided to be open, 
and, above all, remain in the country, the compact homophobia began to erode. 
More and more straight Icelanders were influenced by openly lesbian and gay 
friends and relatives. Socialist MP Kristín S. Kvaran was a personal friend of 
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Guðni Baldursson, one of the first chairs of Samtökin ’78. In 1985 she proposed 
a number of measures to counteract discrimination against lesbian and gay citi-
zens, but the resistance in the Alþingi was too strong, and her proposal was bur-
ied in a Standing Committee.79 Seven years later, Ingibjörg Sólrun Gísladót-
tir from the Women’s List was more successful. Through her job as editor for 
a feminist journal she had got to know several lesbians and gay men. Together 
with gay activist Þorvaldur Kristinsson she prepared the 1992 proposal to ap-
point a Homo Commission. Before presenting it, she went out to persuade 
members from the other parties to sign the bill. “I thought it would be better for 
the cause if I could find one from each party, so that it wouldn’t come from just 
my party. Because then it would be considered a minor matter, because it came 
from the Women’s List.” She sought out members whom she knew felt strongly 
for human rights issues, or who had openly lesbian and gay family members.80 
The strong emphasis on consensus is typical for Iceland in this matter, and when 
the partnership law was finally presented to the Alþingi in 1996, only one MP 
argued against it. Other MPs expressed their pride in the fact that the Icelan-
dic law went one step further than the existing laws in Denmark, Norway, and 
Sweden. Like the existing law on registered cohabitation for different-sex cou-
ples, the Icelandic partnership law would contain a possibility for joint custody 
of children. This was partly a result of the Icelandic lesbian and gay movement’s 
insistence on equal conditions for same-sex and different-sex couples, but it also 
showed that public opinion in Iceland was prepared to go further in recognising 
lesbian and gay rights.81 Another difference was that the Icelanders, always sen-
sitive about language, chose not to call it “registered partnership” but “confirmed 
partnership” (staðfest samvist). There was already a law on registered cohabita-
tion (skráð sambúð) for heterosexual couples, and the lesbian and gay movement 
insisted that their partnerships should not be registered but confirmed.82 When 
the law was finally put to a vote, it was carried with 44 votes against 1. On the 
recommendation of Samtökin ’78, the new law became effective on Christopher 
Street Day, 27 June 1996.83
The new law was born in a spirit of national pride, which was shown by the 
high level of the dignitaries present at the official celebration. There was a re-
ligious service in the Free Church at midnight, and the next day three couples 
were registered, two female and one male.84 At the reception in the City Thea-
tre, the President of the Republic, Vigdis Finnbogadóttir, became the first head 
of state to attend such an event. Overall, there was rejoicing, which contrasted 
sharply with the embarrassed silence that had surrounded homosexuality only 
years earlier.85
On July 1, one week after the Icelandic partnership law, the Danish law be-
came effective in Greenland, but the legal process had begun long before. Since 
Greenland is an autonomous part of the Danish kingdom, its local legislature 
has the right to adopt or reject most laws enacted in Denmark, and it can also 
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propose laws valid only in Greenland. With 56,000 inhabitants scattered over a 
vast area, Greenland has never provided the urban culture that was the breeding 
ground for homosexual subcultures and the rise of gay and lesbian conscious-
ness. Social control has always been strict, but the prevailing social climate is 
one of tolerance, and the introduction of the partnership law was smooth and 
stirred no debate. In 1993 a new Marriage Law became effective in Greenland. 
The following year, the then Minister of Social Affairs, Henriette Rasmussen, 
proposed that the Danish law on registered partnership should also be enacted. 
“The background for this proposal is that this year is the United Nations’ Year 
of the Family, and it is important to establish that there are family forms other 
than the nuclear family,” she said when she presented the proposal.86
The debate in the Greenlandic Parliament, the Inatsisartut (or Landsting), 
was short and sober. Most members voiced their support for the proposal, but 
there were some critical voices. One member opposed even discussing the mat-
ter, saying: “If the insects could hear about this, they would surely laugh at us. 
Even the smallest creatures know, each in its own way, how life shall be passed 
on.” But even he did not vote against the proposal in the end. Otto Steenholt, 
leader of the moderately conservative party Atassut, who five years earlier had 
voted against the Danish law when he was Greenland’s representative in the 
Danish Folketing, said that he was not opposed to the law as such but that he 
wanted it to be discussed in the Greenlandic community before they voted on 
it. Some of the members expressed a concern that this was not consistent with 
Greenlandic culture, and the member most opposed to the law said that there 
were certain areas where Greenlanders were so far from Danes that they could 
not easily be discussed. The final proposal to ask the Danish Government to 
make the law on registered partnership effective in Greenland was carried by 15 
votes and 12 abstentions. No one voted against it.87
Subsequently there was some debate in the Greenlandic press, but there 
seemed to be a consensus that a law on registered partnership was a good thing, 
and that those members of the Inatsisartut who had spoken against it were 
prejudiced. After the Parliament’s decision, however, it took more than two 
years for it to work its way through Danish bureaucracy, probably a sign that the 
question had a low priority in both capitals. It was not asked to be speeded up 
in Nuuk, and it was not pressed for in Copenhagen. When the law was made 
effective in Greenland by a Royal Danish Decree on 1 July 1996, there was no 
media coverage whatsoever, and it was not until 2002 that any gay Greenlandic 
couple used the opportunity to register.88 
Unlike in Greenland, there has been a lively debate on homosexuality and 
the partnership law in the Faroe Islands, and to date the Faroese Parliament, the 
Løgting, has flatly refused to introduce the Danish law on registered partnership 
in its territory. Because of a strong Christian conservative lobby, and because of 
its colonial aversion against anything coming from Denmark, many liberal law 
The Tórshavn Pride March in August 2005 resulted in an initiative to introduce a clause against 
defamation on grounds of sexual orientation, but it was defeated in the first round. Photo: Jens 
Rydström.
61The road to registered partnership
reforms have never been implemented in the Faroes. The abortion law is still 
very restrictive, and in 1988 a proposal to introduce a clause against discrimina-
tion on grounds of sexual orientation was rejected by the Løgting. There was in-
deed a gay personality in the Faroese capital of Tórshavn in the 1970s and 1980s, 
Rólant Samuelsen, who was a hairdresser and amateur actor. His sharp tongue 
and elegant wit made sure that the Faroese could not altogether deny the ex-
istence of homosexuality and bisexuality. After his premature death in 1992, his 
friend and doctor Bogi Davidsen suggested that the Faroes should introduce 
the Danish partnership law to honour Rólant’s memory. Davidsen introduced 
the new word samkynd for “homosexual,” thus avoiding the old, insulting forms, 
and in 1995 he made a 45-minute-long TV-program about the situation of gays 
and lesbians in the Faroes.89 
The Internet made it easier for Faroese lesbians and gays to establish net-
works, and in 2003 they founded the LGBT group Friðarbogin, which has been 
highly successful in moving LGBT rights up on the public agenda, but less suc-
cessful in promoting legal reform. In the summer of 2005, a Nordic LGBT stu-
dent conference was held in the Faroes, and it provoked a heated debate in the 
newspapers. The end of the conference was marked by a Pride March, and ap-
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parently the many homophobic remarks in the press resulted in many people 
wanting to show their support for the gay and lesbian movement. Almost two 
hundred people, far more than the organisers had hoped for, showed up and 
marched through the streets of Tórshavn.90
The events surrounding the Faroese Pride March inspired new parliamenta-
ry action. Two members of the Løgting reintroduced a proposal, not for a part-
nership law, but for a clause against discrimination on grounds of sexual orien-
tation, which had been almost unanimously rejected in 1988.91 This time there 
was a more open debate on the issue, but when the Løgting voted on it in De-
cember 2005 it failed again and the question seemed to be politically dead for a 
considerable time.92 One year later, however, a homophobic assault shocked the 
Faroese and after a heated debate the anti-discrimination clause was adopted 
with 17 votes in favour and 15 against.93 The law on registered partnership has 
never been proposed to the Løgting to vote on, and it does not seem likely that 
it will be introduced in the near future. All political parties are split over the is-
sue, and since the present Government depends on the support from the mor-
ally conservative Centre Party (Miðflokkurin), it will take no new initiatives in 
that direction. However, a new electoral system resulted in less influence from 
the rural consituencies and more women in Parliament. Given that there is also 
political pressure from the other countries in the Nordic Council, the long-term 
prognosis for introducing a partnership law also on the Faroe Islands seems, af-
ter all, rather positive.94
Thus, the small states in the western periphery of the Nordic area have react-
ed very differently to the challenge of same-sex unions. Iceland enthusiastically 
embraced the new order, Greenland accepted it without much debate, and the 
Faroes flatly refused to introduce it. On the eastern border of Scandinavia, Fin-
land went through an extended period of lobbying for a partnership law, while 
at the same time the opposition to the law managed to delay it so that Finland 
became the last independent Nordic country to introduce the law.
Finland: Fierce opposition
During the Cold War, Finland was locked in position as a pawn in the game of 
European security and had to tread very carefully in foreign politics, which also 
influenced internal politics. Presidential power was exceptionally strong under 
Urho Kekkonen, who was President from 1956 to 1982. The rigid political atmos-
phere, combined with traumatic war memories, helped reinforce the speculation 
that homosexuality was something that was done in Sweden, and that it was 
foreign to Finnish culture.95 Both male and female homosexuality was outlawed 
until 1971. After that, the higher age of consent for homosexual acts was in force 
until 1999, and during the same period there was also a special clause prohib-
iting the encouragement of homosexuality. Partly because of this homophobic 
63The road to registered partnership
climate, and partly for ideological reasons, registered partnership was not on the 
agenda of the gay and lesbian movement.96
But all this was to change in the 1990s. One of those who would work politi-
cally for gay and lesbian rights was Social Democratic MP ‒ and future Presi-
dent of the Republic ‒ Tarja Halonen. She was a lawyer and took a keen inter-
est in human rights issues, and in 1980 she published the country’s first schol-
arly article on legislation that discriminated against homosexuals. At that time, 
it was, above all, the higher age of consent for same-sex sexual acts and the ban 
on “encouragement” that attracted attention, but she also mentioned the need 
for a regulation of same-sex relationships.97 Elected to Parliament in 1979, she 
accepted an invitation from SETA to give a speech at the Gay Liberation Week 
in Helsinki the same year, and during her time as MP she presented several bills 
to reform the criminal law regarding homosexuality. In 1980 she became chair 
of SETA, following a tradition that the Finnish gay and lesbian association of-
ten chose prominent straight politicians as their spokespersons. When Halonen 
became Minister of Justice in 1990, many lesbian and gay activists hoped that 
she would work more actively for a law on registered partnership but she chose 
the slow path, knowing that resistance to such a law was strong. She created a 
Family Law Commission and appointed a member from SETA to be part of 
it. In its report it acknowledged the need for registered partnership legislation, 
without, however, proposing any concrete measures.98
As in all other Scandinavian countries, the political initiative to a law on reg-
istered partnership came from the left and from female politicians. In 1993, Outi 
Ojala from the Left Alliance (Vasemmistoliitto / Vänsterförbundet) presented a 
bill to the Finnish Parliament, the Eduskunta, demanding a law on registered 
partnership. She worked hard for gay rights in the Finnish Parliament, but she 
was not the one who wrote the law proposal. “I have to admit that it was I who 
wrote the bill,” Jorma Hentilä said when he was interviewed. He was the party 
secretary of the Left Alliance’s predecessor, a left umbrella organisation called 
the Finnish People’s Democratic Alliance (SKDL/DFFF), from 1977 to 1983, 
and chair of SETA from 1983 to 1991. After the parliamentary elections in 1991, 
Hentilä formulated a radical bill that included adoption rights and the right of 
same-sex couples to be treated equally as different-sex married couples. Ojala 
presented the bill and then asked MPs to support it. “But it wasn’t easy,” Hentilä 
said. “There were perhaps ten MPs who were prepared to sign.”99 Ojala’s ‒ and 
Hentilä’s ‒ 1993 parliamentary bill did not make it past the Parliament’s Stand-
ing Law Committee, but it was debated and had considerable influence. 
In the summer of 1994, SETA organised a Pride Party in Esplanadi Park in 
central Helsinki, where four same-sex couples ‒ one female and three male ‒ 
staged wedding ceremonies in order to influence public opinion. The event was 
widely publicised and many people remember it as provocative and fun.100 How-
ever, conservative resistance against partnership was strong and deeply rooted. 
64 Odd Couples
There were two kinds of religious resistance, according to Rainer Hiltunen, who 
was then Secretary General of SETA. There was opposition from fundamental-
ist Christians, but according to Hiltunen “it was not that dangerous, and some-
times it was even beneficial, because their rhetoric was sometimes so ridiculous 
that people didn’t want to be associated with it.” The second kind of resistance 
was that of the Lutheran State Church, which was more dangerous to the cause. 
“It was the Lutheran Church that nearly defeated us. The politicians listened to 
them.” In the Finnish Parliament, all parties were split over the question, except 
the Christian Democrats, who were unanimously against the law.101 
Two things that distinguished the Finnish campaign from the countries in 
central Scandinavia were: the high level of lesbian participation, and the fact that 
the Finnish gay and lesbian movement never let go of their demand that the 
law should allow for joint adoption and artificial insemination for lesbian cou-
ples. These factors made the Finnish campaign look more like the one in Iceland. 
During the 1990s, SETA had only lesbian chairpersons, most of them mothers 
with a high public profile. Tiina Kivinen, who was chair of SETA 1991–1994, re-
membered during her interview that the lesbian baby-boom at the beginning of 
the nineties changed the discourse and made lesbians more interested in partner-
ship issues. “I got my daughter in 1980 and I got many letters and telephone calls 
from lesbians who wanted to know about it,” she said. “I think that changed the 
discussion, and many thought we needed legislation to protect our children.” An-
other key figure was Hannele Lehtikuusi, organisational secretary of the Green 
Alliance and chair of SETA after Tiina Kivinen. Lehtikuusi was instrumental 
in giving the Finnish campaign such a high concentration of lesbians and gays 
with children. Tragically, she died of cancer at forty-four in 2004. In an inter-
view, Kati Mustola remembers that “throughout the nineties SETA had fe-
male chairpersons who had children. It turned into a league of lesbian mothers.” 
At that time there was some internal opposition on activists’ e-mail list. Some 
members ‒ mostly gay men ‒ thought it was not tactically wise to pursue the 
pro-adoption line, but “Haski [as Hannele was called] was steel-hard in say-
ing that ‘no, we want the whole cake!’” According to Mustola, lesbian and gay 
activists in Finland knew very well that all reforms are achieved one step at a 
time, and that it would probably not be possible to get adoption rights at once. 
But their tactics were to demand “the whole cake” at this stage in order to push 
their bargaining position as far as possible. It was probably Lehtikuusi’s influ-
ence in the Green Alliance that resulted in their firm stand on adoption rights. 
Their condition to support the Government’s law proposal was that it immedi-
ately appoint a commission to investigate the need of adoption rights for same-
sex couples.102
A media event that highly influenced the Finnish debate was the registered 
partnership ceremony of Swedish singer-songwriter Eva Dahlgren and design-
er Efwa Attling in January 1996. Dahlgren was very popular in Finland and the 
Hanna Räty and Hannele Lehtikuusi were one of 
the lesbian couples with children that appeared fre-
quently in the Finnish press in the 1990s. Photo: Ku-
vasiskot, Helsinki.
65The road to registered partnership
union got wide media coverage. Many writers thought it an outrage that her 
loving commitment to Attling could be officially recognised in Sweden, but 
not in Finland. Images of the two happy and successful women appeared in the 
Finnish press, and proponents of the partnership law used them as a positive ex-
ample of how such a law could bring happiness to some people without threat-
ening the majority.103 
In 1996 there was a new motion in the Eduskunta. This time the ground had 
been laid for a more positive treatment, but the broad coalition Government’s 
Minister of Justice was Kari Häkämies, from the conservative National Coali-
tion Party (Kokoomus / Samlingspartiet), who opposed the law. He declared to 
the press that “nothing will happen concerning this question during this gov-
ernment’s mandate,” and hope sank for a speedy reform.104 However, the mo-
tion was positively treated in the Parliament’s Law Committee, and in 1997 the 
Government appointed a commission with representatives from various minis-
tries and Rainer Hiltunen from SETA. The commission delivered its report in 
1999, and they recommended that Parliament pass a law on registered partner-
ship much like the ones in the other Scandinavian countries. 
Rainer Hiltunen wrote a dissenting opinion to the commission’s report and 
demanded that registered partnership should include the right of joint adop-
tion and of artificial insemination for lesbians. This way, SETA again revealed a 
strategy different from the gay and lesbian movements in central Scandinavia. 
It was a result of the increasing involvement of lesbians in the movement, and 
a sign that the idea of homosexuality was becoming more and more associated 
with procreation and child rearing at the end of the 1990s.105 In the last minute 
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some minor amendments were made by the Standing Law Committee. Reg-
istered partners were not to be allowed to take a joint last name, and the term 
for the new institution that was preferred by the gay and lesbian movement, vi-
rallistettu parisuhde, literally “official partnership,” was rejected. Instead, it was 
called rekisteröity parisuhde, “registered partnership,” which to some Finnish ears 
recalled the car register or the criminal register. These limitations had a symbolic 
meaning that was all too clear to those concerned. Kati Mustola commented: “It 
had hardly any practical importance, but it was just to show us gays and lesbians 
our place. That we were worth less in society’s eyes.”106 In this respect, the atti-
tudes of the Finnish authorities contrasted sharply with those of the Icelandic 
legislators, who agreed to call the law “confirmed partnership” instead of “regis-
tered partnership”.
The day the Finnish law was passed, 28 September 2001, the stairs in front 
of the Parliament building were covered with gays and lesbians waiting to get 
in. The security check was rigorous, and many of those waiting were still out-
side when the law proposal was dealt with. A group of Christian fundamental-
ists also stood on the stairs, kneeling and praying for the proposal to fail. But in-
side the building it was passed with 99 votes in favour and 84 against ‒ a slim 54 
percent majority. The people in the spectators’ section burst out in applause and 
were silenced by the Speaker. Kati Mustola was among the activists on the stairs 
outside when the news came to them via mobile phones. There were cheers and 
rejoicing, but no champagne. Only one lesbian couple had brought a mini bot-
tle ‒ hardly enough to share with everybody. Kati Mustola remembers that “we 
were so afraid of being disappointed that it didn’t even occur to me that I should 
have brought some champagne.” But Rainer Hiltunen invited the crowd to cel-
ebrate in the nearby gay and lesbian restaurant “Don’t tell Mama,” where SETA 
offered everybody a glass.107 On 8 March 2002, when the law took effect, there 
were no public celebrations. SETA did not arrange a public ceremony, and SE-
TA’s magazine Z-lehti did not show wedding couples on its front cover, though 
it did run a long interview with a lesbian and a gay couple.108 When Finland fi-
nally got its law, the Netherlands and even Germany and France had already got 
theirs, and there was a sense of disappointment that the politicians had delayed 
the reform so many years.109
Finland was the last country of the five independent members of the Nordic 
Council to introduce registered partnership, and the enthusiasm and celebra-
tory mood that had characterised its introduction in other countries was largely 
absent. Evidently the Finnish political left had underestimated the strength of 
the traditionalist forces in the Finnish rural areas. Finland was urbanised later 
than the other Scandinavian countries, and traditional values are strong in the 
countryside. In 1996, the urban elite thought that the partnership law would be 
passed without much resistance, and many people were astonished when they 
realised how strong the opposition really was. The dynamics of Nordic politics, 
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however, exert some pressure on governments and influence popular attitudes, 
and many times the neighbouring countries are held up as examples. It was thus 
used as an argument against the partnership law in Denmark in 1989 that no 
other Scandinavian country had such a law, while the fact that the law had al-
ready been introduced in most other Nordic countries was used in favour of it in 
Finland and in the Faroes at the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
Conclusions
Two questions need to be addressed in an overall assessment of the history of 
the partnership laws in Scandinavia. Why did these laws appear at that precise 
moment in history, and why did it happen first in Scandinavia? The answer to 
the first question is necessarily to be sought in the global sexual revolution in 
the 1960s and its further developments in the 1970s. Material and institutional 
prerequisites such as new contraceptives and the liberalisation of abortion laws 
freed young people from the constraints that the risk of pregnancy had placed 
on heterosexuality, and this conditioned the ways in which the generational 
rebels talked and thought about sex in the 1960s. In this context, Scandinavia 
received a somewhat undeserved reputation of being sexually lax.110 Same-sex 
sexuality was one of the aspects discussed during this time, but the homophile 
movements did not take part in the debate. In the 1970s, on the contrary, a vi-
talised and highly visible gay movement presented new demands of society. As 
gays moved toward social recognition, legal recognition seemed a logical step to 
many activists, and their allies in the national parliaments did their best to help. 
The AIDS epidemic was hardly ever explicitly used as an argument for in-
troducing laws that officially recognised stable relationships between gay men, 
but it was important on two levels. First, it created a sense of urgency, that 
something had to be done about the life situation for gay men, and second, it 
gave a new status to the lesbian and gay organisations. From being perceived as 
organisations for an insignificant minority, they became legitimate and respon-
sible actors in the fight against AIDS, which was a concern for the whole soci-
ety. However, the demands for legal and social recognition of lesbian and gay re-
lationships had been presented well before news of the disease began to emerge. 
The first Scandinavian AIDS cases were reported in 1983, but the first demands 
for legal status of same-sex relationships came in Denmark and Sweden in 1968 
and 1973 respectively. The first Homo Commission had been appointed in 1977, 
and new gay and lesbian movements appeared in Finland and Iceland in 1974 
and 1978. Fears of gay sex as a source of disease and the wish to discipline gay 
men definitely played a part in the willingness to accept reform, but these argu-
ments were not addressed in the debate. The whole process was perceived as a 
benevolent society’s response to demands from gay and lesbian activists. Legal 
preparations had been well on the way in Denmark and Sweden, where the es-
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tablished gay and lesbian movements had opted for gay marriage, when the sud-
den Danish breakthrough kindled the debate in all the Scandinavian countries.
Why did it happen first in Scandinavia? The answer to that is most probably 
to be sought in the structure of the Scandinavian welfare states. The historical 
agreements between farmers’ parties and social democratic workers’ parties that 
took place in all Scandinavian countries in the 1930s created a strong base for 
social reform, a base founded on consensus and a willingness to compromise, 
but also a base which made possible far-reaching encroachments in the individ-
ual’s life. Thus, the sterilisation campaigns remain a dark chapter in Scandina-
vian history.111 A specific blend of ideals of conscientiousness and industrious-
ness created a society where the needs of the weak were met and the demands 
for cooperation and assimilation were strong. In such a society, an “anomaly” 
like homosexuality could be handled in two ways: by utter rejection, as in the 
1950s, or by incorporation and assimilation, as in the 1980s and 1990s. Anoth-
er important factor in understanding the gradual acceptance of homosexuals as 
valuable members of society ‒ most striking perhaps in Iceland ‒ is the sense of 
fairness and equity embedded in Scandinavian social democracy. Once gay and 
lesbian activists had managed to persuade young Social Democrats to fight for 
their cause, the question of homosexual emancipation ceased to be an ideologi-
cal question for liberals and reformed socialists and became a matter of social 
justice as defined by the broad workers’ movement. When the established lead-
ership of the Social Democratic Party was accused of treating homosexuals as 
less valuable and was asked to defend that position, it had no good answers. If 
it could not be regarded as self-evident that homosexuality was inferior, as had 
happened in the 1950s, what arguments were left?
Thus the dynamics of the welfare state, and a political process, beginning 
with the ideological commitment to lesbian and gay rights in a smaller seg-
ment of the population and culminating with rapid and decisive changes of at-
titudes in the majority, have paved the way for the incorporation of the lesbian 
and gay couple in society. But what ideological shifts among lesbian and gay 
activists have occurred when preparing this reform? And how have these shifts 
influenced its reception? In the next chapter, we will investigate the discussions 
within the lesbian and gay movements in the different Scandinavian countries.
Chapter Two:  
Is marriage what we want?
The demands for legal recognition of same-sex couples are not new. Ceremonies 
of friendship and other forms of bonding necessarily have copied heterosexual 
forms for contracting marriage. In 1884, the deeply religious Swedish philoso-
pher Pontus Wikner wrote in his secret diary about his love for other men. He 
deeply regretted the wrongs he had done to his wife, and he suggested a rem-
edy for the suffering he and those who were like him had to endure and had in-
flicted on others:
Could it not be possible, that an exceptional status be granted to such people who are my 
equals, so that if they could find a being of their own sex, who could reciprocate their love, 
they could enter into matrimony with each other? . . . Oh humans, humans, be merci-
ful! I know what the Bible says, but could there be no exceptional status for excep-
tional people? If I could receive this alliance praising God and another person could 
do the same with me, why could we not be allowed to?
Wikner died in 1888, but his secret diary was not published until 1971, more than 
eighty years after his death. His highly-strung prose was typical for his life and 
time, but his frank confessions about his erotic feelings for men were not. Ap-
parently he had not read any of the emerging literature about homosexuality 
and the third sex. For Wikner, his feeling for men was something that had to 
be negotiated with the Church and with his personal faith. But the world was 
going to change profoundly after his death, when lesbian and gay organisations 
appeared and grew in importance. 1 
There were no organisations for the third sex in Scandinavia before World 
War Two, even if some individuals had contacts with Magnus Hirschfeld’s Insti-
tut für Sexualwissenschaft in Berlin.2 Between 1948 and 1950, however, homophile 
organisations were founded in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. By the end of 
the 1950s these movements were rather well established, with their own pub-
lications, social events, and political lobby groups manned by volunteers in the 
capitals, as well as elsewhere. However, they were forced to be discreet and very 
cautious by the homophobic political climate of the 1950s. In Denmark, the so-
called pornography affair in 1955 all but crushed “The Society of 1948” (Forbun-
det af 1948), putting several of its leaders behind bars.3 In Norway, “The Norwe-
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gian Society of 1948” (Det Norske Forbundet av 1948, DNF ’48) escaped being de 
facto outlawed in 1953, when a law proposal suggesting the prohibition of public 
announcements about meetings for homosexual men and women was reject-
ed.4 In Sweden, the activists of the RFSL kept a relatively high profile in the 
early 1950s and, among other things, wrote letters to the Swedish Government 
and the United Nations demanding human rights for homosexuals. After a few 
years, however, a number of homosexual scandals and a violently homophobic 
press forced them to lie low. The RFSL had petitioned the Government to in-
vestigate the possibility of legally regulating homosexual relations in 1952, but 
later they wanted to withdraw their demand.5 Most activists considered it too 
risky, or meaningless, to demand gay marriage at this point. 
In Norway, the homophile movement successfully averted the danger of be-
ing outlawed by consulting a good lawyer and gaining support for their cause 
among medical and legal professionals.6 In 1949, The Danish Society of 1948 
filed an application for inclusion in the register of free associations of the Dan-
ish Ministry of Commerce, but it was rejected. It was not to be granted until 
1969. Instead, they concentrated on organising a Scandinavian network of lesbi-
ans and gay men, and its founder, Axel Lundahl Madsen (later Axgil), dreamed 
of a Scandinavian homophile union under his leadership. However, there were 
constant tensions between the Danish mother organisation and its Norwegian 
and Swedish chapters, and in 1951–53 they severed their ties with Denmark and 
became independent organisations.7 
In the 1960s the homophile movement was not publicly active, but initia-
tives were taken by other actors. In 1964 a widely publicised meeting in Stock-
holm, which dealt with a wide range of sexual issues, like pornography, abor-
tion, and extramarital sex, also discussed discrimination against homosexuals. 
And in 1966 the student housing agency at the University of Uppsala in Sweden 
declared that homosexual couples would get student apartments according to 
the same rules as heterosexual couples. This is an early example of how concrete 
rights for same-sex couples were sought outside the framework of marriage.8 In 
Finland, the ban on homosexual acts led to some protests and debates in the 
liberal press and among Finnish intellectuals, but there was no organisation for 
homosexuals that could deal with these problems.9 Both Finland and Iceland 
had to wait until the 1970s before nationwide gay and lesbian organisations were 
established. The Finnish and Icelandic gay rights movements emerged at the 
time when the existing homophile movements in other countries had been su-
perseded by more radical gay and lesbian groups of activists. 
From the 1970s onward the discussion whether to fight for marriage-like ar-
rangements for same-sex couples engaged many activists. The homophile move-
ments in the 1950s had cautiously raised the question, but the new generation 
that took over in the 1970s was split. There were those who advocated some kind 
of legal partnership for same-sex couples, but they were up against a firm and 
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well-formulated resistance from lesbian feminists and anti-establishment sex-
radicals.
Activism in the 1970s
The chair of the national Danish gay and lesbian movement from 1970 un-
til 1978, Per Kleis Bønnelykke, was the person who introduced the concept of 
“partnership” in the Scandinavian debate. When he became chair of The Society 
of 1948 there were two issues which interested him most of all. “There were two 
main areas where you can say that there was no equality,” Bønnelykke said in 
an interview. One was the higher age of consent for homosexual relations, “and 
the other area was the lack of possibility to get married, to put it simply.” For 
the marriage activism, he was inspired by the Swiss publication Der Kreis, which 
had argued for a “Partnerschaft” for homosexuals ‒ not marriage, but a partner-
ship.10 In 1972 Bønnelykke wrote a letter to the chair of the Danish Marriage 
Law Commission and pointed out that the commission also had a responsibil-
ity for solving problems that homophile couples met because of their inability 
to marry. He wrote that The Society of 1948 was prepared to accept practical so-
lutions instead of marriage status, and as an example of such a solution he men-
tioned that homophile couples as well as other “paperless couples” had recently 
been granted the possibility of getting apartments under the same conditions as 
married couples. He said that he personally preferred a long-term solution that 
would mean “an extension of the legal consequences of marriage to a larger part 
of the population,” and he proposed the following wording of a law:
Two persons, who wish to live in a steady relationship, can demand that their part-
nership be registered by the authorities. In all areas of the law, the registration (rec-
ognition) will have the same legal consequences as marriage. The recognition of the 
relationship presupposes the consent of both parties. Dissolution will take place if 
at least one of the parties so wishes, and follows the same rules as a divorce.11
This was the first time that the word “partnership” was used in a formal letter to 
a government agency, even if approximately the same rules and procedures had 
been suggested in the Socialist People’s Party’s law proposal from 1968. Bøn-
nelykke’s letter was followed by an intense campaign for registered partnership 
within The Society of 1948.12 The Marriage Law Commission, however, did not 
take into consideration Bønnelykke’s suggestions, and its published reports con-
tained no provisions for same-sex couples.13 After this failed intervention, Bøn-
nelykke and The Society of 1948 gave priority to the fight against the higher 
age of consent for gay sex and were successful in 1976. Until then, the discus-
sion about gay marriage was less intense within the movement, and even after-
wards there was no majority for it in the steering committee of The Society of 
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1948. “There was an attitude that marriage should be reserved for heterosexuals 
. . . and there were, in particular, women who thought that marriage itself was a 
ghastly institution,” Bønnelykke said.14
As mentioned earlier, The Norwegian Society of 1948 (DNF ’48) firmly re-
jected the idea of “homophile marriages.” At its General Assembly in 1973, the 
steering committee proposed a resolution with the title “No to homophile mar-
riage!” The national chair, Kim Friele, presented the proposal, saying that since 
the law prohibiting male homosexuality had been abolished, DNF ’48 had to 
consider its new fields of action. In neighbouring Denmark and Sweden, the 
ongoing revision of the marriage laws had resulted in debates around the le-
gal situation for same-sex couples, but Friele was of the opinion that marriage 
gave unjust advantages to those who had a partner, at the expense of those who 
did not. At the meeting, some members opposed the wording of the resolution, 
and especially its title. After some discussion, the resolution was accepted with 
a revised heading: “Yes to homophile relations ‒ No to marriage in the tradi-
tional way!” The resolution was carried with only one vote against, and it read 
in its entirety:
1. The value of the individual is not dependent on his or her ability, will, or possibil-
ity to couple with another individual.
2. The Norwegian Society of 1948 cannot accept any form of discrimination against 
unmarried people, economic or social. The Society will support any politics that 
has as its purpose the removal of this discrimination wherever it is found. The Nor-
wegian Society of 1948 will also work to defend other forms of relations than tra-
ditional marriage.15
This resolution was to determine the Norwegian gay and lesbian movement’s 
stand on gay marriage for a long time. As discussed in Chapter One, the Nor-
wegian movement was split in two, the DNF ’48 and the FHO, between 1978 
and 1992, but neither of the two organisations gave any priority to gay marriage 
or registered partnership. In 1984 two prominent FHO members expressed the 
view that there was a need for a discussion of strategies in both organisations.
What alternative life forms can we as lesbians and gay men inspire others to in 
the future? We stand outside the nuclear family, and from a freer perspective we 
could perhaps counter the privatising role of the family. Equality between homo 
and hetero must mean equal rights to sexuality, not the adoption of the nuclear 
family’s ideals.16
The DNF ’48 and the FHO existed side by side for thirteen years, but their ac-
tual politics differed very little. The common cause which gave the direct rea-
son for the merger of the two organisations was the lobbying effort for the law 
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on registered partnership. Representatives from both groups participated in the 
working group for registered partnership, and as a result of their efforts Nor-
way not only got a partnership law, but also a unified lesbian and gay national 
organisation, as the DNF ’48 and FHO joined their forces in the new organi-
sation. On 29 November 1992, the two organisations merged and formed LLH, 
The National Union for Lesbian and Gay Liberation (Landsforeningen for Les-
bisk og Homofil Frigjøring).17
In Sweden, pragmatic leaders such as Stig-Åke Petersson (chair of the 
RFSL 1971–72 and 1984–88) worked for equality between homosexual and het-
erosexual couples. “We did not have any opinion on marriage as such, but we 
thought that what applied to heterophiles should also be applied to us . . . I don’t 
remember if we demanded marriage or only that the same rules should apply,” 
he said in an interview.18 When the Swedish Family Law Commission (Famil-
jelagssakkunniga) presented its law proposal in 1972, in which same-sex families 
were not mentioned, the RFSL wrote to all the governmental and non-govern-
mental agencies consulted by the Family Law Commission and presented their 
differing opinion. Some of the agencies, most importantly the National Board 
of Health and Social Affairs (Socialstyrelsen) and the Social Democratic Party’s 
Youth League (SSU), responded positively to RFSL’s letter and mentioned it 
in their comments to the Government. Another RFSL initiative during those 
years was to demand that the Swedish Immigration Authority (Invandrarver-
ket) should treat same-sex couples the same way as unmarried different-sex cou-
ples when one of the partners asked for a residence permit in Sweden. This ac-
tion was done entirely by corresponding with the civil servants of the Immigra-
tion Authority, and the question was never brought to the political level. “Per-
haps that was the reason it was so easy to get it through,” Petersson said.19 
The work that was done during the late 1970s set the agenda for RFSL, and 
it was then that it earned its reputation in neighbouring countries of being a re-
formist, rather conservative organisation, aiming for gay marriage. “Both Nor-
wegians and Danes made fun of us,” Petersson remembers. “They were more 
radical.” His impression is corroborated by Norwegian activist Kim Friele, who 
mentioned in an interview that the Swedes were “a little more bourgeois, a lit-
tle cautious . . . And we made fun of the Swedes at that time. We depicted them 
with scarves and flower pots and so on.” According to Friele, the main differ-
ence was the way the organisations wanted to regulate same-sex marriages. The 
Swedes did it their way, she says, and “they couldn’t move on from traditional 
marriage. But there was a lot of debate between the countries.”20 In 1982, Kim 
Friele was invited to speak during the Stockholm Gay Liberation week and 
took the opportunity to criticise the RFSL for their commitment to marriage. 
This provoked some sour reactions from the RFSL, but Norwegian activists re-
acted in different ways. Some thought Friele’s speech an embarrassing interfer-
ence in Swedish gay politics, though the Swedish activist Calle Almedal, who 
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had lived in Norway for ten years, wholeheartedly supported her views. He 
wanted the gay movement to strive for the same opportunity as heterosexuals 
“without having to be forced to accept the prerequisites of heterosexual society.” 
Many others, however, criticised Friele for choosing such a moment to strike at 
RFSL’s policy.21
The political stand on marriage was thus very different among the Nordic 
countries, and in the beginning of the 1980s these differing opinions had been 
firmly institutionalised. The Icelandic delegation reported back from a Nordic 
meeting in Copenhagen in 1981 that all gay and lesbian organisations had di-
verging views on the partnership issue. According to the report, the Swedish 
RFSL demanded the same rights for same-sex couples as married and cohab-
iting heterosexual couples. The Finnish organisation had not yet a firm stand-
point on the issue, but the Danish, Icelandic, and Norwegian organisations “are 
against the uncritical adoption of the division between married people and oth-
ers, a division that makes a difference between first and second class citizens.” 
The problem was, they pointed out, that married people were given rights that 
they did not have before entering marriage, rights thus not granted to those 
who chose to organise their lives in other ways. According to the report, the 
Danish, Icelandic, and Norwegian organisations refused to divide the group 
of gays and lesbians into first and second class citizens. “On the contrary, these 
groups are of the opinion that people living together, regardless of sex and re-
gardless of how many they are, should be able to organise their private affairs, 
like their economy, in the way they choose.”22 The arguments here mirror the 
radical politics that prevailed in the 1970s. Marriage for homosexuals was reject-
ed on grounds of solidarity and equality, and the coupling of two individuals was 
not seen as the exclusive form of human bonding. 
The Icelandic movement was small, but it nevertheless hosted a variety of 
attitudes to the partnership law. Lana Kolbrún Eddudóttir, who was chair of 
Samtökin ’78 in 1988–90 and 1993–94, remembered the stormy meetings of 
Samtökin ’78 in the beginning of the 1990s, where she encountered criticism 
from both feminists and gay men. One of those who originally were against 
the partnership law was Margrét Pála Ólafsdóttir, who later became chair of 
Samtökin. When she had recently been elected, she gave an interview in the 
journal Sjónarhorn, where she aired her misgivings about the new law. She 
said she had both positive and negative feelings about the fight for it. She felt 
strongly that the lesbian and gay movement should not accept “half a share” too 
easily. “Now, according to the majority of the committee, we will be allowed to 
exist with limited civil rights,” she said. She vowed to work hard for the law, but 
she thought that the lesbian and gay activists must try to influence the MPs 
“so that we are not served scantily with civil rights as second-rate citizens from 
here to eternity.”23 Her argument clearly refers to the restrictions put upon the 
law in all Scandinavian countries, that it did not include custody over children 
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and the right to marry in Church, nor was it open to foreign citizens. These re-
strictions had been accepted by the gay movements as a pragmatic way of get-
ting the law through at all, but for many activists they were unacceptable. Ac-
cording to an interview she gave to Anna Einarsdóttir, Margrét Pála influenced 
Samtökin’s representatives in the Government Commission, Lana Kolbrún and 
Guðni Baldursson, to dissent more strongly from the commission. At any rate, 
Lana’s and Guðni’s minority statement finally had the effect that the Icelandic 
law granted joint custody to registered partners with children.24
Feminist resistance
Before the law on registered partnership became a reality, there was, especially 
in Denmark, an outspoken lesbian resistance to the proposal. When the law was 
adopted in Denmark in 1989, lesbian activist Else Slange was chair of the LBL. 
Slange never publicly opposed the law, but she was clearly sceptical. In an inter-
view, she remembered that many women were against the law, and their argu-
ments had to do with the dependency and subordination of women.
 
Why do we need that petit-bourgeois, well . . . crap?! We were strong women who 
could get by on our own, and what did women work for throughout the seventies? 
To become independent, to be valued, to be themselves! To become something in 
their own right, not as an appendix to another person. 25
Because of their feminist commitment to women’s independency, Danish lesbi-
ans opposed a law that again would make women dependent economically on 
another person. Slange pointed out, however, that there were problems in not 
having regulated inheritance. There were instances in which one of a couple died 
and the other inherited nothing. As for many lesbians, the question presented 
a dilemma for Slange, and neither she nor any of her lesbian activist friends ac-
tively opposed the law.26
Feminist resistance to any kind of marriage-like arrangements for same-sex 
couples was firmly rooted in the second-wave feminism of the 1970s, for which 
materialist theories of patriarchy played an important part. When U.S. econo-
mist Heidi Hartmann published her influential article “The unhappy marriage 
between Marxism and Feminism” in 1979, she strove to combine a Marxist ma-
terialistic worldview, departing from the class struggle, with a feminist analysis 
investigating the exploitation of female labour in the capitalist system. In order 
to understand patriarchal capitalism, she wrote, we must examine all aspects of 
it: 
The crucial elements of patriarchy as we currently experience them are: hetero-
sexual marriage (and consequent homophobia), female child-rearing and house-
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work, women’s economic dependence on men (enforced by arrangements in the la-
bor market), the state, and numerous institutions based on social relations among 
men ‒ clubs, sports, unions, professions, universities, churches, corporations, and 
armies. All of these elements need to be examined if we are to understand patri-
archal capitalism.27
Hartmann and other dual-system theorists were influential among Scandina-
vian feminists, and wherever there was a strong independent lesbian movement, 
there was also strong feminist resistance to the law. But the most influential 
text among Scandinavian lesbian feminists was by far “The Woman-Identified 
Woman” by Radicalesbians ‒ a manifesto that had been used to open the debate 
on lesbian issues at the Second Congress to Unite Women in New York in 1970. 
It was translated into different Scandinavian languages soon after its appearance 
in the United States and influenced the self-image and political standpoints of a 
generation of lesbians. The manifesto departs from the fact that men’s definition 
of “woman” leads to a thwarted self-image and self-hatred among all women. 
A woman is only recognised as such if she is attached to a man, it said: “We are 
authentic, legitimate, real to the extent that we are the property of some man 
whose name we bear.”28 It further maintained that “in exchange for our psychic 
servicing and for performing society’s non-profit-making functions, the man 
confers on us just one thing: the slave status which makes us legitimate in the 
eyes of the society in which we live.” This fundamental criticism of marriage 
was thus highly influential among lesbian women in Europe and in the United 
States, and it is no wonder that lesbians did not support the idea of a marriage-
like institution for same-sex couples as wholeheartedly as most gay men did. 
In 1981, when asked for their opinion on a proposal to give same-sex couples 
recognition by a separate registration, the Swedish group Lesbian Feminists 
(Lesbiska Feminister) wrote: “For a lesbian feminist to support this patriarchal 
institution, marriage, would be an insult to women’s liberation.”29 In Finland 
there was an overall sceptical attitude concerning the law within the movement 
in the 1980s, and Jorma Hentilä explained it by pointing to the strong feminist 
movement: “We weren’t that interested in the partnership law, and I think one 
reason was that among the lesbians at the time there were radical feminist lines 
of thought . . . and anything that was similar to marriage was no good. You didn’t 
want to adopt the forms that heterosexuals had.”30 
To explain the Finnish feminist reluctance to accept gay marriage, Terhi 
Saarinen, lesbian activist in the 1980s, said: “My ideology was more about free 
love or serial monogamy and such. But I was a young person.” When she was in-
terviewed, Saarinen had changed, and so had Finnish society. “The situation was 
so different compared to today because life was so hard, and we were so invisible 
and there were still very discriminating laws in those days . . . So it was so fara-
way to think about registering and so on.”31 The lack of interest in Finland can 
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thus be explained, on the one hand, by an ideologically based resistance to petit-
bourgeois norms and, on the other, by the fact that such a law was perceived as 
very far from the current political reality. 
Feminist resistance to the law, however, was by no means limited to the 1970s 
and the 1980s. Lana Kolbrún told me that there were clearly formulated femi-
nist arguments against it at some stormy meetings she organised in the early 
1990s. “There were those who didn’t want to join the marriage of patriarchy,” she 
said, and she remembered that one of the arguments was: “We won’t let our-
selves be pushed into marriage like heterosexuals, like sheep!”32 
A major change in the social situation for homosexuals came with the AIDS 
crisis in the 1980s. It had far-reaching consequences for the entire gay and lesbi-
an community. One of its effects was that it contributed to separatism and made 
lesbians even less inclined to support a male project of getting a law on regis-
tered partnership, a situation diametrically opposite to that in the United States, 
where the AIDS crisis resulted in closer ties between lesbians and gay men.33 
Women and AIDS
Women had been present as a minority within the Scandinavian homophile 
movement ever since it started and constantly had to fight against invisibil-
ity and male domination. According to Else Slange, many women were mem-
bers of the national gay and lesbian organisation, the LBL, in the 1980s, but 
they were invisible and needed to be motivated by issues that concerned them. 
As an example of how women could be mobilised in the movement if they felt 
that something concerned them, Slange mentioned paedophilia. A paedophile 
group had become affiliated with the LBL in 1983, and in 1985 some lesbian 
members moved to have it excluded. However, the LBL General Assembly de-
cided that it could remain within the organisation. Most women present at the 
meeting voted for exclusion, but they were in the minority. They then demand-
ed an extraordinary general assembly and asked all women members of LBL to 
come. A large number of women showed up and managed to overturn the pre-
vious decision.34 This event proved to be the beginning of a lesbian renaissance 
in the Danish movement, a development that contrasted with the other Scandi-
navian gay rights movements, where women were more marginalised. 
In the other Nordic countries, the AIDS epidemic further alienated wom-
en from the movement and led to the strengthening of separate lesbian groups. 
Þorvaldur Kristinsson had just become chairman of The Society of 1978 when 
AIDS struck Iceland. He remembers how lesbians left the movement when all 
efforts focused on AIDS and men’s sexuality. “What happened here was, as far 
as I understand, somewhat opposite to what happened in the States, where the 
AIDS crisis brought men and women together. Women here complained re-
peatedly about being left behind. They didn’t participate, they couldn’t involve 
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themselves in the AIDS work. They didn’t experience the fear and desperation 
that we did.”35 Lana Kolbrún Eddudóttir, who worked actively with AIDS pre-
vention, remembers that many women were active. But it was also a question of 
taking space in the movement. “The guys had to accept that the girls took up 
more space. And they were needed to keep up the work. We were supposed to 
cooperate, weren’t we?”36
Scandinavian lesbians were indeed divided on this issue. Many of their gay 
friends fell ill and died, and many lesbians were profoundly grief-stricken, but 
many were also disappointed that this happened at the exact moment they had 
managed to get a stronger position in the movement and had forced it to give 
more time and space to lesbians. When AIDS hit Scandinavia, all attention and 
all money and energy were once more directed to gay men. Terhi Saarinen re-
members the situation in Finland: “We women were not so interested in AIDS. 
It wasn’t our problem . . . Some lesbians thought we should be with gay men, 
because the times were so hard. But there were others, like me, who of course 
were sad but thought there were other things that were more important for les-
bians.”37 One explanation for the difference between Scandinavian and U.S. les-
bians’ response to the AIDS epidemic may be that Scandinavia had more de-
veloped public health programmes, and the need for voluntary work was con-
sequently less accentuated. Governmental response to the AIDS crisis differed 
among the Scandinavian countries, but the general health care systems were 
solid, and all over Scandinavia government funding was channelled into the gay 
and lesbian movements.
One woman who worked with AIDS in Sweden was Anna Mohr. In an in-
terview she remembered how tired she was of being questioned and criticised 
by both sides: “I often felt it was difficult to work as a woman among all these 
men with their super-male jargon and very little interest in women’s questions. 
I had to work like hell here [in the RFSL Centre]. And then I was constantly 
called in question by the women’s movement.” There were, according to Mohr, 
two groups of lesbians in the 1980s: those active in the lesbian and gay move-
ment, who felt that AIDS was a very important question, and those more inter-
ested in social activities, who thought that men’s issues were taking over. “They 
saw that the guys got loads of money. There were loads of safe-sex information 
for guys. There were dicks on every wall and there were so many condoms and so 
much male sexuality that you felt like throwing up.”38 At this time many women 
felt marginalised in the Swedish lesbian and gay movement and left and found-
ed the group Lesbisk Nu! (Lesbian Now!). The same thing happened in Finland, 
where lesbians formed the separate group Akanat (Chaff ), and in Iceland, where 
disgruntled lesbians gathered in the group Íslensk lesbíska (Icelandic Lesbians). 
In Norway, where the AIDS prevention work was managed by a separate group, 
independent from the two existing national organisations, there was less ten-
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sion between men and women, and in Denmark women had a stronger position 
within the LBL.39
The wedge that AIDS forced between gays and lesbians in Scandinavia fur-
ther accentuated the differences between their respective goals and priorities. If 
the men had never thought much about feminist issues, most women did not 
care much for male sexuality and their health problems. This was a contributing 
cause why many lesbians felt alienated from the project of registered partner-
ship in the 1980s and left it to gay men to do the fighting. As mentioned, wom-
en took their place in the Danish gay and lesbian movement in the early 1980s 
when they mobilised against paedophilia. In the other Nordic countries, how-
ever, the 1980s were a time of separate lesbian organisations, and it wasn’t until 
the 1990s that women began exerting as much influence as men in the national 
gay and lesbian organisations.
Radical male resistance
If the feminist argument against gay marriage or registered partnership was 
based in a materialist critique of patriarchy, radical gay men’s standpoint fo-
cused on the capitalist modes of production and the crippling mechanisms of 
a homophobic environment. Inspired by Wilhelm Reich, they wanted to com-
bine a Marxist world view with psychoanalytic insights and hailed sexuality as 
the most important force in society. Sometimes their criticism was less articu-
late, and often the hippie slogan “make love not war” gave voice to more diffuse 
discontents with modern society. For many of the groups that were formed in 
the waves of gay radicalism in the 1970s the process of creating a positive iden-
tity was the main priority. Wilhelm von Rosen, who was active in the Danish 
Gay Men’s Liberation Front, BBF (Bøssernes Befrielses Front), between 1973 and 
1977, explained in an interview: “The crucial question was the identity forma-
tion of homosexuals, the self-consciousness of the gay men themselves. That is, 
the struggle against self-hatred and a conception of oneself that is perhaps hard 
to understand now, almost half a century later.” The question of gay marriage or 
registered partnership was not an issue for the members of BBF. Wilhelm von 
Rosen remembers that they were not the least interested in registered partner-
ship and watched the work for it “with a certain indifference and friendly inter-
est,” because the arena in which that struggle took place was so far away from 
the one where BBF wanted to work. When asked, he admits that some mem-
bers were in fact against the law on ideological grounds: “They thought it was 
a bad thing. It was imitating bourgeois marriage, which we shouldn’t work for, 
because we were leftists and socialists and even communists in some cases.” Von 
Rosen remembers the BBF as an organisation that was not primarily interested 
in changing society but in changing the negative self-images of homosexuals: 
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First and foremost we wanted to change the homosexuals themselves. That was 
our primary task. Of course we wanted to change the heterosexuals also, but we 
just told them brutally what we thought of them, that they oppressed us, that they 
were awful, that their lifestyle was appalling, and that we thought of them as ene-
mies. It couldn’t be any other way. And if they thought we exaggerated, we couldn’t 
care less.40
There were other groups who were more focused on social change but still gave 
priority to consciousness-raising. The more politically articulate fraction of the 
gay radicals argued that a social revolution was not possible without a sexual 
revolution. In an article from 2000, suffused with self-irony, Swedish gay activist 
Greger Eman has described how he and his friends went out into the gay men’s 
The members of the gay collective Stormly (Storm Shelter) in Copenhagen were utterly indiffer-
ent to the idea of registered partnership. From left to right: Finn Mikkelsen, Ole Rufus Nielsen, Ole 
Nørlyng, Wilhelm von Rosen. Source: PAN-bladet, Copenhagen, no. 6 (1972).
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cruising park in Göteborg in the early 1970s in order to inspire and politicise 
the “homosexual proletariat.” They lit a bonfire and offered salad to the cruising 
men. “What surprises me in retrospect is that I can’t remember getting any neg-
ative comments from the passers-by,” Eman wrote. “The men smiled shyly and 
accepted the salad. They were friendly but refused to ‘come out of the bushes’ 
and join us on our blanket in singing [the feminist song] ‘Liberation is near.’”41 
As Lana Kolbrún remembers it, Icelandic men opposed the law from both 
political conviction and personal experience. “The guys thought it was the stupi-
dest thing we could do [to work for the law].” But she chooses to understand it 
most of all from a psychological perspective. “You have to understand our feel-
ings. Most of us, the older generation who are forty now, were rejected by our 
own families. And I think some of us were so hurt that they didn’t want to . . . 
do like everybody else. They didn’t want to be normalised.”42
In the radical struggle to change the world lies a dilemma that will surface 
as soon as a group works politically for recognition. First of all, the radical gays 
and lesbians wanted to change society before they became an integral part of it, 
but they also needed recognition from the society in which they lived there and 
then. That dual ambition was the reason they sought and found their foremost 
political allies among the socialist parties to the left of the Social Democrats. 
Most of those parties were no longer revolutionary in a Marxist sense, but they 
worked for a more profound change of society than the reformist Social Demo-
crats, and to the extent they had got rid of their Stalinist heritage, they were also 
prepared to listen to the demands for gay and lesbian rights. 
The right to be different
Another activists’ argument against gay marriage was the insistence that gay and 
lesbian diversity would be threatened by a normalising law such as the law on 
registered partnership. This cultural argument was generally weak or not articu-
lated at all before queer theory questioned heteronormativity in the 1990s. But 
when the Danish law was on its way, it sparked a discussion within the move-
ment that shows that the diversity argument was being developed during this 
time. In 1988, Sanne Yde Schmidt, a lesbian activist of LBL, summarised the 
argument for the Nordic Council for Homosexuals or NRH (Nordisk Råd for 
Homoseksuelle) and the International Gay and lesbian Association, ILGA.43 In 
a document sent out for discussion, she mentioned that a debate had emerged 
in Denmark about the objectives of the gay and lesbian movement when the 
law on registered partnership was being prepared. Much of the debate focused 
on identity. “The question is whether it is possible to resist being discriminated 
against (the fact that we are treated differently) without giving up the idea that 
we are (and have the right to be) different.” When Danish gays and lesbians 
tried to describe their personal visions of what life would be in twenty years, she 
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said, they mainly emphasised visibility ‒ to be visible in society and depicted in 
the arts. If gays and lesbians were visible, it would be difficult to find reasons to 
deny them basic freedoms. “The problem is not whether we wish to be accept-
ed. That is necessary for us. The problem is whether we want to be accepted as 
a lifestyle similar to the heterosexual (except for some minor details), or wheth-
er we want to be accepted as an equal but different culture.” She concluded her 
discussion paper saying that both things were necessary: to point out the like-
ness between homo- and heterosexual cultures, and to “maintain and develop 
our gay/lesbian cultures.”44
The argument here seems to be aimed at those who opposed the partnership 
law and not at those who actually worked for it. But the fact is, there was a gen-
eral consensus on many levels that imitating heterosexual marriage was below 
the dignity of gays and lesbians. And there was an even stronger consensus that 
a separate law on partnership for same-sex couples was unacceptable. Instead of 
being singled out in a special law, many gay and some lesbian activists wanted 
to have the whole loaf and not just crumbs. As the situation in Sweden clearly 
shows, this strong consensus, however, quickly vanished as the Danish law be-
came reality.
All or nothing
Before the Danish partnership law was adopted, none of the Swedish gay and 
lesbian groups accepted the “registration according to a separate order” (regist-
rering i särskild ordning) proposed by the Swedish Government’s Homo Com-
mission. Anna Mohr later recalled opposition to this proposal: “All the organi-
sations, as far as I can remember, were unanimously ‒ and without even reflect-
ing on it as an alternative ‒ against a separate order of registration . . . And it 
was a matter of course that we did not want a separate legislation in any way.”45 
When the Homo Commission sent out a document in 1981, asking for opinions 
on possible forms for the legal regulation of same-sex couples, the condemna-
tion of a separate legislation for gay and lesbian couples was unanimous. The 
RFSL wrote: “The alternative implies, in fact, that a separate set of rules will be 
introduced for homosexual relations, which must be interpreted as discrimina-
tory.” The RFSL could only accept such a solution if the registration was also 
to be open for heterosexual couples (the way it later became in the Netherlands 
and France).46 The political lobby group Homosexual Socialists (Homosexuella 
Socialister), consisting of both organised Social Democrats and Communists, 
was harsher in its criticism. It categorically rejected “all forms of separate legis-
lation for homosexuals” because it had discrimination as a built-in consequence. 
“We think it is dishonest that the ‘registered marriage’ is described as something 
other than a B-marriage, a surrogate that can become better or worse depend-
ing on the possible benevolence of the legislator.”47 A third group that sent in 
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its comments to the proposal, the Ecumenical Group for Christian Homosex-
uals, EKHO (Ekumeniska gruppen för kristna homosexuella), was also negative. 
The only acceptable form for registration of homosexual couples would be that 
all marriages were supplemented with an “act of notification or registration” in 
the presence of witnesses. A separate registration would result in discrimina-
tion and “preservation of prejudice,” they wrote.48 Finally, the earlier mentioned 
group Lesbian Feminists, or LF, dismissed the thought of marriage altogether. 
The nuclear family in patriarchal society, they argued, reduced women to “de-
pendency, passivity, sacrifice, and lack of identity.” Lesbian Feminists could not 
support a proposal merely allowing homosexuals to live in that form, and they 
strongly rejected the idea that homosexuals were to be “squeezed into marriage” 
by a law on separate registration.49 These examples from various parts of the gay 
and lesbian movement in Sweden show that the rejection of the idea of a sepa-
rate legislation for same-sex relations was unanimous in the 1980s. 
These reservations were put aside when the Danish law was adopted and 
some form of law regulation of same-sex relations seemed politically possi-
ble, but since all Scandinavian movements were against separate legislation for 
homosexuals, the Danes called the partnership registrations marriages, even 
though they were not. The Danish gay and lesbian movement repeatedly told 
the world media that Denmark was the first country in the world where ho-
mosexuals were allowed to marry, omitting that this was not an actual marriage 
and that there were restrictions. In an interview, Tobias Wikström commented 
on this use of the language: “It was naturally in order to get the most out of a 
happy landmark victory, but it also has a political tactical twist: They try to call 
it something diminutive, but we call it ‘getting married.’” However, when the 
interview was made, ten years after the registered partnership had been adopt-
ed in Sweden, but before the gender-neutral marriage law had been adopted, 
Wikström’s use of the language had changed accordingly. “Now I wouldn’t call 
it ‘getting married,’” he said, “because now we fight for a real gender-neutral 
marriage.”50
Two activists
Two voices may exemplify queer resistance to marriage laws for homosexuals in 
the 1970s and 1980s: Karen-Christine “Kim” Friele, chair of the Norwegian gay 
and lesbian movement DNF ’48 from 1967 to 1972, its Secretary General from 
1972 to 1989, and thereafter influential public figure and opinion maker, and 
Þorvaldur Kristinsson, one of the leading figures in the Icelandic gay and les-
bian movement from 1980 to the present. Following Norwegian and Icelandic 
custom, I will use Kim Friele’s surname, and Þorvaldur Kristinsson’s first name 
when referring to them. 
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Friele dominated the Norwegian gay and lesbian movement for decades 
and exerted a strong influence on gay and lesbian rights movements in all of 
Scandinavia, and Þorvaldur has been a centrally placed gay activist during 
the paradigm shift, when Iceland quickly evolved from a homophobic to an 
explicitly gay-friendly society. Both of them were decidedly against the idea of 
civil unions for same-sex couples, Þorvaldur for the reason that gays should not 
imitate heterosexual institutions, while Friele’s arguments were more focused 
on the privilege it would give to couples at the expense of those who could not 
or would not live with a partner. It was not until later that she developed the 
argument that the registered partnership did not include children. When they 
were interviewed, Þorvaldur discussed at length the reasons why he changed his 
mind and now endorsed registered partnership, whereas Friele explained that 
she had never changed her mind. She explained that she was always in favour 
of gay marriage, but not in the form it had been presented to the Norwegian 
Parliament in 1993.
During the interview, Þorvaldur mentioned that he became politically in-
fluenced in the early 1980s by Bøssernes Befrielses Front (Gay Men’s Liberation 
Front, BBF) in Denmark, as well as by his Danish lover and his circle of friends 
in Århus. Visibility then became a key concept for him. “I realised that visibil-
ity is actually the key to every answer. I was so convinced that our politics really 
was a simple thing, actually. As soon as you become visible to your surround-
ings, the prejudice will disappear. So I believed. I’m not so convinced anymore. 
But that was my conviction then.”51 Although the BBF worked for visibility and 
public action, gay marriage was not on their agenda, and Þorvaldur remained 
sceptical about it even when he, as chair of Samtökin ’78, lobbied for an Icelan-
dic Homo Commission. Ingibjörg Sólrun Gísladóttir from the Women’s List 
presented the proposal in Parliament, and Þorvaldur made much of the work 
behind it. “What I didn’t fully realize then . . . was the fact that the issue of reg-
istered partnership would become a central one in the work of that committee,” 
he explained in later correspondence.52 After the Danish law had come into ex-
istence, a law on registered partnership seemed the logical way to go for many, 
both within the gay and lesbian movements and in mainstream politics.
Þorvaldur’s conviction that visibility was the best strategy was to guide him 
as one of the leaders of the Icelandic gay and lesbian movement, and it was also 
the reason that he finally could accept the law on registered partnership. At first, 
though, he thought he could never accept such a law. “And the argument was 
very classical and actually banal. I didn’t want to be integrated in a traditional 
heterosexual way. I shared this opinion with many of my friends abroad, in both 
Scandinavia and America, and I was pretty much influenced by American voic-
es in gay publications. I was not aware then that their standpoint in this matter 
was somewhat different from mine. What they meant by marriage was some-
thing quite other than we saw in Scandinavia.” 
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During the interview, Þorvaldur talked a lot about the distinctiveness of 
Nordic culture in general and Icelandic culture in particular. This may explain 
why Icelandic society has experienced the most extraordinary change in atti-
tudes to homosexuality, he said. Þorvaldur didn’t provide any more arguments 
for his earlier resistance to the law, but he said he was happy he had kept his 
doubts to himself. Between 1993 and 1997 he quietly left the movement because 
he could not fight for something he did not believe in, but later he changed his 
mind radically and quickly. It happened when the law on registered partnership 
became effective in Iceland, on 27 June 1996. He changed his opinion “because 
the law meant a certain kind of recognition . . . And already, that day, I could 
see how people were changing. Self-oppressive behaviour was gradually ebbing 
away. It will never completely disappear, but my friends are not the same.”
Þorvaldur went to the reception in the City Theatre of Reykjavík on the 
night when the law on registered partnership became reality. The President of 
the Republic was there, and many other dignitaries. Þorvaldur went reluctantly, 
not wanting to celebrate the passage of a law he had been opposed to, but what 
he saw at the reception made him change his mind. “I met the President and 
my old friends. I saw old guys in their sixties and seventies for the first time in 
their lives coming out, showing themselves in daylight, with prominent figures. 
I met several clergymen from the Icelandic National Church there, et cetera, et 
cetera. So I thought, okay, maybe that is the way to go.”
The years after the law on registered partnership was introduced proved him 
right, Þorvaldur said. During this time, Icelandic society has changed from a 
homophobic society to a country where it is a matter of national pride to be gay-
friendly. According to Þorvaldur, the importance of the family in such a small 
country cannot be overrated. Most families arrange big gatherings every second, 
third, or fourth year, and often several hundred people show up. “All families do 
this, more or less on a smaller or bigger scale. It’s called ættarmót, the meeting of 
the family, which means that people from four generations gather together, and 
it’s mostly out in the country. Those meetings are a bit funny, but emotionally 
very important.” So to be able to present a partner of the same sex at such a huge 
family gathering is very important to every Icelander, which in part explains 
why the formal state recognition of same-sex relationships means so much to a 
person in a small country, based to a great extent on family ties. 
“I think,” Þorvaldur said, “that my old argument, which I fortunately kept to 
myself, was simply wrong, because I didn’t take into account the special situa-
tion of Icelanders, which partly is similar to the whole of Scandinavia.” Family 
ties are probably more important in small linguistic and cultural entities, and 
the acceptance of the family becomes more important than in larger countries. 
However, to marry, to register your partnership, Þorvaldur contended, has only 
partly to do with imitating the rest of society: “You are always more or less imi-
tating the others. We don’t know who we are and are not!”
86 Odd Couples
Þorvaldur expressed his satisfaction that he now realised gay marriage is still 
something completely different from a heteronormative marriage. “You can es-
tablish a family, you can register, you can form this kind of imitation of regular 
bourgeois marriage. This is, however, not the same thing.” Several of Þorvaldur’s 
gay friends who registered a partnership have declared, more or less directly, that 
they live in open relationships, something that Þorvaldur sees as hopeful for the 
queer lifestyle and for the diversity of mankind. “I think that humanity always 
finds its independent way to survive and seek happiness.” 
Þorvaldur came back to gay and lesbian activism in 1997, after the part-
nership law had been adopted, and, as chair of Samtökin ’78 in 2000–2005, he 
worked hard to extend the law to cover rainbow families. He worked for full 
adoption rights and access to assisted reproduction techniques “wholehearted-
ly, convinced that this was the right way to go, an important and necessary step 
toward one single marriage act.”53 It was the visibility and public recognition 
of lesbians and gays that convinced Þorvaldur that registered partnership and 
gay marriage were useful legal tools for gay and lesbian emancipation. Since his 
resignation in 2005, after his third term as chair of Samtökin ’78, he has been 
dedicated to organising Reykjavík Gay Pride, the huge event he was involved 
in founding.
Kim Friele, a Norwegian lesbian activist who has had a great influence on 
Scandinavian gay and lesbian politics in the 1970s and 1980s, sees things differ-
ently. During her interview, she pointed out that it was false to claim that she 
had been against gay marriage. After all, the initiative in debating the partner-
ship issue was hers already in 1973 when she summoned a meeting with the oth-
er Scandinavian movements and the Dutch COC, just to discuss gay marriage. 
After that, the Norwegian movement agreed to legal recognition of same-sex 
relations as long as they were not copying heterosexual marriage. In the 1970s, 
however, the Norwegian movement chose not to focus on legalising domestic 
partnerships for same-sex couples, but lobbied instead for an anti-discrimina-
tion clause in the criminal code.54
In the late 1980s, the partnership issue became a cause of debate within the 
DNF ’48, and a conflict sprang up between Friele and a generation of younger 
activists who were inspired by the Danish law and wanted to work for a similar 
law in Norway. Friele’s arguments in that debate focused on her refusal to grant 
privileges to couples at the expense of single people or those who chose other 
kinds of relationships, and she also presented the feminist argument that there 
should be no mutual support law and no talk about a “weaker partner” in the re-
lation. During the interview, Friele stressed again that she was never against the 
partnership law as such. The debate within the Scandinavian movements at the 
beginning of the 1970s focused on the question of giving privileges to couples 
and not to others. Then there was no debate about marriage for same-sex cou-
ples until 1981 when Friele herself initiated work to formulate an alternative to 
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the Government’s proposal about household communities (husstandsfellesskap). 
Her speech at a general assembly of the DNF ’48 became a semi-official policy 
document. “My advice then to the national board was that we should work for 
legal regulation of the relations of gays and lesbians . . . but I think that since 
we were not in a hurry we should critically evaluate it and see if the marriage 
law in practice has legal effects that are impossible for us to work for.”55 She ex-
plained that she had great difficulty in accepting the partnership law as it had 
been formulated in Denmark, since “it didn’t include the children.” And she re-
garded it as a mistake that the movement accepted such a law. “I thought that 
we shouldn’t be so keen on marriage that we couldn’t wait until we got the chil-
dren included.” And today, Friele pointed out, “the partnership law is called a 
B-marriage by the same people who fought for it! But when I said so at the end 
of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s I was almost shot, wasn’t I?”56 To-
ward the end of the interview, Friele turned to me and said: “Then you can say: 
Should we have waited ten more years? No, I guess not. But we should have 
been courageous and honest enough to have discussed it thoroughly within the 
gay movement.”57 When the interview was conducted, in September 2005, the 
law on registered partnership had been in force for twelve years, but the Social-
ist Left Party had already presented a proposal to replace it by a gender-neutral 
marriage law. The proposal had failed, but Friele pointed out with some satisfac-
tion that the gay activists now were working for something she had suggested 
from the very beginning.
In many ways, Friele’s position demonstrates the dilemma facing gay and 
lesbian activism regarding integration in society. On the one hand, lesbians and 
gays strive for recognition, but on the other they resent assimilation. She admit-
ted that the partnership law has worked well during its years of existence. But 
there is also another dimension to what she wants. “I think they are a bit stout, 
you see, the Norwegian gay and lesbian movement, with house and poodle and 
garden and . . . There aren’t any really controversial ideological gay political de-
bates anymore.”58
The two activists, Þorvaldur Kristinsson and Kim Friele, were both reluc-
tant to accept the idea of a gay marriage law that would emulate heterosexual 
marriage. Whereas Þorvaldur seems to have leaned more toward a plea for di-
versity and sexual freedom, Friele emphasised the equality and solidarity argu-
ment. Both had to give in to strong political pressure, but whereas Þorvaldur 
quietly distanced himself from the gay movement, Friele fought for and loudly 
defended what she believed in.59 The price she had to pay for her many conflicts 
with other activists was to become isolated from the Norwegian gay movement 
for a long period. However, a sort of reconciliation was reached when the Nor-
wegian movement asked her and her partner to be among the first couples to 
register in Oslo City Hall and to be guests of honour at the ensuing wedding 
party. Friele mentioned that she has been criticised for registering her own part-
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nership by those who thought she betrayed the anti-partnership wing in the 
movement and by those who fought against her for the partnership law. “Many 
thought we were traitors. Many thought we had let them down by registering 
our partnership before the children were included in the law.” Others thought 
it was strange that she changed sides so quickly. “And many others used the op-
posite argument. How can it be that you two, who were against the partnership 
law, can be so bold as to register your partnership?” Friele dismissed the second 
argument by claiming that she had never opposed gay marriage. To the others, 
she would say that she didn’t think she and her partner had any obligation to be 
sacrificed for the sake of those with children. “And we said that this is how it is, 
and we have no children, but we have debts, and we have a house . . . We’ll do 
this. Now we shall cherish our love. And so we did.”60 
Conclusions
The idea of gay marriage or separate registration of same-sex couples was thus 
supported by only a minority in the established gay and lesbian movement in 
each Scandinavian country. How could this minority prevail, in view of the radi-
cal stance of the reform movement throughout the 1980s? With typically liberal 
arguments about equality before the law, they did not score very high in the eyes 
of the more militant left forces in the gay and lesbian movement. Yet it was their 
agenda and their priorities that determined the course of Scandinavian gay and 
lesbian politics in the 1980s and 1990s. One reason for this was that they were 
well organised and that they spoke the same language as the authorities. An-
other reason was that the direct gains of the politics of visibility and assimilation 
were obvious and easy to point out to their members. The demands for gay mar-
riage were easy to understand and represented a concrete political goal for those 
who wanted to support the gay cause. As we have seen, Norway chose another 
way in 1973 and gave priority to the work for an anti-discrimination clause. But 
that did not cause celebration, except when the clause was adopted by Parlia-
ment. It did not engender recurring scenes of marital joy, but lengthy trials in 
the court system, trials that were lost more often than not. The law on registered 
partnership was perfect for a society that wanted to mirror itself in its tolerance, 
and for a gay and lesbian community that wanted positive attention. The cer-
emonies that resulted from it constantly reminded all people of the happy out-
come of their decision. Following the same logic, the public ceremony staged 
in Helsinki by SETA in 1994, when four lesbian and gay couples performed “il-
legal” marriage ceremonies, was in itself a strong visual argument for registered 
partnership. To be able to deny the happy couples that joy, one had indeed to 
carry a strong conviction against it.The same can be said about the resistance 
to gay marriage within the movement. When the Norwegian movement made 
its decision in 1973 not to work for gay marriage, it was yet so far from becom-
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ing a reality that it was perceived as a rather abstract policy issue. But when the 
Danish partnership law was on its way, many lesbian feminists and radical gay 
activists who were against it could not bring themselves openly to oppose it. In 
this situation, perhaps the AIDS epidemic had some effect. Gay men were in 
deep crisis, and if marriage was what many gay men wanted, then the opponents 
within the movements may have withheld their opposition.
The most important aspect, however, was that liberal or social democratic, 
reformist gay men had the power in the national gay and lesbian movements in 
the 1990s. Lesbian feminists whose ideological conviction differed significantly 
from the liberal pro-marriage stance chose to work in separate organisations, 
and those who remained in the national movements made compromises with 
the men. 
In Denmark, Per Kleis Bønnelykke, who was chair of the LBL and a liberal 
politician, gave up his attempts to make the LBL work for registered partner-
ship in the mid-1970s. His successor, Bent Hansen, worked in a changing politi-
cal landscape. In 1983 he managed to achieve binding promises from gay-friend-
ly political parties to work for a commission on the living conditions for ho-
mosexuals in society. For him and the other homosexual representatives in the 
Danish Homo Commission, registered partnership was a self-evident goal to 
work for. In Sweden, the radical leadership of the RFSL of the 1970s was gradu-
ally becoming more bureaucratic. Stig-Åke Petersson, founder of the Swedish 
Gay Liberals, was RFSL’s representative in the Swedish Homo Commission. 
For him, some form of gay marriage was a matter of equality. 
The Norwegian movement did not work for registered partnership until the 
beginning of the 1990s. The new chair, Kjell Erik Øie, was later elected to the 
Oslo Municipal Council for the Labour Party. Neither for him, nor for the 
many women who took an active part in the lobbying efforts, were the feminist 
and radical arguments valid anymore. There had been a paradigm shift, in which 
second-wave feminism had been considerably weakened, and theories of patri-
archy were no longer important for lesbian women’s political decisions. The gay 
and lesbian national organisations became professionalised in the 1980s and de-
veloped channels to high-level politicians in each country. In Finland, the lead-
ership of the gay and lesbian movement in the 1980s consisted of social demo-
cratic and left socialist politicians, but registered partnership was so far from the 
political reality that it was never even on the agenda. In the 1990s, the persistent 
opposition from the authorities helped unite the Finnish gay and lesbian move-
ment in its demands for partnership. Iceland, finally, had such a small gay and 
lesbian movement that different opinions could hardly coexist within it. The les-
bian separatist organisation was of limited size, and activists critical to gay mar-
riage often chose not to question the movement’s pro-partnership policy.
The success of the reformist politics of the Scandinavian lesbian and gay 
movements only became possible when there was enough positive response from 
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the political establishment. When there were enough gay-friendly politicians 
on the parliamentary level, the liberals and reformist Social Democrats within 
the lesbian and gay movements were strengthened within their own ranks, and 
the radical feminists and those who advocated confrontational politics accord-
ingly lost ground. In the next chapter, we will see how demands for lesbian and 
gay rights gained acceptance within the mainstream political system.
Chapter Three:  
Gay marriage in mainstream politics
During the twentieth century, the Scandinavian countries saw the establish-
ment of a fairly stable five-party system following two basic divisions: that be-
tween work and capital and that between urban and rural interests. This led to 
the establishment of large workers’ parties, large agrarian parties, and large con-
servative parties that defended the interests of the capital owners. Next to these 
three class-based party formations, smaller ideology-based parties evolved. The 
communist or left socialist parties on the one hand and the liberal parties on the 
other generally attracted between 5 and 10 percent each of the voters. This sta-
ble five-party structure was challenged by the emergence of new political par-
ties in the 1970s and 1980s. Radical right-wing parties were created as a reaction 
to high taxes. Christian parties were established or strengthened as a reaction 
to liberal abortion laws and the release of pornography. Finally, environmental-
ist or Green parties became established in Finland and Sweden. The right-wing 
populist parties generally had a neo-liberal agenda and as such they sometimes 
had a positive stance on gay and lesbian rights issues. However, strong reaction-
ary forces ‒ and a macho leadership ‒ within these parties eventually led to a 
homophobic attitude.1 The position of the green parties in the political spec-
trum was initially unclear, but for the most part they consisted of younger peo-
ple who, when asked, would be in favour of gay and lesbian rights. The Chris-
tian democratic parties, finally, were consistently opposed to such rights, since 
they had been created by conservative Christians to defend traditional values.2
In the late sixties and early seventies, political work for same-sex relationship 
regulation began in the smaller ideological parties, the left socialist or liberal 
parties. The larger parties were either opposed to gay and lesbian rights (like the 
conservative and centre parties) or uninterested or split over the issue (like the 
social democrats). It is important to remember, however, that this picture is sim-
plified, since no party was unanimous in its support for, or resistance to, gay and 
lesbian rights. In Sweden, there was an important presence of Christian free-
thinkers in the People’s Party before the Christian Democratic Party managed 
to attract most of them. They were generally opposed to gay and lesbian rights 
and when their influence in the liberal People’s Party diminished, its commit-
ment to gay and lesbian rights issues grew stronger. Likewise, the acceptance of 
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sexual minorities in the left socialist parties was adversely proportional to the 
presence of Moscow-oriented old-timers.3
Left socialist parties and the leftist response to gay marriage
The 1950s and 1960s saw the creation of new socialist parties to the left of the 
Social Democrats, parties that broke with either the Moscow-influenced Com-
munist hardliners or the Social Democrats and could therefore harbour pro-gay 
standpoints in a more libertarian socialist tradition. 
As we have seen, it was the Danish Socialist People’s Party, SF, that in 1968 
was the first to take the initiative in regulating same-sex relations, but it should 
be pointed out that this was part of a larger proposal to help both same-sex 
and different-sex couples register their relationships, to create a possibility for 
groups to register their relationship, and to allow siblings to marry. The proposal 
stirred some debate, and some newspapers described it as opening the road to 
harems, polygamy, incest and moral decay. All in all, the debate in Parliament 
was held in a cautiously positive tone, and more than one speaker specifically 
welcomed the provision for same-sex couples to regulate their relationship. In 
concluding the parliamentary debate, SF’s leader Poul Dam thanked the speak-
ers for constructive comments, and he said he did not believe that the law, if 
it were adopted, would lead to higher numbers of homosexual couples. “But I 
think that those that really exist will get a better, a more humane life, if soci-
ety tells them that ‘yes, we know you are there, we not only tolerate you, but we 
also see that you have certain problems that we would like to help you solve by 
legislation.’”4 This liberal and understanding attitude contrasts sharply with the 
homophobic campaigns just a decade earlier, but it is also an example of a be-
nevolent speech concerning tolerance and help instead of rights. The gay and 
lesbian movement had not yet developed a radical stance and had not yet the 
power to influence the general debate to any significant degree. 
In the proposal that the Swedish Left Communist Party (VPK) present-
ed five years later, the part about communal living had been toned down. “The 
state should recognise the existence of such forms of cohabitation but not le-
gally regulate them” was their standpoint.5 The Standing Law Committee dealt 
rather favourably with the Left Communist Party’s motion. It rejected its pro-
posal but acknowledged the need to deal with the situation of homosexuals, and 
it wrote in its report that “a love relation between two persons of the same sex 
is from the point of view of society a fully acceptable form of coexistence.”6 As 
in Denmark five years earlier, the debate in Parliament was generous, and there 
was remarkably little opposition to the suggestion that same-sex relations were 
“fully acceptable.”7
Like its sister parties in Denmark and Sweden, the Norwegian Socialist 
Left Party (Sosialistisk Venstreparti) was the closest ally to DNF ’48 in Parlia-
93Gay marriage in mainstream politics
ment during the 1970s and took several initiatives in questions of lesbian and gay 
rights.8 Since the lesbian and gay movement had clearly declared that it did not 
want gay marriage, it did not present any marriage-law proposals to the Storting, 
but worked instead for a clause against discrimination on grounds of sexual ori-
entation.
As earlier mentioned, most of the leading lesbian and gay activists in Nor-
way sympathised either with the Socialist Left Party or with the AKP(m-l). But 
whereas the Socialist Left Party had no problems in combining a socialist posi-
tion with a pro-gay stance, the AKP strived to integrate its views on homosexu-
ality in a Marxist-Leninist understanding of history and society. In its “Decla-
ration on homosexuality,” the AKP said that class was a more important aspect 
of the struggle for justice than sexual orientation:
As communists and revolutionaries we declare that class solidarity, and one’s posi-
tion in the class struggle, is more important than one’s sexual orientation. In order 
to evaluate the position of homosexuals in society, it is therefore necessary to take 
the class conditions as a point of departure. . . . At the same time, the Party does not 
want to press homosexuals to change their orientation. Only a scientific analysis on 
the basis of Marxist-Leninist Mao Tse-tung’s thoughts, and knowledge based on 
will and commitment, can fully solve the contradictions in this area.9
The quote illustrates the dilemma that left political organisations have faced in 
all questions related to minority group rights. Just as the women in the early 
workers’ movements were expected to give priority to the men’s political strug-
gle instead of the work for women’s right to vote, so the Norwegian lesbian and 
gay Marxist-Leninists must acknowledge the precedence of the class struggle. 
Lesbian and gay members of the AKP were torn between their political convic-
tion and their desire to support the rights of sexual minorities. They were often 
successful in creating understanding for homosexuality within the party, but a 
self-critical document from 1981 described how the party’s gay political work 
systematically was purged of “everything that smacked of ‘women’s separatism,’ 
homo chauvinism,’ ‘political lesbianism,’ and ‘humour’.”10 From 1981, however, 
the AKP changed its political line concerning homosexuality and became de-
cidedly gay friendly. Since then, its daily newspaper Klassekampen has been a 
forum for positive discussions about homosexuality. The homopolitical shift of 
position of the AKP in 1981 paved the way for a reconciliation between the party 
and the various lesbian and gay movements in Norway, and in 1982 the exclusion 
of Marxist-Leninist members of the DNF ’48 was lifted.11 
To a large extent, thanks to Jorma Hentilä, who was Party Secretary from 
1977 to 1983, the Finnish SKDL/DFFF took a decisively pro-gay stand. Hen-
tilä was not open to the public about his homosexuality when he became Par-
ty Secretary, but later he came out publicly as a gay man. In an interview for a 
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Swedish lesbian and gay publication in 1989, he regretted that he had not been 
more open, “but the situation in Finnish society was different back then. The 
Jeremy Thorpe scandal had occurred in England, and he had been forced to re-
sign because of his contacts with a male prostitute. I thought that people could 
have referred to that if I had been open.”12 Most of the people around him, in-
cluding the party leadership, knew he was gay long before. From 1968, he lived 
in a steady relationship with Max Rand, who was a journalist for the national 
public radio and also for Finland’s largest daily, Helsingin Sanomat. This meant 
that most Helsinki journalists and many politicians from various groups knew 
that the Party Secretary of one of Finland’s largest political parties was gay, but 
they refrained from writing about it. Hentilä became chair of SETA in 1983. By 
then he had already worked for a long time behind the scenes for lesbian and 
gay rights.13 The Finnish Communist Party (Suomen Kommunistinen Puolue / 
Finlands Kommunistiska Parti), which formed part of the SKDL/DFFF, organ-
ised the Moscow-oriented hardliners and did not sympathise with gay rights, 
but the larger organisation supported all initiatives to improve the legal situa-
tion for lesbians and gays. 
In 1981 when the left socialist gay lobby group “Left Homo” (Vasenhomo / 
Vänster-Homosexuella) was allowed to take part in the People’s Democrats’ May 
Day March under its own banner, its leader, Bengt Lindblom, complained in an 
interview that this had only been possible after long discussions, and he said he 
wished the SKDL/DFFF would take the same position as the Swedish VPK, 
which had worked actively for gay and lesbian rights for a long time.14 This in-
cident showed the limits of pro-gay politics in Finland at that time, and the 
impatience among many gay activists. In the interview, Hentilä said that there 
was, on the whole, support from the party leadership when they learned about 
his homosexuality, but he admits there were some negative reactions in the par-
ty in the early 1980s. “When I became a Party Secretary, the ones who elected 
me knew I was a homosexual. But when I became chairperson [in SETA] there 
were some negative reactions from party comrades. Some people in the districts 
wanted to write protest letters to the chairman of the party.”15
In Iceland, it is difficult to determine where the political parties stood on gay 
and lesbian rights issues, since they were not part of the political agenda until 
fairly recently. Kristín S. Kvaran, who presented the proposal for pro-gay legis-
lation in 1985, represented the small Social Democratic splinter party, The So-
cialist Alliance (Bandalag jafnaðarmanna).16 Once the Women’s List became in-
terested in lesbian and gay issues, they were reliable as an ally to the lesbian and 
gay movement. Ingibjörg Sólrun Gísladóttir was its leader, and she was also edi-
tor of the feminist journal Vera. Through her editorial job, she began to be inter-
ested in lesbian and gay issues and wanted to bring them up in Parliament, “be-
cause there was a clear connection between women’s liberation and the strug-
gle that homosexuals waged for their rights. It was a struggle for human rights 
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and I felt there was a strong connection between these things.”17 Throughout 
the 1990s, the Women’s List and the People’s Alliance were the foremost sup-
porters of gay and lesbian rights, and it is fair to say that the adoption of the 
law on registered partnership in Iceland was due mainly to their initiative.18 As 
we have seen, there is now a general consensus in all parties that lesbian and 
gay rights are important, though the parties on the left have more often taken 
the initiative. In 2002 Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir, leader of the United Left Party 
(Samfylkingin), which is a fusion of the Social Democrats, the Women’s List, 
and the People’s Alliance, registered her partnership with Jónína Leósdóttir, an 
Icelandic author and playwright. She was openly lesbian long before she became 
Prime Minister in 2009.19
In Greenland as well, it was the political left that supported gay and les-
bian rights. It was an initiative from socialist Inuit Ataqatigiit’s (IA) Minister 
of Social Affairs, Henriette Rasmussen, that brought about the introduction of 
the law on registered partnership. Moreover, as long as the gay and lesbian or-
ganisation Qaamaneq existed (2002–2007), another MP from IA, Asii Chem-
nitz Narup, served as its official protector. All in all, it is the left socialist IA that 
most consistently has worked for lesbian and gay rights in Greenland.20 
In the Faroes, finally, where explicit political resistance to lesbian and gay 
rights has blocked the introduction of the law on registered partnership, all par-
ties are split on lesbian and gay rights issues. The legal initiatives to introduce 
an anti-discrimination law, however, came from Social Democratic MP John 
Johannesen and Finnur Helmsdal from the Republican Party (Tjóðveldi). The 
Leader of the Republican Party, Høgni Hoydal, has repeatedly declared that he 
is in favour of the registered partnership, but at present it is impossible to intro-
duce the bill without breaking up the coalition Government.21
The Scandinavian left has been far from unanimous in its pro-gay stand. 
The Swedish Communist Marxist-Leninist Union (revolutionaries) (Kommu-
nistiska Förbundet Marxist-Leninisterna [revolutionärerna], KFML[r]), was an 
orthodox Marxist-Leninist faction that later changed its name to the Com-
munist Marxist-Leninist Party (KPML) and began participating in elections. 
In 1973 the party received a questionnaire from the RFSL regarding their views 
on homosexuality. In a scathing article an anonymous member of KFML(r)’s 
Politbureau dismissed homosexuality as “an unnatural phenomenon that stems 
from particular social conditions” (emphasis in original). The author’s explana-
tion for homosexuality was that the oppression of women under capitalism led 
to a widespread disdain for women among men, which many times resulted in 
men wanting to have sex only with men. (The author did not comment on the 
existence of female homosexuality.) That was not enough, however, for homo-
sexuality to spread. It was mainly in societies that were “doomed to extinction” 
that homosexuality could thrive, and it had to do with the widespread pessi-
mism in those societies: 
96 Odd Couples
The rising class of our times, the modern proletariat, the class that is bearer of the 
future, the class that will overthrow capitalism and build socialism on its ruins, the 
class that will finally deliver humanity from exploitation, war, and oppression, and 
guarantee a rich material and cultural life for all, rejects with contempt the bour-
geois quasi-scientists, who exalt what is natural for their own degenerate class and 
their own doomed society to something universal and natural.
All the questions asked by RFSL got negative answers, and the KFML(r) 
spokesperson added one question: “Can homosexuals obtain membership in the 
KFML(r)?” The answer to that was also no.22 
This article sparked a debate within the revolutionary left. Many organised 
lesbians and gays sympathised with movements on the far left, so the categorical 
dismissal of homosexuals as members of the Marxist-Leninist organisation was 
provoking, but there were also others who reacted. In a long article, KFML(r) 
member Thomas Bibin sharply criticised the argument that heterosexuality was 
more natural than homosexuality because heterosexual intercourse led to more 
babies. With quotations from Darwin, Kinsey, Lenin, Marx, Engels, and Bebel, 
he demonstrated that the author of the original article had lapsed into idealism, 
and he also criticised the author for setting aside the democratic centralism in 
the party. Without consulting the members, the author had issued new direc-
tives about membership. Moreover, he had “publicly defended the idealism pre-
sented in the article.” Bibin claimed that homosexuality, like all sexual politics, 
must be of secondary importance to the revolutionary left, but since the ques-
tion had been raised, he sharply criticised the way it had been dismissed. Why, 
he asked, did not the KFML(r) leadership analyse “RFSL and its self-absorbed 
reform struggle in the name of legalism, a reform struggle that not so much as 
glances at the fact that we live in a class society?” Finally, Bibin demanded that 
KFML(r)’s Politbureau “denounce the articles in our press and undertake thor-
ough self-criticism for the attitude they have expressed.”23
This discussion once again shows the dilemma of the political left at the 
time. Sexuality and gender issues were generally regarded as being of secondary 
importance, and when they surfaced it was generally assumed that oppression 
of women and homosexuality were social evils that would disappear in a future 
classless society.
Liberal parties: A split electorate
The standpoint of the liberal parties in Scandinavia seems to depend to a large 
extent on the strength of rural and/or Christian groups within the parties. The 
Danish Radical Left Party, a classical liberal party with an urban electorate, had 
already taken up gay and lesbian issues in the sixties, and its MP Else-Merete 
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Ross consistently worked for gay and lesbian rights within the Danish Parlia-
ment.24 The Norwegian Left Party (Venstre) is a classical liberal party with an 
urban electorate. It was influential until it was almost annihilated in connection 
with the EU membership referendum in 1972. It had a positive stand on gay and 
lesbian issues but was far from significant when the partnership debate began 
in the early 1990s.25
In Sweden and Finland, the liberal parties were split over partnership for 
same-sex couples. The main divide in Sweden was between the so-called urban 
liberals and the “free-thinkers” (frisinnade), who stemmed from a free-church 
movement that fought state-church fundamentalism in the late nineteenth cen-
tury. At the Party Congress in 1990, the question came to a head when a ma-
jority of congress representatives passed a mandatory resolution requesting that 
the party’s MPs work for registered partnership for homosexual couples. In the 
parliamentary elections of 1991, the People’s Party shrank from 12 to 9 percent of 
the votes, and the Christian Democrats grew from 3 to 7 percent. These chang-
es were only partly because of the controversies over gay and lesbian rights, but 
they were definitely the result of many Christian voters’ leaving the People’s 
Party to join the Christian Democrats. According to MP Barbro Westerholm, 
this made it easier to work for gay and lesbian rights within the People’s Party, 
and further concentrated the resistance to gay and lesbian rights in the Chris-
tian Democratic Party.26 
During the postwar period, the Finnish Liberal People’s Party (Liberaalinen 
Kansanpuolue, LKP / Liberala Folkpartiet, LFP) had between 4 and 8 percent 
of the votes until the elections in 1983, when it virtually disappeared from the 
political scene. Before that, gay and lesbian issues were not part of mainstream 
politics in Finland, so it is hard to say what their stand on these questions might 
have been.27 The Swedish People’s Party (Svenska Folkpartiet, SFP / Ruotsalai-
nen Kansanpuolue, RKP), however, which represents the interests of the Swed-
ish-speaking minority in Finland, has a largely liberal agenda. The SFP has be-
tween 4 and 5 percent of the electorate, but by representing an important part 
of the Swedish-speaking minority, its political influence is larger than its lim-
ited electorate would imply. The Party Congress in 1996 requested that the SFP 
representatives in Parliament and Government work for registered partnership 
for homosexuals, but at the Party Congress in 1999, several candidates from the 
rural province of Österbotten (Pohjanmaa) demanded that this decision be re-
voked. The tensions in the SFP did not follow religious lines but regional ones 
and there was largely a split between urban and rural liberals.28 
Social Democrats: A slow process
In the 1960s and 1970s, Scandinavian Social Democrats were opposed to or in-
different to gay and lesbian rights, but toward the end of the 1960s there was an 
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opening toward feminist issues due to the radicalisation of the feminist move-
ment. In 1967, the Danish Social Democrats appointed a working party on fam-
ily politics. The discussion document they sent out in 1969 was radical, especially 
in its definition of family: “By family is understood a group consisting of adult 
people with or without children. (Extended families and homophile marriages 
are thus included in this concept of family.)” The document demanded that soci-
ety take a far-reaching responsibility for the safety and well-being of the family 
unit, first and foremost by building more day-care centres, but also by protect-
ing the rights of children.29 In 1974, the Women’s League of the Swedish Social 
Democratic Party followed suit and published a pamphlet on “Family Politics 
in the Future” which stirred some debate at the Party Congress. The booklet de-
manded full equality for women in the work market, extensive development of 
day-care facilities, and a reformed marriage law. Existing family laws should be 
part of a number of new “cohabitation laws” (samlevnadslagstiftning), based on a 
view of the family as a voluntary union of economically independent members. 
The booklet pointed out that many groups remained outside the scope of tradi-
tional marriage legislation: “extended families, sibling households, homosexuals, 
and others.” A new legislation would define the family differently: “By family 
we thus mean all forms of cohabitation of two or more individuals.” One of its 
illustrations showed a man asking a woman, “Do you want to register with me?” 
Many delegates found the proposals too radical, but they had the support of 
the party leadership, including party leader Olof Palme and child psychologist 
Lisbet Palme, who played an important role in influencing the Social Demo-
cratic Party’s feminist stand.30
Lesbian and gay rights were not a prioritised issue in the workers’ move-
ments, but during the 1980s there was a slow shift of opinion within the Scan-
dinavian Social Democratic parties concerning these questions, often because 
of the initiative of their youth leagues. In Denmark, the Social Democrats were 
won for the cause already in the 1980s, when the balance in Parliament made 
it convenient for them to seek alliances with the smaller socialist parties. The 
left socialist parties’ pronounced stance in favour of lesbian and gay rights influ-
enced the Social Democrats, and internal pressure from gay and lesbian party 
members also had an effect. In Norway a small group of young Social Demo-
crats managed to swing opinion within the party in the beginning of the 1990s, 
and in Sweden at the same time it was the grass roots members who forced the 
Social Democratic leadership to work for a law on registered partnership. 
The person who was chosen to prepare the partnership issue in Denmark 
was Pia Gjellerup, who was elected to the Folketing in 1987 as one of the younger 
Social Democratic MPs. When interviewed, she emphasised that it was natural 
that the Social Democratic Party promoted registered partnership, “because it 
. . . was about minorities and rights.” When the proposal was presented to the 
Folketing, the Social Democratic Party was the first party behind the bill. “And I 
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have thought of this as ‘when the big old party finally decides to do something, 
then things indeed begin to get done.’”31 There was some resistance within the 
party, Gjellerup admitted, but it was marginal. What was crucial for promoting 
the cause in Denmark was the opinion poll in 1988, which showed that a ma-
jority of the Danes were in favour of a law on registered partnership. “It doesn’t 
happen very often in such issues that people are ahead of the politicians,” Gjel-
lerup said, “because it’s a little bit of an elitist question, you could say: minor-
ity rights.”32 The opinion poll made it easier for some Social Democratic MPs, 
those who had been concerned about the attitudes in their home constituencies, 
to support the law. And by then the party leadership dealt firmly with dissenters. 
As the main party behind the proposal, it could not tolerate prominent mem-
bers challenging the party line. In the end, some MPs were permitted to abstain 
from voting, but no one was allowed to vote against it. When asked, Gjellerup 
agreed that the resistance initially had come from older men in the party, but 
she did not think it was solely a question of age, and she had the impression that 
those with a specific professional background eventually would endorse the bill. 
The party’s representatives in the Standing Committee for Social Affairs and in 
“Do you want to register with 
me?” The Swedish Social Demo-
cratic Women’s League present-
ed a radical programme for fam-
ily politics to the Party Congress 
in 1972. Drawing: Katarina Er-
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the Standing Law Committee were all for it. And she mentioned some older 
MPs from other parties who had voted in favour of it, like Ebba Strange from 
the Radical Left (RV) and Jens Peder Jensen, a gentleman in his sixties from the 
agrarian-liberal Left Party. Unlike most of his party fellows, Jensen supported 
the law, according to Gjellerup, purely on legalistic and humanitarian grounds. 
In Norway, the elections of 1989 were a success for the Labour Party (Arbei-
derpartiet). It did not, however, get a majority in Parliament, and a right-wing 
coalition Government was formed. But the opposition was strengthened, and 
an unprecedented number of members of the Labour Party’s Youth League, 
AUF (Arbeidernes Ungdomsfylking), were elected to the Storting. There were 
many expectations that they would promote issues cherished by the AUF, one 
of them being gay and lesbian rights. The AUF group in Parliament decided 
that they would try to persuade the whole parliamentary group to present a 
bill on registered partnership modelled on the Danish one. They decided that 
Trond Jensrud would sign the bill, and then they would need a more experi-
enced MP to support them. Grete Knudsen declared that she was willing to 
do that. With his twenty-one years, Jensrud (b. 1968) was the youngest person 
ever to have been elected to the Storting, but Grete Knudsen (b. 1940) had been 
in Parliament since 1981. She had the reputation of being in the left wing of 
the party, and she had specialised in family politics. She seemed like the obvi-
ous choice for the younger Social Democrats when they wanted a more expe-
rienced ally.33
At the group meeting it became clear that Labour’s parliamentary group 
would not support the bill, but Jensrud and Knudsen declared they would sign 
it anyway, as private MPs. Party leader Gro Harlem Brundtland said that she 
thought it unwise to go against the party line, but she did not try to stop them. 
When the next issue on the agenda was due, Knudsen stood up and hissed to 
Jensrud: “Trrrond! Come here! Let’s go down and sign the bill! When we’ve 
signed it, these people can’t blow it away!” Knudsen had a strong position in the 
party, and she didn’t hesitate to confront the majority. According to Jensrud, 
they both got negative reactions from party members. For Jensrud it was espe-
cially unpleasant, given that everyone in Parliament was older and more expe-
rienced than he was.34 
During the time the law proposal was being prepared, the situation changed 
and the Labour Party swung over to wholeheartedly supporting it. The chair-
man of DNF’48, Kjell Erik Øie, and his team of lobbyists had an important role 
to play in this, but there was also a shift in the overall political situation. “When 
the proposal came back we had formed a government, and Grete Berget, who 
was the Minister [for family matters], was in favour of the law,” Jensrud ex-
plained. When it came time for the vote on the partnership law, another issue 
got mixed up with it. There was a proposal to protect certain waterways, which 
the AUF endorsed out of concern for the environment. But some people from 
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the trade union movement, “power socialists” (kraftsosialister), as Jensrud called 
them, were against the protection of the waterways out of concern for local in-
dustry. On this issue, the party followed the trade union people and said no to 
water protection. The young socialists had to let go of the waterways, because 
if they had challenged the party line on this issue, the “power socialists” would 
have challenged them on the issue of registered partnership. It was a perfect 
situation for the group leaders, Jensrud said, because this way they could keep 
both groups disciplined.35 Since then, the shift of opinion within the Norwegian 
Labour Party has been swift and thorough, and the party leadership has had no 
problems relating to issues concerning gay and lesbian rights. 
In Sweden the situation was different, and it was the grass roots movement 
that forced the leadership to adopt a more positive view on gay and lesbian 
rights. In an article from 1986, sex-reform activist Hans Nestius complained that 
the proposals put forth by the Homo Commission were not going to be pre-
pared as a law proposal by the Government, since the Social Democratic Par-
ty’s leadership was against it. The Minister of Social Affairs, Gertrud Sigurdsen, 
had addressed the International AIDS Conference in Stockholm and received 
an ovation when she announced that the Swedish Government would present a 
proposal to strengthen the rights of homosexuals. “Alas,” Nestius wrote, “the ap-
plause came too early, because there will be no Government proposal in Decem-
ber . . . Several ministers, led by Prime Minister Carlsson, questioned, among 
other things, one of the cornerstones of the proposal, namely that the new law 
on cohabitation for heterosexuals that recently was presented to the Riksdag 
should also include homosexual couples living together.”36 
There seems to have been some hesitation within the party, a fear of alien-
ating parts of the core electorate if it began pushing too hard for such con-
troversial issues. Whether or not the leadership was opposed or indifferent to 
gay rights issues, it did not push for them in the 1980s. Two member’s propos-
als concerning homosexuality were presented to the Social Democratic Party 
Congress in 1987, but neither was accepted.37 The next Party Congress, in 1990, 
dealt slightly more favourably with the issue. The Stockholm Social Democratic 
Students’ League suggested that the party should work for a law on registered 
partnership. The Party’s Steering Committee recommended that the Congress 
wait for the result of the Partnership Commission, but during the debate sev-
eral members disagreed with the Steering Committee. Anne-Sofie Hermans-
son from Göteborg said that the discussion was not always pleasant. “I’m tired 
of hearing comrades from our own ranks call these proposals ‘faggot proposals,’” 
she said. As a compromise the Congress decided “that the proposal for legis-
lation on registered partnership, which the Board of Health and Social Affairs 
recently presented, should be speedily handled by the Government and Parlia-
ment.”38
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Former Minister of the Work Market, Maj-Lis Lööw, who was a leading 
figure in the Social Democratic Women’s League, and one of the architects 
of the radical family politics in the early 1970s, had a key role, as chair of the 
Riksdag’s Standing Law Committee, when the law was prepared in 1991. Dur-
ing the interview, she said that at the first meeting with the Social Democratic 
parliamentary group some members expressed reservations about the law. “As 
I remember, it was mostly women who supported the idea, and men who were 
reluctant ‒ not all, but some.” Even if the support was not unanimous, nobody 
said that they could not support the idea at all, so Lööw and her allies in the 
Law Committee proceeded with their work. But the party leader, Ingvar Carls-
son, told her that she had to make sure that the number of the majority for the 
law was not too small. It would not be wise, he said, to adopt such a contro-
versial law with a majority of just one or two votes. Thus it was crucial to keep 
the Social Democratic group in Parliament together. At a late stage, there were 
some Social Democrats who declared that they could not vote for it, but if they 
had not declared their position earlier, they were not given any choice. Accord-
ing to Lööw, the party did not accept dissenting votes on this question, and they 
did not allow the reluctant to be absent. At the decisive vote on 7 June 1994, only 
ten out of 128 Social Democratic Members of Parliament were absent. Among 
them, however, were the party leader Ingvar Carlsson and the future party lead-
er Göran Persson.39 
The Finnish Social Democratic Party (Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue, 
SDP / Finlands Socialdemokratiska Parti) is perhaps more divided on this ques-
tion than any other Scandinavian Social Democratic Party. In spite of the fact 
that Tarja Halonen had been chair of SETA and as a young MP had worked 
hard for gay and lesbian rights, the party itself did not place these issues high 
on its agenda. After she was elected President of the Republic in 2000, Halonen 
chose not to talk publicly on lesbian and gay issues, but the mere fact that she 
had once been chair of SETA and a gay rights advocate brought a lot of public 
attention to gay and lesbian rights and gave them a high degree of legitimacy 
in the eyes of the public. Gay activist Rainer Hiltunen summarized it thus: “Of 
course we would have wanted her to say more, but she had already said a lot to 
history.”40 As in all other parties, the Youth League and the women were more 
positive in regard to gay and lesbian rights, but in a large and hierarchical party 
like the Social Democrats they have seldom been successful in raising these is-
sues. Tiina Kivinen, former chair of SETA and now head secretary of the Green 
Alliance’s Parliament Group, commented on the split within the Social Dem-
ocratic Party: “The divisions are not so much dependent on age or gender, as 
from where you come. There is a huge difference if you come from a city or the 
country, if you are from the north or south. Those are the main dividing lines.”41
A problem for the Finnish Social Democratic Party, according to Hiltunen, 
was the importance of the trade unions within the workers’ movement. “I think 
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that in both the Social Democrats and in the Left Alliance it was the activists 
in the trade unions [who were against the partnership law], as, for instance, in 
the lumber industry trade union, a very masculine environment.” Social Demo-
cratic Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen, in office 1995–2003, could not or would 
not prevent the National Coalition Party’s Minister of Justice Kari Häkämies 
from blocking registered partnership for years. When Häkämies was replaced 
by Social Democrat Johannes Koskinen in 1999 the prospects for a law became 
brighter, but, according to Hiltunen, Koskinen was far from enthusiastic. “He 
was hesitant, he didn’t give openly his support for registered partnership . . . He 
forwarded the law and he voted yes.”42 The rural-urban divide in Finland, and 
the big difference between attitudes to homosexuality in rural areas and in the 
cities, thus contributed to the enduring split within the Finnish Social Demo-
cratic Party. 
Agrarian and green parties: Toward acceptance
In all Scandinavian countries, agrarian parties have played a significant role in 
the history of the welfare state. As a response to the economic crisis of the 1930s, 
the Social Democratic parties and the Agrarian parties formed coalitions in all 
Scandinavian countries. These coalitions guaranteed the necessary political sta-
bility to carry out the welfare reforms that laid the foundations of the Scandi-
navian welfare states.43 
In Finland, Norway, and Sweden, the Agrarian parties were transformed in 
the 1950s and 1960s and changed their names to Centre parties in order to at-
tract an urbanised electorate, but they retained strong ties to the agricultural 
sector. Ideologically, they harboured conservative convictions and Christian ele-
ments, but since the transition they have developed more liberal views.44 
There are large differences between them, however. The Swedish Centre Par-
ty has abandoned its old cooperation with the Social Democrats and sought al-
liances with the political right. As a result, the polarisation of Swedish party 
politics has increased. This turn to the right has been accompanied by more “ur-
ban” views on marriage and sexuality, making it possible for openly gay Andreas 
Carlgren to pursue a career as the vice chair of his party. His presence at a high 
level in the Centre Party has probably facilitated the adoption of its present 
pro-gay politics.45 In Finland, however, the Centre Party is a strong conservative 
force and has proved to be the most stubborn opponent of the law on registered 
partnership when it was prepared.46 The Norwegian Centre Party (Senterpartiet) 
has made a move to the left. Traditionally, it has sought alliances with the politi-
cal right, but since 2005 it forms a government with the Labour Party and the 
Socialist Left Party. It has gradually come to accept legal regulation of same-sex 
relationships, and when the joint marriage law was introduced, a minority with-
in the Centre Party’s group in the Storting supported the bill.47 
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The Danish Left Party is, despite its name, a liberal-conservative party that 
up until the 1980s remained essentially agrarian. Except for a brief period at 
the end of the 1970s, when it formed a government with the Social Democrats, 
it has always sought its coalition partners to the right. Its largely conservative 
stance may be explained by the fact that Danish agriculture is dominated by 
owners of medium-sized farms rather than smallholders.48 When the Radical 
Left Party split off in 1905, the Left lost its urban liberal electorate and became 
increasingly dependent on rural interests. Around the turn of the millennium, 
however, the Left Party became the largest party in Denmark and it promotes 
national-conservative values. Its attitude to gay and lesbian rights issues is col-
oured by its solidly liberal individualist convictions, and it generally supports 
bills that promote free choice for the individual. It is negative to the idea of gay 
marriage, but in 2009 six of its MPs made it possible to give adoption rights to 
same-sex couples by failing to vote the party line.49
Environmentalist or Green parties appeared in Finland and Sweden in the 
1980s and, in a sense, sapped the Centre parties of their more progressive forces. 
There was a moment in the 1970s when the Centre parties harboured environ-
mentalist interests that appealed to a generation critical of unlimited growth 
and a society structured around centralistic and hierarchical thinking, but these 
interests were in general taken over by the young Green parties.50 In Sweden, it 
was the movement against nuclear power in connection with a referendum in 
1980 that formed the basis for the Environment Party’s organisation. It attracted 
voters from all over the political spectrum, and for many years refused to place 
itself on the left-right scale in politics. Their stance on gay and lesbian rights has 
always been benevolent, and within the European Green movement it became 
a core element of their ideology. When the Riksdag voted in favour of a gender-
neutral marriage law in 2009, the Environment Party demanded a more radical 
solution: the abolition of marriage and its replacement with a civil registration 
act. From 2006 its influence in Swedish politics has grown considerably, since it 
is cooperating formally with the Social Democrats and the socialist Left Party 
(which dropped the word “Communist” from its name in 1990).51 
Likewise, the Green Alliance (Vihreä liitto / Gröna förbundet) in Finland has 
consistently worked for gay and lesbian issues. It was established as a party in 
1987, but already in 1983 the environmentalist network that preceded it managed 
to get two representatives into the Eduskunta via the Green lists they presented 
at the election. The head secretary for the Green Alliance’s Parliament group, 
Tiina Kivinen, has worked hard within the party on gay and lesbian issues. She 
got the position as secretary for the Green Alliance in the Eduskunta in 1991, 
the same year she was elected chair of SETA. During her interview she remem-
bered that some party members thought it was risky to give her the job as sec-
retary. Perhaps the party would be accused of giving too high a priority to gay 
and lesbian issues. Since that time, however, she has never heard any such com-
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ments, and the Green Alliance is respected in Finnish politics as a party that 
has gay and lesbian issues high up on its agenda. It has an overall support of 
around 8 percent of the national votes, but is strongest in big cities. In Helsinki 
it received around 20 percent of the votes in the last elections, while in Lapland 
County in the north it got only 3 percent.52 The Green Alliance’s Organisation-
al Secretary and Member of Helsinki’s Municipal Board, Hannele Lehtikuusi, 
was elected chair of SETA after Tiina Kivinen. Lehtikuusi was the one who 
consistently brought up adoption rights and the right of access to assisted fer-
tilisation. A lesbian mother herself, she has contributed to the high visibility of 
lesbians and gay men with children in Finland.53 
Conservative parties: From opposition to acceptance
The Scandinavian debate on registered partnership for same-sex couples can be 
seen as a process with many factors influencing decision-makers that slowly cre-
ated a political landscape of acceptance. But alongside the slow building up of 
pro-partnership arguments, resistance to the law occurred and became increas-
ingly ideological. Conservative resistance to gay and lesbian rights diminished 
over time, though it remained in religious groups within each party and in the 
growing Christian Democratic parties. In the 1970s and 1980s, the purely con-
servative argument against gay and lesbian rights was strong.
The Danish Conservative People’s Party (Konservative Folkeparti) has been 
consistent in its resistance to extending gay and lesbian rights. As leaders of a 
minority Government, they were forced by a parliamentary majority to appoint 
a commission to investigate the living conditions for lesbian and gay citizens. 
Since they were against it, they did not lend any support to the commission’s 
work. When the law on registered partnership was adopted, the Conservatives 
were unanimously against it. Though the party has since accepted the law, it has 
consistently opposed any additions to it. When MPs from its coalition part-
ner the Left Party rebelled and voted in favour of adoption rights for registered 
partners in 2009, it provoked heavy criticism from the Conservative People’s 
Party.54
The Norwegian Right Party (Høyre) had a brusque awakening in the fall 
of 1979, when their parliamentary representative from the Oslo Region and 
spokesperson on education, Wenche Lowzow, declared not only that she was a 
lesbian, but also that she was in a relationship with Kim Friele, the chair of the 
Norwegian national gay and lesbian organisation. In an interview in May the 
following year, Lowzow said she had not experienced any explicitly negative 
reactions within the party, but that she received considerably fewer invitations 
to speak to the party’s district organisations.55 She was afraid there was a silent 
opposition to her presence, and in November she felt that her suspicions were 
confirmed when she was not renominated for her former position on the Oslo 
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list. This provoked internal debate, and the national party secretary criticized the 
chair of the Oslo county organisation, which had failed to nominate Lowzow. 
According to the nomination committee, the reason was that Lowzow had be-
come too narrowly focused on gay issues in Parliament, but the chair of the Oslo 
branch, Kirsten Lyche, spoke out more bluntly. She explained to the press that 
“out of consideration for the young generation it is wrong to normalise homo-
sexuality. Think of all the parents who don’t want their children to end up there. 
Lowzow should have told us about her orientation before we nominated her in 
the first place.”56 Obviously, the public appearance of Wenche Lowzow in the 
Right Party forced the party members to consider and reconsider their opin-
ions on homosexuality. In February 1981 she was nominated again, but four years 
later the party leadership decided they did not want her as a candidate for Par-
liament.57 In 1993, however, when the partnership law was discussed, the Right 
Party was split over the question. Its leaders were all against it, but some of their 
MPs voted in favour of the law.58 Around the turn of the century a number of 
prominent party members, among them the future Minister of Finance, came 
out to the press as gay. This resulted in some commentators calling it the Homo 
Party.59 
In Sweden, when the law was voted on in 1994, the Moderates (Moderater-
na) were against it but they let their representatives vote according to their con-
science. Only two of their younger MPs, Ulf Kristerson and Fredrik Reinfeldt, 
voted against the party line and supported the law. After a generational shift in 
the party, Reinfeldt is now its leader.60 
In Finland, the conservative National Coalition Party was initially negative 
concerning gay rights and registered partnership, but the Secretary General of 
SETA, Rainer Hiltunen, was an active party member and exerted some influ-
ence within the National Coalition. When interviewed, Hiltunen insisted that 
there was no clear-cut left–right division in gay-rights issues in Finland. There 
were opponents and proponents of the law in every party, even if the support for 
the law “statistically” was more prominent in the political left.61
The only vote cast against the law on registered partnership in Iceland was 
from Árni Johnsen from the moderately conservative Independence Party, but 
his opposition to the law was the result of personal conviction rather than an 
expression of the party line. He was generally considered an eccentric and was 
not supported by his party.62 
No Greenlandic party has expressly worked against gay and lesbian rights, 
but liberal-conservative Atassut politician Otto Steenholt voted against the 
Danish partnership law in 1989 when he represented Greenland in the Danish 
Folketing. When the proposal was brought up in the Greenlandic Inatsisartut 
in 1994, he argued that it needed more discussion in Greenlandic society. In the 
end, however, he did not vote against it, but abstained from voting.63
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Christian Democrats and Radical Right: Bastions of resistance
The Scandinavian Christian Democratic parties did not have any problems 
about their stand on the issue of registered partnership in the 1990s. They were 
opposed to it and, in all the Scandinavian parliaments where they were repre-
sented, all their MPs voted against it.64 It is interesting to compare the fate of 
two leaders of the Christian Democratic Youth League, Anders Gåsland in 
Norway and Erik Slottner in Sweden. In 1992, Anders Gåsland told the me-
dia that he was gay and that he supported the partnership law. This happened 
during the peak of the debate on registered partnership in Norway and was the 
least suitable moment for his mother party to deal with it. The Christian Peo-
ple’s Party (Kristelig Folkeparti) lost momentum in its campaign against the law 
on registered partnership and, in the words of Kjell Erik Øie, campaign lead-
er for registered partnership, “We then had the whole Christian block parked 
around that issue ‒ they were just fighting over that.” In effect, harsh reactions 
from some of the more conservative members of the Christian People’s Party 
made people feel sympathy for Gåsland and move toward accepting the idea 
of registered partnership. Gåsland’s friends in the Christian Democratic Youth 
League stood up for him and supported him, but the older and more conserva-
tive members did not. The party leader, Kjell Magne Bondevik, kept a low pro-
file. According to Gåsland, the first thing Bondevik asked him was whether he 
had a boyfriend (which he did not). The question whether he was a practicing 
homosexual or lived in celibacy thus made a difference for the party leadership 
at this time. Shortly after the following year’s elections, Gåsland left politics.65 
In Sweden ten years later, an openly gay man was elected leader of the Swed-
ish Christian Democratic Youth (Krist-Demokratisk Ungdom, KDU). Erik Slot-
tner represented a liberal wing within the party, and his election was a victo-
ry for those who wanted to modernise the movement. Registered partnership 
was by now accepted by the Swedish Christian Democrats (Kristdemokraterna, 
KD), and Slottner himself declared that he was opposed to adoption rights for 
homosexual couples.66 His downfall was prompted by another issue. In 2005, a 
Pentecostalist minister, Åke Green, gave a sermon in which he branded homo-
sexuality as a “cancer” and referred to Bible quotes condemning same-sex sex-
uality. His sermon was deliberately worded so that he could test the new law 
that prohibited hateful speech directed at a number of minority groups, among 
them homosexuals.67 In a TV studio, Slottner was pressed into saying that even 
preachers should not be allowed to propagate hate toward homosexuals. Short-
ly thereafter he was forced to resign as chair of Christian Democratic Youth.68
These two episodes illustrate how the Christian Democratic parties’ stand on 
homosexuality had altered in ten years, or, rather, how the whole field of debate 
had changed. In 1992 the mere fact that Gåsland was homosexual was a prob-
lem, and it was an issue whether he lived as a celibate or not. In Sweden in 2005 
the partnership law had been a reality for ten years, and an openly gay politician 
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could make a career even within the Christian Democratic Party. But expression 
regarding these issues had been limited for Slottner and when he differed from 
the party line he was out. Ironically, the Christian Democratic parties in Nor-
way and Sweden now have turned into the staunchest defenders of the partner-
ship laws. In both countries their main argument against opening up marriage 
for same-sex couples was that the law on registered partnership was the best 
way to safeguard the legal interests of same-sex couples. 
The new radical rightist parties in Scandinavia have evolved from anti-tax 
and anti-bureaucracy parties into being explicitly anti-immigrant and anti-gay. 
As so often, their histories differ in the various Scandinavian countries. In Fin-
land, the Finnish Rural Party (Suomen Maaseudun Puolue) under Veikko Ven-
namo targeted the established politicians and urban interests and scored over 10 
percent in the 1970 elections. The Danish Progress Party under Mogens Glis-
trup relentlessly criticised high taxes. Glistrup claimed that tax evaders were to 
be hailed as freedom fighters, equally as heroic as the resisters under German 
occupation during World War Two. In the 1973 elections, the Progress Party be-
came the second largest party in the Folketing with almost 16 percent of the vote. 
The Norwegian Progress Party was founded in 1977 and had its largest electoral 
success in the 2005 election with 22 percent of the vote, making it the second 
largest party in the Storting. In Sweden, the rather short-lived New Democracy 
held the balance of power in the Riksdag between 1991 and 1994. 69
 None of these parties initially had any fixed views on gay and lesbian rights, 
but they developed an explicitly negative attitude to these issues over time. The 
Danish People’s Party, which is a direct successor of the Progress Party, but with 
a rather different programme, has said no whenever the left-leaning parties in 
the Folketing have attempted to extend the scope of the partnership law. How-
ever, they regard a liberal view on homosexuality as proof of traditional Dan-
ish tolerance, as opposed to the intolerance of “other cultures,” and for a period 
they even tolerated an openly lesbian MP, Louise Frevert, to represent them. In 
an interview she emphasised that her party had no problems with lesbian and 
gay issues. The reason she was forced to leave the party was not because of her 
homosexuality, but because she went too far in spreading her aggressively an-
ti-Muslim views.70 As opposed to the relative tolerance of the Danish People’s 
Party, the Sweden Democrats, a party that had a considerable success in the 
2006 elections and received 5.7 percent of the votes and 20 seats in Parliament 
in 2010, is decidedly anti-gay.71
“A tribute to Kent”: Shift of opinion in the nineties
As mentioned earlier, only two Swedish Moderate MPs voted against the par-
ty line and supported the law on registered partnership when it was adopted 
in 1994. One of them, Fredrik Reinfeldt, is now leader of the Moderates and 
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Swedish Prime Minister. This is symptomatic of the rapid shift of opinion in 
the 1990s. Politicians who supported gay rights in the 1980s and early 1990s 
were considered an embarrassment and many times were ousted from politics ‒ 
depending, of course, on which party they belonged to. As we have seen, Con-
servative MP Wenche Lowzow was not renominated after two terms, and she 
herself claimed that it was because she was openly lesbian.72 Likewise, Trond 
Jensrud, the young Social Democrat who signed the first Norwegian bill on reg-
istered partnership, which went to Parliament in 1990, disappeared from poli-
tics, as did his colleague from the Progress Party, Jan Erik Fåne.73 However, 
their co-signer Kristin Halvorsen from the Socialist Left Party is now its leader 
and Norwegian Minister of Finance. Else-Merete Ross from the Danish Rad-
ical Left Party and Jörn Svensson from the Swedish Left Communist Party 
could both become and remain prominent MPs for their respective parties, even 
though they worked for gay and lesbian rights in the 1970s. In Finland, one of 
those who worked early for gay and lesbian rights was Social Democratic MP 
Tarja Halonen. She is now President of the Finnish Republic. During the nine-
ties it became more and more common that politicians supported gay and les-
bian rights, or that they came out as lesbian or gay themselves. 
The first Scandinavian MP to speak openly about her or his homosexuality 
after Wenche Lowzow was the young Swedish Social Democrat Kent Carls-
son, who in 1991 came out to the media when two members of the right-wing 
populist New Democracy were expelled because of their homosexuality. In 1995 
he was followed by Andreas Carlgren, a prominent name in the Swedish Centre 
Party.74 The first person to be elected to the Riksdag as an openly gay candidate 
was Tasso Stafilidis, who became an MP for the reformed socialist Left Party 
in 1998. He was also the founder of the Parliament’s LGBT group (Riksdagens 
HBT-grupp), which has coordinated many LGBT-rights bills signed by MPs 
from different parties.75 
In Norway, no other Member of Parliament came out after Lowzow until 
the beginning of the 1990s. The first openly gay elected to the Storting was La-
bour Party’s Anders Hornslien, who was elected as a deputy representative in 
1993. In 1996 he became the first MP who registered partnership ‒ and managed 
to get positive media attention in spite of the negative news about his part in 
a scandal concerning fraudulent membership lists of the Labour Party’s Youth 
League.76 Since then, many Norwegian Members of Parliament have come out 
as lesbian or gay, among them, Per-Kristian Foss from the Right Party. He had 
been a Member of the Storting since 1981, came out to the media in 2000, and 
registered partnership and became Minister of Finance in 2001. For a long time, 
it had been an open secret that Foss and a handful of other prominent figures in 
the party were gay or bisexual, which may explain to some degree why the Nor-
wegian Right Party was not more energetically against the partnership law.77 It 
was when the Right Party’s Bent Høie and André Oktay Dahl also chose to 
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come out publicly as gay in 2001 that their party was dubbed the Homo Party.78 
There is a growing number of openly gay male MPs in all Scandinavian coun-
tries, but very few lesbians have come out. Siri Hall Arnøy, who was elected for 
the Socialist Left Party in 2001, is an exception. She was openly lesbian when 
she was elected, and her nomination was a result of her party’s striving to be-
come the most homo-oriented political party in Norway.79
In Denmark, the first MPs to come out were Yvonne Herløv Andersen from 
the Centre Democrats and Social Democrat Torben Lund, both in reality “out-
ed” by the former head of the National Health Board, Palle Juul-Jensen, who 
had many conflicts with Lund concerning AIDS when Lund was Minister of 
Health. When Herløv Andersen succeeded Lund in 1994 the conflicts contin-
ued until Juul-Jensen was forced to resign from his post the following year. His 
revenge was to publish a memoir in 1996, in which he sharply criticised Herløv 
Andersen and Lund, and asked what his situation might have been “if the two 
latest Ministers of Health, not only politically but also personally, had had an-
other relationship to the National Union for Gays and Lesbians.”80 Herløv An-
dersen and Lund were of course easy to identify, and shortly after the publica-
tion of Juul-Jensen’s memoir, they both publicly acknowledged their homosexu-
ality. Evidently their political careers did not suffer the least from the revelation. 
Even before coming out to the public, both Herløv Andersen and Lund were 
important influences within their respective parties. 
Another important factor in facilitating the acceptance of the partnership 
laws by politicians was of course openly gay or lesbian friends and family of the 
decision-makers. In her interview, the leader of the Norwegian Socialist Left 
Party, Kristin Halvorsen, asked herself whether the gay and lesbian lobbyists 
knew that she had a gay brother: “Why on earth did they target me? Might 
there be someone who knew my brother?” In her autobiography, she admits that 
her brother was an important reason for her to work for gay and lesbian rights.81
Another example of the importance of lesbian or gay relatives occurred when 
one of the most prominent members of the Norwegian Centre Party, the Min-
ister for Regional and Municipal Affairs, Magnhild Meltveit Kleppa, declared 
that she would support the proposed marriage law. To explain why she had 
changed her mind, she told the press that her gay son had been a good dialogue 
partner and had made her understand the hardships of lesbians and gays. “I 
think it is with me like it is with many others, that I previously haven’t had this 
so close to me. That’s the reason I have had a lack of knowledge, for instance, 
about the suffering that many young gay people still experience in this country, 
not least in the countryside, where it, in fact, affects the suicide statistics.” She 
also said she hoped her voters in the rural region of Rogaland would understand 
her decision. With her background in the Inner Mission, it was doubtless a dif-
ficult decision to make.82
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In Finland, Oras Tynkkynen from the Green Alliance became the first open-
ly gay person in the Eduskunta when he was elected in 2004. Gay activist Jorma 
Hentilä was never a Member of Parliament, but as a party secretary for the Peo-
ple’s Alliance he was a public figure in Finnish politics. His being gay was kept 
secret until the late 1990s, however, another example of Finland’s being a “late 
bloomer” in lesbian and gay politics.
Iceland and the Faroes represent special cases in the Nordic community. Ice-
land introduced the new legislation quickly, and even went one step ahead of the 
other countries in allowing joint custody of children. According to Lana Kol-
brún Eddudóttir, it was the emotional impact of recognising lesbians and gays 
as members of society that was decisive for the Icelandic process. She succeeded 
Guðrún Gísladóttir as Samtökin’s lesbian representative in the Homo Commis-
sion, and she worked hard, together with the other Samtökin representative, to 
convince the other members that lesbians and gays were ordinary people. This, 
she says, ultimately paved the way for a law that included children in the idea of 
a same-sex couple. “Icelanders are so used to extended families, and I think we 
made them understand that we, too, were part of the large Icelandic family. And 
that we had families of our own and that we were ordinary, friendly people.”83
But if the “family effect” in Iceland prepared the ground for a rapid change 
of attitudes, it instead led to a painful exclusion from society in the Faroes. The 
influence of traditional religion, the small numbers of lesbians and gays who 
choose to remain in the islands, and the opposition to liberal ideas emanating 
from Denmark all contributed to the Faroes’ status as the most homophobic so-
ciety in the Nordic community. There is at present very little support for the les-
bian and gay movement, and there are no openly lesbian or gay politicians who 
can lead the way toward acceptance.84 
Kent Carlsson, the first Swedish MP to come out, did so in 1991 but died 
early, in 1993. He did not live long enough to see the Swedish law on registered 
partnership, but he played no little part in influencing attitudes within his own 
party and in the Riksdag. Many persons have referred to him as preparing the 
way for the partnership law. During her interview, the former chair of the Riks-
dag’s Standing Law Committee, Maj-Lis Lööw, remembered him in the politi-
cal work for gay and lesbian rights: 
I think Kent contributed a lot. He had a strong position, he was a colourful repre-
sentative for the party, and everybody liked him. I think that in the end, and I think 
also at the Party Congresses, he had an important role. But then he died. In a way, 
the law became a tribute to Kent.85
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Conclusions
When did Scandinavian mainstream politicians begin to listen to the demands 
of the gay and lesbian movement, and what made them listen? The processes 
that led to an almost complete acceptance of same-sex couples’ right to marry 
and have children consist of an intricate interaction between legislative changes 
and shifting popular attitudes. On a higher analytical level, the new openness 
owes a lot to the end of the Cold War and the crisis of the welfare state. What 
U.S. philosopher Nancy Fraser called the politics of recognition became a much 
more prominent feature of world politics after 1989. In the dichotomous world 
of the Cold War there was little room for demands from culturally or socially 
oppressed groups, and the inequalities due to age, disability, ethnicity, gender, 
race, or sexual orientation were either disregarded or made to fit into a teleolog-
ical, class-based analysis. In contrast, the years immediately after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union saw worldwide changes in the 
geo-political systems, and the fall of dictatorships in Africa, Asia, and Eastern 
Europe. This led to intensified work for human rights, which increasingly be-
came defined in a broader fashion, now including rights for women, ethnic mi-
norities, and people with disabilities, as well as for LGBT persons.
Since popular attitudes have become more accepting of homosexuality, it 
has also become a rewarding topic for politicians. It is easy to understand and 
explain, and it costs very little. Giving same-sex couples the right to marry en-
tails limited costs for the state and gets high media attention, while dealing with 
pensions and health insurance is both complicated and costly. On 7 June 1994, 
the Swedish Riksdag voted on the law on registered partnership after years of 
heated debate, Government commissions, and lobbying work. The next day the 
pension system that had been in place since 1958 was abolished and a new sys-
tem was adopted, without much public debate and with a minimum of news 
coverage. This way, symbolic questions like gay and lesbian rights can steal news 
attention from much more complicated questions that carry proportionally 
much greater consequences for more people.86
The opening up of marriage or marriage-like arrangements for same-sex 
couples of course has to do with the ongoing redefinition of marriage itself in 
Western society. Because of the changes in the legal and economic status of 
women in society, heterosexual marriage has been redefined during the last cen-
tury, creating an institution in which the legal custody of the husband over his 
wife has been abolished, divorce facilitated, and taxation made separate.87 As 
Danish historian Karin Lützen put it in a 1998 article: “As a worn-out piece of 
folklore, marriage and perhaps even church weddings will be tossed at homo-
sexuals.”88 She has been proved right in her assumption that marriage and even 
church weddings have become possible for same-sex couples, but she underes-
timated the symbolic force of state recognition.
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The AIDS epidemic was important in influencing the views of politicians 
and people working in the health services, since they met a gay community 
in crisis and saw the needs of its members. All Scandinavian countries are so 
small that personal contacts and networks become very important for influenc-
ing public opinion. In most Scandinavian countries there were no serious con-
flicts between gay movements and the authorities, perhaps due to the reform-
ist leadership of the gay movements as well as the understanding attitude from 
their governments. The AIDS argument, however, was only rarely used in any of 
the five Scandinavian countries. Instead, proponents of the law were concerned 
about fairness and equality, and the main effect of the AIDS epidemic was to 
direct media attention to the living conditions of gay men.
The first politicians who took up gay and lesbian issues were from the small-
er ideological parties. From the beginning, demands for same-sex marriage ar-
rangements came in a package of proposals that stemmed from a radical critique 
of the family, and the most important part of the package was the abolition of 
traditional marriage. These proposals were not successful, but they led to dis-
cussions on a high political level about alternative ways of looking at the fam-
ily. The most interesting ideological change perhaps occurred when same-sex-
marriage initiatives shifted from leftist demands for a redefinition of marriage, 
into classical liberal arguments of equality before the law. The latter approach 
does not question marriage as such, but pleads that its definition be widened 
to include same-sex couples. The bases of the two approaches are, in fact, dia-
metrically opposed, but they can be combined for pragmatic politics and more 
limited demands.
Demands for gay marriage could not be allowed in the larger, class-based 
parties until a general change in public opinion had taken place. A generational 
shift in the political parties was crucial for this process. In all parties there were 
MPs who had a personal dislike of homosexuality and homosexuals. Also, many 
of them were afraid of negative reactions in their constituencies if they support-
ed gay and lesbian issues. In the long run, however, these MPs either changed 
their minds or were marginalised as Youth and Women’s Leagues in each party 
pressured for changed attitudes to homosexuality. When more and more poli-
ticians came out as lesbian or gay, first to their fellow party members and then 
to the media, the result was a change of climate which made lesbian and gay 
rights a part of mainstream politics. The generational shift eventually swayed 
the opinion within the conservative parties. There is a tradition of discreet ho-
mosexuality within the upper class, which sometimes could lead to understand-
ing attitudes, as long as public scandal was avoided. This made it easier to accept 
pro-gay legislation for some members of the older generation in the conserva-
tive parties. The younger generation, with its stronger emphasis on neo-liberal 
values, embraced pro-gay legislation more whole-heartedly, seeing in liberated 
sexuality a precondition for the freedom of the individual. Finally, the lobby-
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ing efforts by the Scandinavian gay and lesbian movements in the 1980s and 
the 1990s were crucial for influencing the attitudes of mainstream politicians. 
In Norway, the activists of the national gay and lesbian movements were lauded 
afterwards by politicians from different parties, who described the activists as 
well read and efficient.
In the end, even the Christian Democratic parties were influenced by the 
general change in opinions during these years. They had been consistently op-
posed to a law on registered partnership, but when the debate turned toward 
granting marriage to same-sex couples they claimed that the partnership law 
was a good law for homosexuals. In the debate, they had been accused of be-
traying the Christian core values of love and compassion. They had replied by 
stressing family values, but their anti-gay stance received diminishing support 
from Scandinavian society.
The most important factor, however, was the specific structure of the Scandi-
navian welfare states, which made them such a fertile ground for lesbian and gay 
law reform. A long tradition of consensus made a polarised debate less likely, 
and in fact led to the shaming of the most outspoken opponents of gay and les-
bian rights. A strong emphasis on fairness and equality contributed to the suc-
cess of the arguments based on these values and was crucial in getting support 
from the large Social Democratic parties. Stable political institutions guaran-
teed that the issue stayed alive through many shifts of government, and well-es-
tablished, trade-union-like lesbian and gay movements kept the channels open 
to elected representatives. The limited size of the Scandinavian countries led to 
an overall acceptance of the new laws and created a positive atmosphere around 
gay and lesbian members of society, an effect most clearly visible in Iceland, 
where the whole country very quickly became supportive of gay and lesbian 
life and culture. Finally, armies of loyal civil servants guaranteed the swift im-
plementation of the new laws. The next chapter will deal specifically with the 
obstacles that were there before the new institution of registered partnership 
found its place in society.
Chapter Four: Implementation
The fear of negative consequences of the registered partnership law was not ex-
actly widespread in Scandinavia, but it could be dramatically formulated. When 
the Danish partnership law became effective on 1 October 1989, five men and 
one woman voiced their concern in a letter to the editor of a local newspaper:
October 1st ‒ a fatal day ‒ a death sentence! We Danes and not least we Chris-
tians have signed our own death warrant! . . . So far out in the mud have we come, 
we Danes, that other countries must regard us as the country most polluted by sin 
in the world!1
This argument cannot be regarded as representative of many Danes, but it ex-
pressed the feelings of some of those of a Christian conviction who opposed 
the law. Denmark would be punished by God and disregarded by other nations. 
As far as it is humanly possible to ascertain, this has not happened, but the law 
in Denmark ‒ and in the other Nordic countries ‒ nevertheless has had effects, 
not only on the lives of the gay and lesbian couples who used it to regulate their 
relationships but also on society as a whole. Here we will examine the immedi-
ate aftermath of the laws in the various regions of Scandinavia, the struggles to 
obstruct their implementation, and the initiatives to widen their scope. We will 
discuss the effects of the partnership laws on society as a whole and will trace 
the development from state recognition of the childless same-sex couple to that 
of the procreative rainbow family. 
Smooth implementation in Denmark
When the law was first adopted in Denmark, it was supported by more than 
half of the population, but as the quote above indicates, there were those who 
feared that it would harm Denmark as a nation, and that it was a violation of 
the Christian values that Danish society was built on. Immediately after the bill 
had been voted on by the Danish Parliament, the small Christian People’s Par-
ty (Kristeligt Folkeparti) demanded a referendum. However, they were far from 
having the necessary sixty signatures in Parliament which would force the Gov-
ernment to order it. Only their own four members and a handful of members 
from the right-wing populist Progress Party signed their petition. The Conserv-
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atives and the right-of-centre liberal Left Party (Venstre), which also opposed 
the law, considered a referendum to be the wrong way to handle the situation. 
According to political commentators at the time, the most probable cause for 
their refusal to sign the petition was the support for the law expressed in the 
opinion polls.2 
There were also direct obstructions on the local level. The Danish press re-
ported in January 1990 that the Conservative Mayor of Vallensbæk municipal-
ity, Poul Hansen, refused to register partnerships. The LBL protested, but in a 
letter to the gay and lesbian organisation, Social Democratic MP Pia Gjellerup 
downplayed the importance of the Mayor’s demonstration: “There is no falter-
ing in the support for the law ‒ not in the Folketing either (except for the Chris-
tian Democrats of course). A law is a law and it must be upheld in all places. 
Poul Hansen is a little bit the laughing matter in this, but so he is in various 
contexts.”3 
The law had consequences on many levels, and the gay and lesbian move-
ment was active in some instances in influencing its implementation. In De-
cember 1990, the LBL noted that Statistics Denmark still listed people living in 
a registered partnership as unmarried. The reason the statisticians gave for this 
in their monthly publication was that they regarded marriage as “a unit with a 
reproductive quality,” and that the calculation of fertility quotients depended 
on an internationally comparable definition of marriage. In a letter to Statistics 
Denmark, LBL’s chair Else Slange then asked whether all married women who 
had passed the age of fertility should also be regarded as unmarried. She sug-
gested that Statistics Denmark separate the categories to enable international 
comparison, and she complained that the current practice would render regis-
tered partners invisible in statistics.4 In a letter to LBL in January 1992, Statistics 
Denmark announced that they were in the process of changing the presentation 
of data on marital status, and in March 1993 they informed LBL about their 
new way of presenting it. From 1 January 1992, Statistics Denmark added three 
new marital statuses to the four traditional “unmarried,” “married,” “divorced,” 
and “widow/er,” namely: “registered partner,” “dissolved registered partnership,” 
and “longest living registered partner.” Because of the striving to preserve the 
category of married people intact, the three new categories were created with 
only a small number of individuals in each. From that day, there were separate 
columns also for registered partners, divorced partners, and widowed partners, a 
practice which would be followed by the statistical bureaus in the other Nordic 
countries. Even if they were of little consequence for Danish citizens in general, 
the establishment of the new categories shows how the institution of registered 
partnership caused family as a statistical unit to be redefined.5 
Heads of Section Henning Christiansen and Anna Qvist both worked at 
Statistics Denmark when the new law forced them to create new categories. 
Henning Christiansen said in an interview in 2008, that it was the low num-
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bers of the registered partnerships that made them hesitate: “All the tables con-
cerning marital status had to be expanded from four, I think, to seven columns, 
and in those days data bases weren’t as easy to handle as they are today, so we 
thought that it was too much work connected with something that concerned 
so few.” His colleague Anna Qvist remembers that she felt insecure because she 
did not have any precedent. “We were in the dark. It was something completely 
new. Should we consider them as married couples or . . . In the beginning we 
classified them as unmarried. They didn’t like that.”6 
An issue that took some time to settle was the question of widowers’ pen-
sions. The Danish pension system is based on a flat-rate state pension that does 
not guarantee the level of income, and it is therefore supplemented with a sys-
tem of pension insurances administered by trade unions and private companies. 
In 1990, there were 31 branch-based pension funds ‒ like the Pension Fund for 
Danish Lawyers and Economists ( JØP) and the Danish Pension Fund for En-
gineers (DIP) ‒ and 121 corporate-based pension funds.7 The law regulating the 
pension funds overruled the Partnership Law, because the Partnership Law ex-
plicitly stated that “Regulations in Danish law which contain special rules about 
one of the persons in a marriage who is specified by sex will not be used for the 
registered partnership.”8 Most pension funds quickly changed their statutes in 
order to grant pensions to the surviving partner in registered partnerships that 
had been dissolved by death, but during the first phase of the transition, some 
individuals were victims of slow decisions. One such case was the “Leif case” 
from 1990, when a person did not receive a pension because his partner died in 
May and the pension fund changed its statutes in July. One of Denmark’s largest 
employers, the Danish East Asiatic Company (Østasiatisk Kompagni, ØK), was 
also slow to adapt to the new situation.9 But it was the Danish Engineers’ Pen-
sion Fund, DIP, that became branded as discriminatory when it failed to change 
its statutes on two occasions. It was not explicitly stated, but in view of the on-
going AIDS epidemic, the reluctance to include a group with higher mortality 
than average could have been dictated by economic considerations.10 
Because of the urgent situation for many gay men whose partners were dy-
ing of AIDS, the LBL then wrote a letter to the Standing Law Committee 
(Retsudvalget) of the Folketing and suggested law changes to correct the situa-
tion. They pointed out that around fifty partnerships per month were registered 
in Denmark. The couples lacked the possibility of adopting one another’s chil-
dren, LBL wrote, but that was a legal situation that the Folketing had intended. 
As opposed to this, the discrimination against same-sex couples by the large 
pension funds was not intended and could easily be ended by legislation.11 There 
was no revision of the law that would force pension funds to include gay and 
lesbian widows in their systems, and no MP presented any such proposal, but it 
seems that all private pension funds soon adjusted their statutes to do so.
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Another area that was affected was the various reductions heterosexual cou-
ples were offered on public transport, in hotels, and the like. There was nothing 
in the new law that could force public transport companies or hotels to give the 
same reductions to registered same-sex couples as to heterosexual ones, but the 
law served as a powerful signal to society. Several Danish companies declared 
within months from the law’s implementation that they would extend the ben-
efits granted to heterosexual couples to same-sex couples. The airline company 
SAS and the Danish State Railways were among the first to make such an-
nouncements. Since SAS is a joint Scandinavian company, this had effects also 
in Norway and Sweden.12
Part of the history of the implementation of the partnership law is the wave 
of benevolence toward gay people that swept over Denmark. There were nega-
tive reactions, to be sure, but, on the whole, it seems that more and more Danes 
took pride in displaying tolerant attitudes toward lesbians and gays. When Pia 
Gjellerup was asked why she thought Denmark, and no other country, was first 
in the world to adopt such a law, she hesitated and then explained: 
It confirmed a conviction among Danes that we can be decent people . . . You know, 
we love the story that the Jews were saved in Denmark . . . It’s the good story. All 
nations have their good stories. And this is the one that will be told when we want 
to say that this was the good story from the end of the twentieth century. That’s 
good. That way, small countries have a chance to make great things happen.”13
Religious resistance in Norway
In Norway, the introduction of the law met with a more articulate resistance, and 
it was mainly from Christian circles and in rural areas that there were negative 
reactions.14 When the partnership law was already adopted by the Storting, but 
before it became effective, an MP from the Christian People’s Party proposed 
that marriage registrars (sorenskrivere) should have the possibility of refusing 
to perform partnership ceremonies if it was against their personal belief. The 
proposal was rejected by the Storting majority without debate.15 The following 
year, the leader of the Christian People’s Party, Kjell Magne Bondevik, moved 
that the law should be revoked, but his proposal was rejected after a short debate 
in the Storting.16 These two attempts to obstruct or abolish the new law received 
little support in the Parliament, and it was in other areas that the struggle over 
the implementation of the new law was to be waged.
The post-law debate in Norway was focused on the Church and whether 
it could condone homosexual practice. Already in 1977 the Norwegian Church 
Meeting, the highest decision-making body of the Church of Norway, had de-
cided that it could accept homosexual orientation but not homosexual practice, 
and that decision was to be the guiding principle for a majority of the Church 
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for a long time. The Church Meeting of 1995 decided after lengthy discussions 
to uphold the principle laid down in the 1977 declaration, that it accepted ho-
mosexuals but not their sexual practice, which meant that the Church could not 
have practicing homosexuals as priests, deacons, or catechists, i.e. any office that 
involved religious consecration. Among those who voted against the 1995 de-
cision were three of Norway’s eleven bishops, a foretaste of the deep tensions 
that were to threaten the unity of the Norwegian Church in the years to come.17 
Local politics in Sweden
As in Denmark and Norway, there was widespread celebration in Sweden when 
the law became effective. National and local media ran big feature articles show-
ing happy couples preparing for their registration, or encountering cheering 
crowds outside the courthouse. In the midst of this celebratory mood there was 
also some disappointment that there were only a limited number of same-sex 
couples who showed up. One local newspaper published an ad looking for les-
bian or gay couples who were prepared to register and would consent to be in-
terviewed. That way, the new law even created a demand for homosexuals where 
previously there had been none.18 
However, obstructions to the law were more widespread in Sweden than in 
Denmark and Norway, the most serious being the refusal by some municipali-
ties to appoint partnership registrars. The formalities around a partnership reg-
istration differed slightly within Scandinavia, depending on how civil marriage 
ceremonies were organised. In Sweden, all judges employed by a District Court 
were obliged to perform both marriage ceremonies and partnership registra-
tions. In addition, each local municipality had to nominate one or more civil 
marriage registrars who were to be officially appointed by the local state repre-
sentatives in the County Administrative Board (länsstyrelsen). Already in De-
cember 1994, before the law was effective, both civil marriage registrars in Ör-
kelljunga municipality, in southern Sweden, declared that they would refuse to 
perform the corresponding ceremony for same-sex couples. “Don’t forget that 
matrimony is a holy act, even when it is a civil ceremony,” one of them declared 
in the local newspaper.19
One month after the law became effective, 93 out of Sweden’s 288 local dis-
tricts had failed to nominate a partnership registrar.20 This delay in the imple-
mentation of the new law was generally interpreted as an unwillingness to ac-
cept its consequences. Many letters to the editor in local newspapers gave sup-
port to or condemned those who delayed the process, and several of the mar-
riage registrars had to defend their position publicly.21 The fact that many of the 
marriage registrars were politically active, and in effect nominated by local party 
organisations, created tensions within the political parties. Vice Prime Minister 
Mona Sahlin wrote a sharp letter to the Social Democrats’ district organisations 
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in which she demanded that Social Democratic marriage registrars who refused 
to perform partnership registrations should reconsider.22 At the same time, the 
Youth League of the Centre Party demanded the same thing from the marriage 
registrars of their party.23 In 1997 the Moderate MP Fredrik Reinfeldt was nom-
inated as marriage registrar by his party. He then declared that he also wanted to 
register partnerships. On this occasion, he told the reporter that he had encoun-
tered many negative reactions from within the party for his support of gay and 
lesbian rights. “It was tough then, tough internal negotiations. Some, especially 
among the older members, were rather unreasonable with me.”24
The discussion about the communal partnership registrars continued for 
several years and each time stirred debate in the local media. In May 1999, one 
of the first actions of the recently created Ombudsman against Discrimination 
on Grounds of Sexual Orientation was to reprimand three municipalities that 
had been reported by RFSL for not having any partnership registrars. The local 
councils of Timrå and Mariestad quickly chose to nominate registrars. Örkel-
ljunga was recalcitrant, and the tone of the debate got heated, but the Ombuds-
man could count on the support of the new Social Democratic Government. 
In May 2000 the law was changed so that the two offices were combined. After 
that, anyone who applied for the position of registrar of civil marriages would 
also have to be prepared to perform partnership registrations. However, those 
already commissioned were exempt from having to perform the double duties.
Those who were commissioned by a religious congregation also were not under 
any obligation to marry couples they did not consider fit for marriage ‒ whether 
they were divorced or because they belonged to the same sex. After the turn of 
the millennium, the discussion about registered partnerships and the Church 
took a somewhat unexpected turn in Sweden.  In 2000, a lesbian couple had a 
ceremony in a church in Gothenburg, where they were registered by a registrar 
and blessed by a priest. This provoked a complaint, and the following year the 
Bishops’ Meeting officially banned registration ceremonies inside the Church. 
The gay priest and activist who had officiated, Lars Gårdfeldt, then quickly 
invented the “Church Stair Wedding” (kyrktrappsbröllop), a new word which 
soon entered the Swedish vocabulary. In these ceremonies, the partnership was 
registered on the Church Stairs and then the couple proceeded into the Church 
to be blessed by the priest. The Bishops’ ban on partnership registrations in 
Church lasted until November 2009, when the Church of Sweden decided to 
perform legally binding Church weddings.25
Religious debate in Iceland
In Iceland, as in Norway, the debate about the new law mainly concerned the 
attitudes of the Church. But unlike in Norway, the Icelandic State Church did 
not have much influence in politics. There has never been any Christian Dem-
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ocratic party of significance in Iceland, and Icelanders are not known to be a 
particularly religious people. Iceland was also the country in Scandinavia where 
the law on registered partnership was most warmly received by the state. Only 
one member of the Alþingi voted against the new law, and the President of the 
Republic honoured the first registered partners with her presence at their recep-
tion. There seems to have been very little resistance on the local level, and press 
commentaries were generally favourable. Joint child custody was accepted to a 
limited extent when the law was first adopted. In 1997 there was a proposal to 
allow for stepchild adoption, which became a reality in 2000 when the partner-
ship law was revised.26 
One bone of contention, though, was whether the Icelandic People’s Church 
should create a blessing of same-sex couples. The Church was deeply divid-
ed over the issue, and it was this question that would provoke the most heat-
ed debate about the legitimacy of same-sex couples in Iceland. In September 
1999, Ólafur Stephensen wrote a letter to the editor of Iceland’s largest news-
paper criticising the State Church for not recognising same-sex couples and for 
choosing to interpret the Bible in an intolerant way. Stephensen argued that 
homosexuality “is part of the Creation, and consequently the will of God,” and 
he claimed that the Bible is full of inconsistencies and that it should be used 
to find strength and faith, not to condemn other people’s lives.27 Ten days later, 
the priest Ragnar Fjalar Lárusson answered him, saying that he found himself 
forced to counter such distortions of the Faith: “Most priests in this country, as 
well as the leaders of the Church, let such criticism blow past their ears without 
responding to it. They are completely silent, so that they won’t offend anyone!” 
Lárusson did not want to characterise homosexuality as a sin, however. Homo-
sexuals cannot help the way they are, and “the Church of Christ may never con-
demn anyone for the sickness he carries.”28 His article provoked the intellectual 
establishment, and in the ensuing debate the majority of those involved con-
demned his views. In a society built on consensus, it was almost as if the public 
had been waiting for this opportunity.29 
Silence in Greenland
The most striking feature of the implementation of the law in Greenland was 
that nobody noticed that it was there. After the initial debate in the Greenlandic 
press in 1994 when the Greenlandic Parliament, the Inatsisartut (or Landsting), 
had decided to introduce the law on registered partnership, there was a com-
plete silence. When the law was finally effective, two years after the political de-
cision, there was not a word about it in the newspapers. There was no gay and 
lesbian movement yet, and nobody in the cultural and political establishment 
brought the law up for discussion. Statistics Greenland has never considered 
making registered partnerships visible in their reports or on their home page, 
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and lesbians and gays remained relatively invisible in Greenlandic society. The 
Mayor of Nuuk, Agnethe Davidsen, who reportedly has performed two of the 
registrations in Greenland, has so far refused to deliver the dates of the registra-
tions or confirm their number.30 In such a small society as Greenland, though, 
with only 56,000 inhabitants, people are bound to know a lot about each other, 
and the first lesbian couple who registered was already known in Nuuk, where 
they lived, and in their respective hometowns of Ilulissat and Qeqertarsuaq. 
Estrella Mølgaard and Regine Jørgensen met in a boarding school in Den-
mark in 1983. They became lovers, and when they moved back to Greenland they 
decided to be open about their relationship. The first years were hard, they told 
me, but gradually their families and friends accepted their relationship. In 2002 
they decided to register their partnership. Since the introduction of the law 
in Greenland had been surrounded by total silence, Mølgaard and Jørgensen 
did not know when the law on registered partnership had become effective. 
They just assumed that the Danish law from 1989 was also valid in Greenland. 
When they decided to register, they had already been together for nineteen 
years. When they told their families that they were going to register their part-
nership, some relatives reacted negatively. To publicly announce their relation-
ship by the act of registration obviously was a very serious indiscretion. In 2004, 
when they appeared in an interview in Greenland’s largest newspaper, they met 
with more negative reactions from some family members.31
The visibility of lesbians and gay men in Greenland was not brought about 
by legislation, but by the emergence of a gay and lesbian lobby group. In 2002, 
gay radio journalist Erik Olsen decided to start an organisation. He let himself 
be interviewed anonymously in Greenland’s largest newspaper, but he made 
sure that the journalist published his e-mail address. He got more response than 
he had dared hope for, and in a very short time he had assembled a gay and les-
bian rights group in Nuuk, Qaamaneq (The Light).32 With the emergence of a 
gay group, and of a handful of lesbians and gay men who appeared openly in the 
media, there was suddenly a focus for discussion about gay and lesbian rights in 
Greenland. It was thus not the partnership law as such that increased openness 
in Greenland, but the initiative of organised lesbians and gay men. 
Ambivalent politics in Finland
In Finland, the law on registered partnership became effective on 1 March 2002, 
eight years after the first initiative had been rejected by Parliament. The Finn-
ish debate on gay and lesbian rights had been intense even before the law, and 
when the new law was introduced, old and new demands were mixed. Already 
at the beginning of May 2002, the Government appointed a commission within 
the Ministry for Social Affairs to investigate the legal rights of registered cou-
ples, including the possibility of adoption rights and assisted fertilisation.33 At 
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the same time, the Finnish Evangelical Church gathered for its annual meeting 
and had to deal with two diametrically opposed proposals: one, that the Church 
should create a ceremony for blessing same-sex couples, and the other, that the 
Church should ban gays and lesbians from working within the Church.34 An 
opinion poll showed that only 30 percent of the Finnish population were in fa-
vour of a ceremony for the blessing of same-sex couples, and when Bishop Wille 
Riekkinen in Kuopio declared that he was ready to perform such a ceremony, 
he was immediately reported to the Church for compromising the evangelical 
foundations of his office.35 Minister of Justice Johannes Koskinen from the So-
cial Democratic Party sharply criticised the Church for even discussing a ban on 
registered partners working for it, calling it anti-constitutional, but after a while 
he admitted that the Church had the right to demand that persons in “spirit-
ual” positions follow its teachings.36 The debate within the Finnish Evangelical 
Church went on for a long time, and still goes on, but the Finnish Orthodox 
Church to date has no regulations concerning homosexual employees.37
These questions, however, were largely internal matters for the two State 
Churches in Finland and, as opposed to Norway in the 1990s, they did not 
spill over into the general debate. Outside the realm of religion, public discus-
sion focused on the rights to adoption and assisted fertilisation. Opinion polls 
showed ‒ again ‒ that Finland’s rural and urban populations were divided and 
that support for gay and lesbian parental rights was stronger in the cities. The 
polls also showed that women were more supportive than men in these mat-
ters.38 It was also a generational question, and younger politicians from several 
parties expressed their support for the idea that same-sex couples should be able 
to adopt children.39 An issue that became especially controversial in Finland was 
the question of assisted fertilisation. The Finnish gay and lesbian movements 
had been adamant in their demands for parental rights, and the gay and lesbi-
an campaign for registered partnership in Finland focused more on parenthood 
than in any other Scandinavian country. The lobbying for registered partner-
ship in Scandinavia in the 1980s and early 1990s consciously avoided the men-
tion of, or explicitly excluded, children from the discussion, but in the late 1990s 
and early twenty-first century, the children of gay and lesbian parents entered 
the discourse. By initially focusing on existing children with lesbian or gay par-
ents and pointing out their need for legal security, the gay and lesbian move-
ment also paved the way for positive decisions on assisted fertilisation. Moreo-
ver, since there was no law at all regulating assisted fertilisation in Finland, a 
practice developed after the mid-1990s of private fertility clinics accepting both 
single women and lesbian couples. This was unacceptable to many conservative 
Finnish politicians, who strove for a strict regulation of assisted fertilisation.40 
But just as the law of registered partnership had been delayed because progres-
sive and conservative forces blocked each other, the law on assisted fertilisation 
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also took time to get passed. The new law, allowing access to reproductive tech-
nologies for lesbian couples and single women, was not enacted until 2007.41
Conclusions
What, then, were the effects of the initial partnership laws? Contested from left 
and right, for threatening family values or selling out to them too easily, they 
were a compromise from the beginning, excluding church marriages and chil-
dren, but setting up extra strict requirements for citizenship. Scorned by some 
as a second-rate marriage, and detested by others as the end of civilisation, they 
did indeed have far-reaching effects in Scandinavian society.
As I have shown, the mere existence of the laws created a demand for the 
recognition of homosexuality in local communities. At the same time, howev-
er, state recognition placed claims on same-sex couples as well as on their envi-
ronment. What can be more disciplining than the act of pronouncing a couple 
man and wife, thus anchoring them in the social fabric with vows of fidelity and 
expectations of providing offspring to their kin, society, and nation? Urbanised 
modern society has relaxed some of the expectations and granted more freedom 
to individuals, but the symbols and discursive framework around marriage re-
main. What same-sex couples achieved in 1989 in Denmark, and between 1993 
and 2002 in the rest of Scandinavia, was a special legal arrangement in which 
the demands of fidelity were implicitly present, but procreation and child-rear-
ing had been removed. Sprung from urbanised modern society, the gay and les-
bian subculture reserved its right to interpret marriage in various, individualised 
ways, but the main reason for the rapid acceptance of the new laws was that the 
majority culture could mirror itself in them.
On the other hand, the regulation of same-sex bonding also destabilised tra-
ditional concepts of marriage. The institutionalisation of gay and lesbian cou-
ples increased visibility for all non-heterosexual people in Scandinavia, as the 
implementation of the partnership laws coincided with the introduction and 
proliferation of queer theory.42 There was a lot of interest in queer theory in the 
national news media, which led to further diversification of the image of non-
heterosexuality. The laws on registered partnership were only part of that image. 
However, the most important effect was the spread of gay and lesbian pres-
ence from the centre to the periphery in each country, as well as from the cen-
trally placed countries in Scandinavia to those in the periphery ‒ most notably 
Finland in the East and Greenland, Iceland, and the Faroes in the West. All 
over Scandinavia, the debate about the laws helped spread the idea of homo-
sexuality over the whole territory. Before, it was generally thought of as an ur-
ban phenomenon, concerning only a small segment of the population, but that 
was to change.43 In every single municipality decisions had to be made as to who 
should deal with the potential partnership registrations. Local newspapers had 
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to decide whether to publish paid partnership announcements, and, if so, under 
what heading. In the local press, as well as in the national media, politicians who 
obstructed the laws were branded as backward and intolerant, and a growing 
number of articles featured happy same-sex couples, with or without children. 
All of this influenced public opinion. Moreover, what emerged in the columns 
of the Scandinavian press during the 1990s was a clear-cut generational divide. 
The younger politicians seemed to embrace the ideas of partnership and equal 
rights for homosexuals, whereas the older generation was more reluctant. The 
remaining battleground was ‒ and is ‒ within the national churches. Because of 
a Scandinavian history of state churches that administered civic registration and 
marriage ceremonies, it was very important what they thought of homosexual-
ity and gay marriage. Increasingly, however, the question of religious recognition 
has been handed over to the churches themselves to deal with, and public dis-
cussions increasingly have focused on the question of parenthood.
As we have seen, the gradual fertilisation of the once childless gay and les-
bian couple came about as a logical consequence of the laws on registered part-
nership. Stripped of children and religious ceremonies, the first registered cou-
ples nevertheless carried the potential for both. They were presented in the press 
either as young and starry-eyed with a bright future ahead of them, or as ma-
ture couples who were granted their official status as a reward for their long and 
faithful relationship. And as I have pointed out, the laws on registered partner-
ship created their own demand. Two Swedish gay men, interviewed in 1997, 
claimed that it was their heterosexual neighbours who had persuaded them to 
register their relationship after having been together for forty-eight years. They 
had become close to the young family next door over the years and had acted as 
gay “grandfathers” for the family’s children. When the law on registered part-
nership became effective, it was mainly the children who insisted, and the gay 
men agreed to register their partnership, even though they thought it was un-
necessary after so many years. As a celebration, the neighbour family impro-
vised an altar in their living room, and the sixteen-year-old son learned to play 
Mendelssohn’s wedding march on the guitar. It was a beautiful ceremony and 
the two men were profoundly moved. Not even the discovery that their pen-
sions were reduced, since they were no longer registered as unmarried, made 
them regret it.44 
At this time, the national media presented older, childless gay and lesbi-
an couples alongside young, potentially parenting couples. Sometimes, though 
not always, the young couples would tell reporters that they thought of having 
children in the future. But same-sex couples with children were not featured in 
the press. Only toward the end of the 1990s did they begin to appear regularly, 
in connection with the increasingly intense debate about the rights of children 
with lesbian or gay parents. Before that, media had not shown much interest in 
the matter, and gay and lesbian parents had good reason to stay out of it, because 
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of the negative attitudes toward their families. When Denmark introduced the 
ban on insemination for lesbians and single women in 1997, followed by a law on 
stepchild adoption in 1999, the issue was brought to public attention, and from 
around then gay and lesbian couples have been more readily connected with 
child rearing in the public mind. 
The next chapter will demonstrate the gendered character of the partnership 
laws and discuss how the lesbian baby-boom in the 1990s coincided with a more 
pronounced lesbian interest in the registered partnership laws.
Chapter Five:  
Gender and marriage statistics
When the law on registered partnership was first introduced in Denmark in 
1989, international press coverage was extensive, and the pictures of the aging 
gay couple Axel and Eigil Axgil went all over the world. Axel Axgil was the 
founder of The Society of 1948 and he and his partner had worked for many 
decades for lesbian and gay rights in Denmark, so it seemed natural that they 
would be given the honour to be first. They had waited long, but now they were 
the first registered gay couple in the world and were celebrated by a huge crowd 
in Copenhagen’s City Hall Square. The tone in the press was generally happy 
and generous, and many newspapers took the opportunity of congratulating all 
homosexuals for their victory.1 Some of the reports, however, showed some dis-
appointment. After so much debate and confrontation, it turned out that rela-
tively few persons took advantage of the new law. Moreover, very few women 
had their partnership registered. When the law became effective on 1 October 
1989, eleven male couples registered in Copenhagen’s City Hall, but there were 
no lesbian couples. According to the morning paper B.T., the Danish Gay and 
Lesbian Association LBL explained the absence of women by saying that they 
were “afraid of publicity” and were waiting till another day when there weren’t 
so many journalists around. But the newspaper noted that lesbian interest in 
the law still seemed low after nearly two weeks.2 Here the journalist hit a sore 
spot within the Danish gay and lesbian movement. As we have seen in previ-
ous chapters, the law was a project mainly fought for by gay men, while there 
was strong resistance among lesbian feminists against a law that emulated het-
erosexual marriage. As has already been pointed out, this must be placed in the 
context of second-wave feminism in the 1970s, which saw the heterosexual nu-
clear family and marriage as the cornerstones of patriarchy. The dominating 
feminist discourse in the 1970s was built on various theories of patriarchy, and 
for most feminists gay marriage was an oxymoron. That was one of the reasons 
the chair of LBL, Else Slange, refused, when she was asked, to recruit lesbian 
couples for the first registration ceremony. Like many other lesbian feminists in 
the gay and lesbian movement, she did not believe in the idea of gay marriage 
or registered partnership, and she did not want to work for it. But on the other 
hand, she chose not to lobby against it, and the issue was not important enough 
for her to cause a split in the movement.3
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Statistical evidence indicates that women chose not to take advantage of the 
law in the beginning of its existence but that they later became more interested 
in registering their partnerships. Here we will look closer at some statistics con-
cerning the changing patterns of registering. We will also compare Scandinavi-
an figures with corresponding statistics in the Netherlands, which show signifi-
cant differences and similarities.
All in all, there are four characteristics that national statistics on partner-
ship registrations display in all the four Scandinavian countries that have large 
enough populations to provide significant figures. First, the built-up demand 
for the reform resulted in an initial number of registrations that were three or 
four times as high as the following years.4 Second, the number of partnership 
registrations compared to the number of marriages was much lower than could 
be expected if homosexuals were 10 percent of the population, as has often been 
claimed. Third, the male and female partnership registrations show that the 
propensity to register was much lower among lesbians than among gay men in 
the 1990s, but that this tendency was reversed during the first years of the new 
century. Fourth, there has been an increasing tendency, on the whole, to register 
partnerships in all Nordic countries since the turn of the century. All of these 
characteristics will be discussed below.
Initial marriage boom
The high numbers of partnership registrations during the first year the laws were 
in force are perhaps the least surprising fact of the partnership statistics (see Ta-
ble 1). Men and women of all ages who lived in steady relationships with part-
ners of their own sex were waiting for the reform, and as soon as the laws went 
into effect many of those who had long wished to marry hastened to register 
their partnership. That way, a built-up demand led to high numbers during the 
first years, an increase of registered partnerships that soon levelled off. One re-
sult of the initial “marriage boom” was that the world had never before witnessed 
so many elderly brides and bridegrooms. Data from a Norwegian-Swedish sur-
vey from 2006, led by Swedish demographer Gunnar Andersson, suggest that 
the average age of couples registering partnership was considerably higher than 
that of heterosexual couples who marry.5 There are reasons to believe that same-
sex couples generally would wait longer to get married, since the process of com-
ing to terms with one’s sexuality tends to be more extended for persons defining 
themselves as lesbian or gay. On the other hand, the coming-out as non-hetero-
sexual seems to occur earlier in life than it did some decades ago. Moreover, the 
accumulated demand for marriage should be over by now, so that the average age 
may be lower.
Gunnar Andersson’s study further demonstrates that the frequency of di-
vorce is considerably higher among homosexual couples than among heterosex-
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uals. Men who have registered partnership have a 55 percent higher frequency 
of divorce than heterosexual couples, and lesbians divorce twice as often as ho-
mosexual men. 
Table 1. Partnership registrations yearly in the Nordic countries, 1989–2009. Number of 
couples
Denmark Norway Sweden Iceland Greenland Finland
Year Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
1989 62 267
1990 115 345
1991 89 197  
1992 91 186
1993 66 177 41 115
1994 104 165 47 86
1995 88 178 34 64 84 249
1996 110 158 47 80 64 101 10 11
1997 111 126 43 74 52 79 7 5
1998 130 135 44 71 46 79 6 5
1999 136 160 62 82 67 77 5 6
2000 131 177 76 78 70 109 7 5
2001 169 178 77 108 93 98 8 5 1
2002 163 140 78 105 105 106 4 5 1 207 249
2003 172 148 88 116 129 120 6 7 109 83
2004 199 134 85 107 141 143 8 9 102 84
2005 218 176 95 97 175 122 7 6 100 100
2006 223 177 125 102 191 139 10 10 1 107 84
2007 236 189 157 110 194 131 9 10 4 120 93
2008 254 187 134 90 252 156 6 12 4 158 91
2009 243 145 .. .. 43 32 10 10 3 154 78
Sources: Denmark, Centralt Populations Register (CPR) 1989–1997, Statistics Demark 1998–
2009; Norway, Statistics Norway; Statistics Sweden; Iceland, Statistics Iceland; Finland, 
Statistics Finland; Greenland, Statistics Greenland, Atuagagdliutit/Grønlandsposten 7/22/04.
Note: Data from Denmark 1989–1998 show the number of Danish citizens who registered 
partnership divided by two and rounded off upward. Data from Denmark from 1999 
onward show the number of couples. Data from Norway, Iceland and Finland account for 
the number of couples. Partnership data from Sweden show the number of individuals 
who registered partnership divided by two and rounded off upward. Swedish partnership 
statistics only accounted for persons who had permanent residency in Sweden, which 
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may lead to odd numbers, and in Norway only those couples were accounted for in which 
the oldest partner had residency in Norway. Data from Greenland show the number of 
registered partners residing in Greenland 1 January 2009, divided by two, and the year 
they registered their partnership. A female couple known from the media, who registered 
in 2002 but has divorced, is added, as well as three couples registered in 2009 after a new 
search by Greenland Statistics.
On the other hand, the survey shows that same-sex couples in general follow 
the same divorce patterns as heterosexuals even if the levels are higher. Factors 
that usually tend to destabilise a relationship, as a higher age difference or a dif-
ferent ethnic origin within the couple, seem to have the same effect on homo-
sexual couples as they have on heterosexuals. Correspondingly, the presence of 
children has a stabilising effect on both kinds of family, and higher levels of ed-
ucation also lead to lower risks of divorce. Homosexual couples in Norway and 
Sweden differ from heterosexual couples in all these ways. On the one hand, 
there is generally a higher age difference between the partners, they are more 
often of different ethnic origins, and they seldom have more children than het-
erosexual couples, which are all destabilising factors. On the other hand, they 
more often have higher education and they are, on the average, older when they 
register their partnership than heterosexuals are when they marry, factors which 
have a stabilising effect. That way, the population of same-sex couples displays 
three destabilising and two stabilising factors that could be expected to even out 
each other, but the fact remains that they have a considerably higher frequency 
of divorce. This should perhaps not be interpreted routinely as something tragic. 
Perhaps it is a sign that registered partnership has not yet become the disciplin-
ing institution some feared and others hoped for. If expectations of surrounding 
friends and families that couples should stick together are weak, relationships 
can perhaps become more dynamic and tendencies to keep together unhappy 
people less effective.6
Why so few?
The second characteristic that partnership statistics display, the comparably low 
number of partnership registrations compared to an expected 10 percent of the 
marriage rate, needs further discussion. This question has been dealt with by 
several scholars before. Gunnar Andersson argues, as well as William Eskridge 
and Darren Spedale, that the lack of institutional support and expectations from 
the surrounding society contribute to the fact that same-sex couples register 
partnership or marry less frequently than different-sex couples. U.S. gay activ-
ist Paul Varnell claims that it is the novelty of the institution that is the reason, 
and that the numbers will rise when lesbians and gays get used to the idea.7 Lee 
Badgett uses statistical data from Belgium, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia to 
investigate how same-sex couples make use of the registered partnership (and, 
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since 2001 in the Netherlands, marriage). She does not analyse the changes over 
time, and she does not analyse the data according to gender, but she addresses 
the question why so few have made use of the laws. She is critical of many of the 
explanations put forth by earlier studies. Neither the novelty of the institution 
of registered partnership, nor the lack of support from the surrounding society 
are valid explanations, she argues. 
Instead, Badgett runs the average rate of same-sex registered partnerships in 
each country against a number of known factors concerning the majority pop-
ulation, and convincingly establishes that no single factor in the general popu-
lation can account for the lower rate of partnership registrations or marriages 
among same-sex couples. The only significant correlation she finds is a higher 
rate of same-sex partnerships and marriages in countries with a higher propor-
tion of the population who regard marriage as outdated! However, there are a 
number of relevant factors within the lesbian and gay community itself, which 
are impossible to study with this method, and Badgett enumerates a number of 
such factors that she has observed during her interviews. Lesbian and gay cou-
ples may have found other ways to regulate their affairs and obtain recognition 
from the surrounding society; they generally have less children than straight 
couples; and there may be political objections to marriage among them. All 
these factors can contribute to the fact that a smaller portion of same-sex cou-
ples choose to register partnership or marry than different-sex couples.8 
The first factor mentioned by Badgett is not studied in this book, whereas the 
two last are thoroughly discussed. But the discrepancy between the different-
sex marriage rate and the same-sex registered partnership rate remains so high 
that questions about the actual numbers of potential same-sex partners must be 
raised. Gunnar Andersson puts the problem thus: If, as many say, homosexuals 
are 10 percent of the population, and if the propensity of homosexuals to form 
and formalise their relationships is the same as that of the heterosexual majority, 
one would expect that the partnership registrations each year would be around 
a tenth of the corresponding numbers for heterosexual marriages. Instead, the 
figures for new partnership registrations per 100,000 inhabitants are less than 1 
percent of the corresponding figures for heterosexual marriages in Scandinavia 
(see Table 2). So either the marriage habits of lesbians and gays are radically dif-
ferent from those of the majority population or they are significantly fewer than 
10 percent of the total population.9
The actual number of homosexuals in the population has been a matter of 
debate ever since the category “homosexual” was created and described toward 
the end of the nineteenth century. The first large inquiry into the matter was 
made by Magnus Hirschfeld in 1903 and 1904. 
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Table 2. New partnership registrations and marriages per 100,000 inhabitants in Scandinavia 
and the Netherlands, 1989–2008
Year Denmark Norway Sweden Iceland Finland The Netherlands
Mar. Part. Mar. Part. Mar. Part. Mar. Part. Mar. Part.
Differ-
ent-sex
Same-
sex
1989 602 6,39 453 1277 467 494 610
1990 614 8,94 498 471 455 500 642
1991 604 5,09 447 426 483 492 632
1992 624 5,37 435 428 478 466 619
1993 611 4,67 435 3,62 389 465 486 579
1994 680 5,18 458 3,07 388 494 488 541
1995 666 5,1 481 2,25 381 3,77 464 464 528
1996 685 5,1 513 2,9 382 1,81 503 7,84 477 550
1997 649 4,49 521 2,66 365 1,48 549 4,45 455 546
1998 656 5 504 2,6 357 1,41 561 4,04 466 566 19,23
1999 667 5,57 526 3,23 402 1,63 566 3,99 469 577 11,15
2000 720 5,78 565 3,43 449 1,98 637 4,3 505 564 10,09
2001 684 6,49 509 4,1 402 2,14 524 4,59 478 516 18,41
2002 693 5,64 530 4,03 425 2,36 576 3,14 518 8,57 570 14,81
2003 651 5,94 490 4,47 435 2,77 531 4,51 495 3,64 547 12,6
2004 699 6,17 487 4,18 478 3,15 521 6,88 560 3,55 509 11,03
2005 668 7,28 484 4,15 491 3,28 565 4,43 557 3,81 502 10,78
2006 672 7,37 466 4,87 500 3,62 561 6,67 535 3,62 498 11,21
2007 668 7,76 501 5,7 522 3,54 555 6,18 556 4,02 496 12,08
2008 677 7,99 522 4,65 552 4,41 524 5,74 581 4,67 520 11,71
2009 595 7,01 505 5,83 506 9,09 463 6,26 558 4,34 492 11,26
Sources: Danish Central Population Register; Statistics Denmark; Statistics Norway; 
Statistics Sweden; Statistics Iceland; Statistics Finland; Statistics Netherlands.
Note: In the Netherlands, the column ”Different sex” is based on the number of different-
sex marriages until 1997, thereafter on both different-sex marriages and different-sex 
partnership registrations. The column “Same-sex” shows the rate of same-sex marriages 
per capita in the Netherlands until 2000, thereafter the rate of both same-sex partnership 
registrations and same-sex marriages. In Norway, “Marriages” comprise only different-sex 
marriages. From 2009 the column “Partnerships” shows same-sex marriages. In Sweden, 
“Marriages” comprise only different-sex marriages. The column “Partnerships” shows 
registered partnerships until 30 April 2009 and thereafter same-sex marriages.
He sent out 8,000 questionnaires to male college students and workers about 
their sexual inclinations. About half of them answered his questions and 
Hirschfeld concluded that 4 percent were attracted to both men and women and 
1.4 percent were attracted only to men.10 Hirschfeld’s figures can be compared 
to the findings of a survey made in the United States at the beginning of the 
1990s, that 1.3 percent of the women and 2.7 percent of the men had had a sexual 
partner of the same sex during the previous year, and that 4.1 percent of the 
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women and 4.9 percent of the men had had sex with a member of their own sex 
since they turned eighteen.11 These figures would correspond better to the rate 
of partnership registrations than the widespread assumption that homosexuals 
constitute 10 percent of the population, a figure derived from the Kinsey report 
and publicised by the gay and lesbian movement in the 1970s and 1980s in order 
to prove that homosexuals were a large and invisible minority.12 
But what did Kinsey actually say? Alfred Kinsey and his team concluded 
that “10 percent of the males are more or less exclusively homosexual (i.e., rate 5 or 
6) for at least three years between the ages of 16 and 55” and they estimated that 
“4 percent of the white males are exclusively homosexual throughout their lives, 
after the onset of adolescence.”13 The figures for females were much lower, but 
among unmarried women between 2 and 6 percent were “more or less exclu-
sively homosexual” between the ages of 20 and 35, while the same was true for 
less than 1 percent of the married women. Between 1 and 3 percent of the un-
married, and less than 3 in a thousand of the married women had been exclu-
sively homosexual between the ages of 20 and 35. Among the previously married 
women, between 1 and 3 percent belonged to that category.14 Kinsey’s research 
methods have since been questioned, and a possible bias in the sample has been 
discussed, but the general problem with all attempts to establish quantitative 
data for the presence of “homosexuals” in the population is the impossibility of 
determining the criteria for such a category.15
The discrepancy of the results from the various attempts to establish the in-
cidence of homosexuality in the mean population reflects, in fact, the impossi-
ble nature of the question. The homo/hetero binary is something which West-
ern culture has built much of its self-understanding on, but which would not be 
adequate for a global understanding of sexuality.16 Even in Western industrial-
ised society the definition of what it is to be a homosexual is vague, and nega-
tive attitudes to homosexuality have forced most people to hide any desire for 
their own sex. In times and cultures different from today’s dominating discours-
es, same-sex sexual behaviour has been part of the standard upbringing, but in 
still other times and cultures its practice resulted ‒ and still results ‒ in severe 
punishment.17 It is thus impossible to say whether gays and lesbians in Scandi-
navia are more or less prone to register their partnership than heterosexual cou-
ples are to marry. For that reason, it is also probably impossible to establish the 
number of “homosexuals” in the population based on the number of registered 
partnerships. Finally, the incidence of partnership registrations varies region-
ally. According to our data, Denmark displays a significantly higher frequency 
of partnership registrations than the other Scandinavian countries, and in the 
Netherlands we see an even higher rate of same-sex partnership registrations or 
marriages. 
In 1998, the Netherlands adopted a law on registered partnership similar to 
the Scandinavian ones, but with the important difference that the new marital 
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status was also open to heterosexual couples. It turned out to be a popular re-
form, and after a few years, the heterosexual partnership registrations by far out-
numbered those of same-sex couples (see Table 3). 
Table 3. New partnership registrations yearly in the Netherlands, 1998–2009. Same-sex 
couples and different-sex couples
Same-sex 
couples
Different-sex 
couples
1998 3010 1616
1999 1757 1500
2000 1600 1322
2001 530 2847
2002 547 7774
2003 542 9577
2004 583 10573
2005 608 10699
2006 619 10182
2007 605 9945
2008 611 10231
2009 489 9001
Source: Statistics Netherlands.
In the Netherlands, the formalities surrounding divorce are easier for those who 
register partnership instead of marrying, and such an arrangement is seen by 
many as a less serious step than traditional marriage.18 The fact that the Dutch 
partnership law was not a law reserved for a minority and the fact that different-
sex couples soon saw it as a good alternative to marriage perhaps made it more 
popular also among same-sex couples. In 2001, the law that allowed marriage 
for same-sex couples was adopted and the Netherlands became the first coun-
try in the world to give exactly the same marital rights and benefits to same-sex 
couples as to different-sex couples. Those who already lived in registered part-
nership had the option to convert their partnership into marriage and those 
who lived in marriage could accordingly apply to have their marriage turned 
into a registered partnership. It then happened that the interest in registering 
partnership decreased among homosexuals but increased among heterosexu-
als. Many heterosexual couples had their marriages converted into partnerships, 
while many same-sex couples “upgraded” their partnerships to marriage.19 The 
number of same-sex partnership registrations fell dramatically after the intro-
duction of gay marriage. It seems thus that there was a movement of lesbians 
and gay couples into full marriage, and of straight couples out of it.
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Diagram 1. Denmark: Number of new partnership registrations yearly 1989–2009. Female 
and male couples
Sources: 1989–1997 Central Population Register (CPR); 1998–2009 Statistics Denmark.
Note: Data from 1989 show the number of partnership registrations from 1 October, when 
the law became effective.
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When marriage laws were made gender-neutral in Norway, Sweden, and 
Iceland in 2009-10, all three countries chose a solution different from the Neth-
erlands. Existing family legislation was adjusted to allow same-sex couples to 
marry in the same conditions as different-sex couples (and the question of 
church marriage was left to the religious congregations to solve). At the same 
time, the partnership law was abolished, with the effect that no new partner-
ships will be registered. Couples living in partnerships can transform their mar-
ital status to full marriage through a simple registration or through a new cer-
emony. From having had different sets of laws for same-sex and different-sex 
couples, Norway, Sweden, and Iceland now offer only one option for both, and 
the statistical columns of partnership registrations are closed. This was in ac-
cordance with what the gay and lesbian movement wanted. Their strongest ar-
gument was to push for equality before the law, and no wish seems to have been 
there to keep or extend a quasi-marriage arrangement such as registered part-
nership. The general trends in lesbians’ and gay men’s marriage habits do not 
seem to have been influenced by the fact that the registered partnership was re-
placed by marriage. The same-sex marriage rate is increasing at the same pace as 
partnership registrations did before the reform, and the difference between men 
and women remains (see Diagrams 2, 3, and 6).20
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Diagram 2. Norway: Number of partnership registrations yearly 1993–2008 and same-sex 
marriages 2009. Female and male couples
Source: Statistics Norway.
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Finally, the low rate of partnership registrations per capita compared to dif-
ferent-sex marriages, suggests that 1) there are either much fewer lesbians and 
gays in the Scandinavian population than the 10 percent often put forth, built 
on a simplified interpretation of Kinsey, or 2) that their marriage patterns differ 
dramatically from those of the heterosexual majority, or 3) that the concept of 
“homosexual” is so vague and fluid that the head-count becomes meaningless. I 
would suggest an explanation with elements from all three hypotheses. 
To begin with the last one, a growing body of research in the history of 
same-sex desire shows that the concepts and identities have constantly changed 
throughout history.21 Same-sex desire seems to have been present in all times 
and in all civilisations, but the social norms around it have varied greatly, and it 
has more often than not been intertwined with gender-transgressive behaviour 
and identities that render the very term “same-sex desire” if not meaningless, at 
any rate blurred and ambiguous.22 Even the Kinsey reports, indeed some of the 
most detailed and nuanced large studies of human sexual behaviour in Western 
society in our time, if read carefully, give little support to the establishment of a 
fixed category of homosexuals.23
Second, the marriage patterns among those who organise their lives in steady 
relationships with another person of their own sex lack the traditions and pres-
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sure from the surroundings to be pushed into marriage the same way as the het-
erosexual majority. Lesbians and gay men in Western society have a long tradi-
tion of celebrating their unions in various ways. They have staged ceremonies 
within their communities, with or without the inclusion of a religious blessing, 
and with or without their straight friends and family. The element of state rec-
ognition, however, is new to this community and so there are no traditions con-
cerning it. Thus it is not to be expected that the gay and lesbian population will 
immediately fall into the same marriage patterns as the general population.24 
Moreover, the practical consequences of marriage differ a great deal between 
different countries. Since the Scandinavian welfare systems are directed to the 
individual, and not to the couple, it has less consequences than in a country 
where the family remains the main recipient of welfare.25
Third, it is to be assumed that the segment of the Scandinavian population 
with a lasting and more or less exclusive desire for a member of their own sex 
who organise their lives in a steady relationship with that person is lower than 
the 10 percent put forth by the gay and lesbian movement, but that it is con-
stantly changing, possibly growing. Many studies indicate that people tend to 
define their sexual identity differently according to the changing norms of so-
ciety.26 With the increasing importance of the transgender experience in the 
Western world, and its interconnectedness with genderised sexual cultures in 
Asia and Africa, it is to be expected that global sex will take on a slightly less 
rigid dichotomous character. This, combined with the increasing possibilities for 
same-sex couples, both technologically and discursively, to have children, indi-
cates that the question of the “actual rate” of “homosexuals” in a population is 
obsolete. So the old ideological construct that 10 percent of all people are ho-
mosexuals needs to be reconsidered.
Gendered marriage patterns
The third characteristic of partnership statistics is women’s reluctance to register 
at the beginning of the period and the higher interest among them to register at 
the end of the period. It is a tendency that is clearly seen in the three large coun-
tries with a long-enough history of partnership. In Finland the male-female ra-
tio has been even from the outset (see Diagrams 1–4).
From the beginning, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden displayed large dif-
ferences in the number of registrations of female and male couples, and the 
number of female partnership registrations was less than half of the male regis-
trations. The uneven distribution of partnership registrations levelled out some-
what but was significant until the year 2000, when the curves intersected. Now 
there is a significantly higher interest among female couples to register partner-
ship in all three countries. The shift took place later in Norway than in Den-
mark, and the gender distribution in Sweden was fairly even between 2001 and 
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2004. How can we explain this development that follows more or less the same 
pattern in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden? To begin with, there was the wide-
spread scepticism concerning marriage-like arrangements that held lesbians 
back early in the period. The ideological change in the 1990s, when second-
wave feminism was challenged by queer feminism and intersectionality, ironi-
cally made registered partnership more acceptable to lesbian feminists.27 As tra-
ditional feminism was accused of a one-dimensional view on gender inequal-
ity, overlooking differences in race, ethnicity, and sexuality among women, the 
theories of patriarchy were also discredited. Marriage was still seen as a petit-
bourgeois invention giving privilege to some at the expense of others, but it was 
no longer perceived as the foundation of patriarchy. As the concept of rainbow 
families spread in Scandinavia, it was given the status of a positive alternative 
to conventional families. From a queer perspective, lesbians and gays with chil-
dren were seen as agents of change, as they fought for visibility and respect in 
an intricate web of welfare-state institutions designated solely for different-sex 
parenthood. The critique against gay marriage and registered partnership that is 
now voiced by lesbian feminists in Scandinavia is no longer formulated in terms 
of the struggle against patriarchy but is inspired by queer theory’s resistance to 
mainstreaming and normalising.
The conditions for the debate within the gay movement and among lesbian 
feminists changed radically when the law on registered partnership became a 
reality. In countries where the law is under discussion ‒ most obviously in the 
United States ‒ the question determines the political agenda of gay and lesbi-
an activists and leads to heated debates. A gay conservative wing in the United 
States gives priority to the introduction of full marital rights, which has sparked 
a fierce resistance from traditionalists in the U.S. From the other side of the po-
litical spectrum, gay and lesbian radicals use a wide range of arguments against 
the idea of gay marriage. They claim that gay marriage is the wrong priority, or 
that it is outright harmful to the gay and lesbian community because it stands 
for conservative principles of dependence and exclusion.28 In Europe, where 
laws on registered partnership and/or gay marriage have been introduced in a 
number of countries which have a strong gay and lesbian movement, the debate 
among activists is different. The question of registered partnership or gay mar-
riage is often reduced to a question of personal choice or is seen as an important 
landmark in the fight for diversity.
Lesbian women’s interest in having children is probably the most important 
reason for their changed behaviour regarding registered partnership. As seen in 
Table 1, the effect of the built-up demand for the reform, i.e. the high numbers 
of new partnership registrations during the first years after the law’s introduc-
tion, was not at all visible for women in the countries that got the law first. But 
when Finland introduced the law on registered partnership in 2002, women dis-
played the same behaviour as men, with a boom of new registrations during the 
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Diagram 3. Sweden: New same-sex unions yearly 1995–2009. Female and male couples
Source: Statistics Sweden.
Note: New partnership registrations yearly 1995–2008,  new partnership registrations  
1 January–30 April 2009, and same-sex marriages 1 May 2009–31 December 2009.
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law’s first year. Since the law was introduced in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden 
during the first half of the 1990s, there had obviously been a shift in many wom-
en’s attitude to it, most probably because the question of the custody of children 
had arisen. The Finnish law did not allow for stepchild adoption of children for 
registered partners, but demands for it were formulated by lesbian mothers in 
the public debate, and registered partnership was to a high degree perceived as a 
concern for both women and men. In her study of marriage resisters in Sweden, 
Anna Adeniji lets one of her fictional characters change her mind when her les-
bian partner gets pregnant. Someone asks why, and she answers:
“The child, of course. It feels safer if we have it on paper. For [the pregnant girl-
friend] Sanna it’s probably also that we should do it because we can. She thinks 
that one should use the law that’s there and not think too much about what’s not 
there yet.”29
Adeniji did not dwell further in her analysis of what difference pregnancy 
makes, probably because there was no ground for it in the numerous interviews 
she conducted.30 It is, however, beyond any doubt that the lesbian (and gay) life-
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style has changed dramatically since the early 1990s, and that children are now 
part of what a young lesbian woman can expect. In a study of lesbian feminism 
in the 1970s, Swedish Gender Studies scholar Hanna Hallgren said one of the 
aims of her study was a will to know more about her “history as a lesbian,” a 
will that is founded in her own experience of oppression and her will to change:
When I came out, 19 years old, in the beginning of the 1990s, lesbian life looked 
very different from today. My self-understanding as a lesbian fresh from the closet 
included, for example, that I never would have children, because I was a lesbian. 
Also that I wouldn’t be able to marry. During the 1990s and 2000s, new laws have 
been introduced (for example concerning partnership and insemination) that have 
interacted with my lesbian identity and restructured my self-understanding.31
The situation for self-identified lesbians has changed tremendously since the 
1990s as a result of new assisted reproduction techniques, but it is also ‒ or 
mainly ‒ a discursive change. Techniques for insemination were there long be-
fore the IVF techniques were developed, and with a known donor it was no 
problem for lesbian couples to have children. Legislation concerning insemina-
tion was, above all, important in sending signals to young lesbians that child-
raising was a possibility. Before the mid-1990s, many lesbians did have chil-
dren, but it wasn’t until the debate about lesbian motherhood (and gay father-
hood) became more intense at the end of the 1990s that this practice grew and 
became more public.32 In Karin Zetterqvist Nelson’s study of Swedish rainbow 
families from 2007, several of the participants declared that they had felt they 
had to choose between their homosexuality and children when they came out 
to friends and family. One of them said that “that’s the way it was before . . . you 
dropped that if you chose to live out your sexual orientation then . . . you often 
chose not to have children.” And her partner added: “Yes, it wasn’t until part-
nership came . . . and it was Eva who made us visible.” The partnership law, but 
also the press coverage when the Swedish singer Eva Dahlgren’s registered part-
nership with designer Efva Attling became known, had thus been important for 
these two women.33 
The number of male couples registering showed a slight decline after the in-
itial boom, but now it has stopped decreasing and in most Scandinavian coun-
tries is slowly climbing, though the figures are still lower than the female ones. 
It has been suggested that the concern for the longest living partner in the wake 
of the AIDS epidemic was an incentive for many gay couples to register part-
nership in the early 1990s, before new medicines radically increased life expect-
ancy for HIV-positive persons. That may be true, but it has probably not influ-
enced the overall figures. The number of male couples registering in Denmark, 
Norway, and Sweden dropped, in fact, until 1996–97, when the new medicines 
were introduced, and then it evened out in Denmark and increased in Norway 
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and Sweden (see Diagrams 1–3). Most probably the AIDS epidemic played an 
important part in some individual couples’ decision to register, but mattered lit-
tle to the majority. Rather, there were other trends in society, such as the grow-
ing marriage business, that were more important.
If we compare the Scandinavian statistics with corresponding data from the 
Netherlands, we see that they both display a shift from the situation in which 
more men than women chose to register partnership. The differences between 
male and female registrations were never very large in the Netherlands, but the 
shift is nevertheless clear. During the short period between 1998 and 2001, when 
it was possible for Dutch same-sex couples to register partnership but not to 
marry, slightly more male couples were registered each year, and when marriage 
was opened to same-sex couples, men again took the lead. Since 2003, however, 
more women than men both register partnership and marry (see Diagram 5).
Increasing interest
The fourth characteristic I would like to discuss is the total increase of part-
nership registrations in Scandinavia during the last ten years (see Diagram 6). 
There may be two reasons for this, of which the first is purely mechanical. When 
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the first group of lesbians and gay men had registered their partnerships during 
the first boom, the need for partnership was saturated. But after that, new gen-
erations of lesbians and gay men of the marrying kind have come of age, and the 
increase can be seen as a recovery. The other explanation is that marriage as such 
has become more popular, and the increase of the number of partnership regis-
trations corresponds to an increase of the number of heterosexual marriages in 
the general population. 
The Dutch figures, which include same-sex marriages as well as same-sex 
partnerships, display two peaks, one when the law on registered partnership 
was introduced in 1998 and one when marriage was made available to same-sex 
couples in 2001. The most striking difference between Dutch and Scandinavian 
data is that the will to formalise same-sex relationships is much stronger in the 
Netherlands than in any Scandinavian country. The Danish marriage frequency 
is the highest in Scandinavia, and that is also true for registered partnerships. 
The Dutch figures by far outnumber Denmark’s when it comes to same-sex un-
ions, but not concerning the different-sex marriage rate (see Table 2). 
Diagram 5. The Netherlands: New partnership registrations and same-sex marriages yearly 
1998–2009. Female and male couples
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Diagram 6: Rate of new partnership registrations per 100,000 inhabitants in Scandinavia and 
the Netherlands, 1987–2009
Sources: Danish CPR; Statistics Denmark; Statistics Norway; Statistics Sweden; Statistics 
Iceland; Statistics Finland; Statistics Netherlands.
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If we return to Table 2, we can study the changes in the heterosexual mar-
riage ratio in Scandinavia and the Netherlands, and we see that Denmark and 
the Netherlands have a higher tendency to marry than the other countries. 
Apart from the “marriage craze” in 1989 (when the widow’s pension was going 
to be abolished, and thousands of couples hastened to marry to be covered by 
the old rules), Sweden has the lowest marriage rate in Scandinavia. It was de-
clining until 1998, but since then there has been a steady increase. The trends in 
the other countries are less clear-cut, though in all Scandinavian countries there 
is an increase in the marriage rate after the turn of the century.
The high marriage rate in Scandinavia may seem surprising, given the fact 
that most economic incentives to marry have been removed. The Scandinavian 
welfare state typically channels support to the individual and not to the fam-
ily. In Sweden, the taxes on inheritance have been abolished, as well as the wid-
ow’s pension, and in the other countries also there are fewer economic reasons 
to marry.34 It appears that the symbolic value attributed to marriage is enough 
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to keep the marriage statistics high. Boosted by a developing marriage industry, 
the dream of a perfect marriage and its manifestation to society, family, and state 
seems to strengthen the idea of marriage in Scandinavia.
Conclusions
Marriage statistics of the kind presented here give only a rough idea of trends 
in the population, and their variations are due to factors that are hard to deter-
mine. Variations in general attitudes and fashion trends interact with material 
conditions such as changes in welfare schemes, class structures, and ethnic pat-
terns. Qualitative research is necessary to explain why some choose to marry 
and others do not. 
Nevertheless, the trends that stand out clearest in these tables and diagrams 
allow us to ascertain the following: 1) Women who live in steady relationships 
with another woman have become much more inclined to register their partner-
ship since the end of the 1990s, when adoption of children gradually became an 
option for registered couples. That is true for all Scandinavian countries, and is 
probably due to the discursive and legal changes that have weakened the femi-
nist marriage resistance and increasingly associate same-sex couples with child-
rearing. 2) The emergence of laws on registered partnership have in no way led 
to a decreasing will to marry among different-sex couples ‒ which has already 
convincingly been shown by earlier research. 3) The low instance of same-sex 
registrations or marriages show that there are either far fewer lesbians and gays 
in the population than has been claimed by the gay and lesbian movement, or 
their marrying patterns differ significantly from the majority. I suggest an expla-
nation that includes both these factors and also takes into account the fluidity 
of the category “homosexual.”
Chapter Six: 
The next step
The idea that the law on registered partnership was just the first step was used 
by both sides in the debate. Conservatives used it to call attention to a threat-
ening possibility if the law was passed, while gay activists used it as a pledge to 
fight its limitations. “The next step is the Church,” a headline announced in the 
Danish daily Politiken as the partnership law was voted through in Norway in 
1993. The chair of LBL, Else Slange, said in an interview that the next step in 
Denmark must be to convince the Danish People’s Church to let lesbians and 
gays marry in the Church. Other tasks for the Danish gay and lesbian organisa-
tion, Slange said, would be to work for free insemination for lesbian women in 
the national health system, and to change the law to make it possible for part-
ners in registered partnership to adopt their partner’s children. She concluded 
that the LBL looked forward to the next parliamentary session in order to make 
this “adjustment of the partnership law.”1 Slange thus considered Church mar-
riages to be a mere adjustment of the law, and that the following steps should be 
insemination for lesbians and adoption rights for registered partners. This was 
exactly what the opponents of partnership laws warned about. When the Swed-
ish law proposal was debated in the Riksdag in 1994, the chair of the Stand-
ing Law Committee, Maj-Lis Lööw, tried to calm the opponents by assuring 
them that no such adjustments would take place. “Some ask if this is not only 
the first step. After this will come adoption, mutual child custody, and insemi-
nation,” she said. “Demands have indeed been made concerning these issues. I 
can only answer for me and for the Social Democratic Party. This is the step. It 
is not the first step.”2 Lööw’s words have been quoted many times, and she has 
been accused of hypocrisy, since she ought to have known that the next steps 
would come. When she was interviewed in 2006, she said it was necessary to 
make clear that what was voted upon that day was only the registered partner-
ship law and nothing else. She felt public opinion was not ready for adoption 
at that time, and in her own party there were those who said they could accept 
registered partnership but not adoption.3
The steps some hoped for and some were apprehensive about were the abo-
lition of the three major exceptions that had been built into the laws when they 
were first adopted. These exceptions can be summarised as: children, church, 
and citizenship. All three were rapidly challenged by gay activists and by an in-
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creasingly pro-gay public opinion. At the same time, however, the opposition to 
gay rights grew and became better organised. The exclusion from church wed-
dings was both the most symbol-laden exception and the one that had the least 
practical or legal consequences. We note that Maj-Lis Lööw did not even men-
tion it in her speech in the Riksdag. 
The next step that LBL chair Else Slange hoped for was, in fact, to be the fi-
nal one. The exemption from legally binding church weddings proved to be the 
most difficult to abolish. The Scandinavian National Churches are deeply divid-
ed over this issue, and the structure of these churches makes it difficult to dis-
regard them. Historically important agents of state power, they claim a special 
status within the Scandinavian political landscape, and their decision-making 
bodies, the Church Meetings and the Bishops’ Meetings, demand recognition 
on the same level as the national parliaments. The churches’ autonomy prevents 
the state from forcing them to accept same-sex weddings in church, at the same 
time as they exert state authority by performing legally binding marriage cer-
emonies. Thus, the right to church weddings would be the last remaining dif-
ference between registered partnerships and full marriage, and it was generally 
solved by letting the churches themselves handle the question. 
Citizenship
The first amendments to the partnership laws were, in fact, measures to further 
limit their scope. The Danish Folketing rapidly abolished same-sex couples’ right 
to counselling by a priest in case of divorce in 1989, and in 1995 same-sex couples 
were excluded from the new law on parental rights (forældremyndighed). Also, a 
law was passed in 1997 excluding lesbian women in registered partnership from 
assisted fertilisation by registered physicians.4 But after this initial period of re-
strictions, all changes in the Scandinavian partnership laws aimed to narrow the 
gap between heterosexual marriage and registered partnership. First, the provi-
sion that only citizens with residency had the right to register partnership was 
done away with. This provision seems originally to have been the result of a con-
cern that lesbians and gays from all over the world would come to Denmark to 
marry. Vague ideas of mass immigration of gays figured in the discussions, but, 
as legal experts and politicians would soon acknowledge, it was a completely ir-
rational fear.5 The immigration authorities in Denmark and several other Nor-
dic countries already treated same-sex couples the same way as different-sex 
couples in matters of immigration, as the condition to get a permanent resi-
dence permit because of an intimate relation was no longer connected to mar-
riage. Moreover, the legal effects of registered partnerships were necessarily lim-
ited to countries that had similar laws, so it was of no use going to Denmark to 
register and then claim any benefits in your own country because of that. In 1999 
the Danish partnership law was amended so that foreign citizens could register 
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partnership in Denmark if both had lived there for at least two years, and if at 
least one of the partners was a Danish citizen, residency was no longer required. 
Citizens in Iceland, Norway, and Sweden were given the same rights as Danish 
citizens in that respect.6 The following year, Sweden abolished the prerequisite 
that one of the partners should be a Swedish citizen, making it possible to regis-
ter if one of the partners had had residency in Sweden for two years. For citizens 
of Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and the Netherlands it wasn’t even necessary to 
have lived in Sweden for two years, only that at least one of the partners had 
residency.7 A case brought to the European Court of Justice in 2001, however, 
showed that registered partnership did not give the right to spousal benefits to 
the European Union’s own employees, and the trend has indeed been that the 
scope of the law is limited to countries that have already introduced some form 
of regulation of same-sex relationships.8 
Parenthood
“The next step” as defined by Maj-Lis Lööw in the Swedish Riksdag had to do 
with parenthood, and that was the most important exception to the definition 
of same-sex relationships as different from those of opposite-sex couples. The 
idea of lesbian women raising children was not new ‒ already in 1955 the Swed-
ish Supreme Court ruled that being lesbian was not a reason to deny legal cus-
tody of her children to a divorced woman.9 But there was no room for children 
in the official idea of the same-sex couple. It was construed as a life companion-
ship involving sex, but not children. It was thought of as a barren, sterile rela-
tionship, while the young heterosexual couple was supposed to give birth to fu-
ture generations. To some extent, young lesbians and gays in the 1970s and 1980s 
faced a choice between a life with children in accordance with society’s norms 
or a lesbian or gay lifestyle without children. In fact, the dichotomy between 
childless queers and procreative heterosexuals was upheld both by the major-
ity culture and by the post-Stonewall gay movement. Before Stonewall, it was 
generally accepted in homophile circles that some people married heterosexu-
ally and had children, but lived bisexually and had same-sex relationships, af-
fairs, or brief sexual encounters outside their marriage. The gay liberation move-
ment, however, demanded that lesbians and gays choose sides and renounce the 
bisexual lifestyle. The derogatory term “breeder” was reserved for the procreative 
heterosexuals, and lesbians and gays were henceforth discouraged from having 
children not only by society but also by other homosexuals.10 
In the 1980s, however, this dichotomy was challenged when more and more 
lesbians and gay men invented different ways to combine a gay lifestyle with 
children. In Scandinavia, the “four-leaf clover family” became a new concept, as 
lesbian couples and gay couples began cooperating to get children. In the 1980s 
many children were born with four social parents: two mothers and two fathers, 
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or one mother and one father and two co-parents, depending on the family’s in-
ternal agreements.11 When procreative techniques developed, however, women 
became increasingly free to have children without the involvement of (most of-
ten gay) men, and in the 1990s there was a veritable lesbian baby boom. More 
and more lesbian mothers appeared in the media demanding legal rights for 
themselves and their children. Access to assisted reproductive technology and 
the right to joint custody and parenthood were their main demands, whereas 
the right to adoption more and more was conceived of as a male concern.12 
The legal regulation of gay and lesbian parental rights has involved legisla-
tion on adoption and on assisted reproductive technology, and those two areas 
have followed partly different lines of argumentation. The cornerstone argument 
in all debates on gay and lesbian parental rights has been and still is “the child’s 
best interests,” but the ground for evaluating the child’s best interests becomes 
dramatically different depending on whether it concerns an existing child or 
one that is not yet conceived. The interests of a living child with two parents of 
the same sex can often be defined as the child’s right to stay with the social co-
parent in case the biological parent dies. Consequently, the first amendments 
to existing laws on registered partnership involved the possibility of adopting 
one’s partner’s biological child, so-called stepchild adoption. But the legislation 
on these issues in the 1990s was characterised by uncertainty and change. As al-
ready mentioned, the Danish partnership law was amended in 1995 in order to 
prevent same-sex couples from using the new law on child custody to transfer 
the custody of the child from the biological parent to her or his partner.13 And in 
1997, when a new law on assisted reproduction was prepared in Denmark, some 
members of the Folketing discovered that the proposed law would allow lesbian 
couples to conceive children. They quickly prepared an amendment to the law 
proposal, which would reserve the use of assisted reproduction techniques for 
heterosexually married women. In the parliamentary debate, members from all 
political parties testified to the importance for a child to have both a female and 
a male parent, and the resulting law forbade medical doctors to perform assist-
ed fertilisation on single women or women in registered partnership. However, 
midwives and nurses were not covered by the law, and in 1999 Danish midwife 
Nina Stork opened the Stork Clinic for lesbian women and single women. Nina 
Stork’s clinic is still catering to many women, even though the prohibition for 
doctors to perform assisted fertilisation on single women or registered women 
was lifted in 2007.14 
Negative attitudes to gays and lesbians having children was weakened 
throughout the 1990s, partly because of the media coverage of seemingly healthy 
children of homosexuals, and partly because of lobbying efforts by the gay and 
lesbian movements. Policy-makers were especially influenced by the argument 
for the legal protection of children already living with two parents of the same 
sex. Unless the non-biological parent already had parental rights over the child, 
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it risked being orphaned or transferred to a biological parent (or other members 
of the biological family, such as grandparents) against its own will in the case 
of the biological parent’s death. Because of this, the right to stepchild adoption 
was the easiest to get through, and also it was deemed the most pressing issue 
by lesbian and gay activists. The Danish Parliament approved of stepchild adop-
tion in 1999, but only from the third month after the child’s birth, to allow time 
for a biological father to claim his parental rights. Iceland followed suit in 2000, 
and Norway in 2002, whereas the Swedish legislators decided to wait until the 
whole issue of adoption had been investigated.15 In 2008, Siumut, the ruling par-
ty in Greenland, proposed to update the Greenlandic law to harmonise it with 
the rest of the Nordic countries, and on 1 July 2009, stepchild adoption was al-
lowed in Greenland. All 26 members present in the Greenlandic Parliament 
voted in favour of the proposal, but an earlier proposal to give lesbian couples 
access to insemination had been rejected and recommended for further investi-
gation.16 In Finland, a parliamentary commission proposed that stepchild adop-
tion should be made legal for same-sex couples, and after long considerations 
the law was voted through in Parliament with a clear majority of 108 votes in 
favour and 29 against. The law took effect on 1 September 2009.17
External adoption was the next “step.” After extensive preparations, a Swed-
ish Government commission in 2001 proposed that the law on adoption be ex-
tended to allow same-sex couples the same right to be considered as adoptive 
parents as different-sex couples, thus allowing both stepchild adoption and ex-
ternal adoption. The law passed in Parliament after a long debate, with 193 votes 
in favour and 66 against. At the same time, it was decided that lesbian women 
should not be given access to assisted fertilisation in state-run clinics until the 
legal questions of custody in such cases were settled. The right to be considered 
as adoptive parents was hailed as an important reform for gay and lesbian cou-
ples, but it has since then largely been thwarted by the unwillingness of most 
adoption agencies to give up children for adoption by same-sex couples.18 Full 
adoption rights have since been granted in Iceland (2006) and in Denmark 
(2009).19 In 2009, as Norway introduced the gender-neutral marriage law, full 
adoption rights were automatically given to married same-sex couples.20 
In Finland, the question is still far from being dealt with by Parliament, but 
in May 2009 the Party Congress of the Swedish People’s Party accepted a pro-
posal to work for full adoption rights for same-sex couples. The question threat-
ens to split the Swedish-speaking party, as the rural electorate in Österbotten 
(Pohjanmaa) strongly opposes the law. One of the representatives from Öster-
botten told the press that he feared the party would lose all voters from his dis-
trict, that they would vote for the Christian Democrats. Another representative, 
from southern Finland, complained: “This is suicide for the SPP. Now the Finns 
can call us the homo-party.” At the elections to the European Parliament two 
weeks after this, however, the SPP’s share of the votes proved stable, and even 
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rose from 5.7 to 6.1 percent. Perhaps this is rather a sign of the inherent stabil-
ity of a party that organises an ethnical minority, rather than a measure of the 
Swedish-Finnish population’s gay-friendly attitudes.21 
In 2003, the Icelandic Alþingi appointed a commission to investigate the 
living conditions for gay and lesbian citizens and propose ways to minimise 
discrimination. Its report, presented in 2004, suggested a number of measures, 
most important of which were the rights to adoption and assisted reproductive 
technology. These measures were adopted by the Alþingi in 2006 and, as has be-
come customary with gay and lesbian rights reforms in Iceland, the new law 
took effect on Christopher Street Day, 27 June 2006.22 Rules about cohabitation, 
adoption, and assisted fertilisation were all harmonised so that they would ap-
ply equally to same-sex and different-sex couples. In November 2007, a group of 
MPs presented a bill to the Alþingi proposing that a joint marriage law would 
apply both to same-sex couples and to different-sex couples, but after a short 
debate their proposal was rejected. Instead, a law was passed which allowed 
ministers of the Icelandic State Church as well as other religious leaders to per-
form legally binding registered partnerships in church. The new law took effect 
on 27 June 2008.23 Since then, there remains no difference between the legal ef-
fects of the marriage law for heterosexuals and the law on registered partnership 
for homosexuals in Icelandic legislation. The legal status of registered partner-
ship was the one reserved for homosexual couples until 27 June 2010, when the 
marriage law was opened to same-sex couples and the partnership law abol-
ished.24
The rapid development of assisted reproductive technology has had a deci-
sive effect on both the behaviour of same-sex couples wanting children and the 
legislators’ attempts to control and regulate reproduction. In this area we witness 
a complicated interaction between the legislators and the agency of individuals 
and couples who use the new technologies to have children. Finland was, for a 
long time, the only country in Scandinavia where insemination was not regu-
lated by law, and single women and lesbians from the other Scandinavian coun-
tries took advantage of Finland’s lack of law in this area and went to Finland to 
become pregnant. A lively debate went on in Finland for several years, bring-
ing up issues about family values, the best interests of children, and the need to 
regulate assisted reproductive technology. A law proposal was prepared in 2002 
which would restrict the use of the new technologies considerably, but it was 
rejected by a majority of the Eduskunta.25 When the law on assisted fertilisation 
was adopted in 2006, it allowed access for lesbians and unmarried women to as-
sisted reproductive technology in fertility clinics. As in Sweden and Norway, the 
Finnish law required that the identity of the sperm donor could be made known 
to the child at the age of eighteen, but without any consequences of legal par-
enthood for the donor.26 
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Gender-neutral marriage laws
After the 1999 decision to allow stepchild adoption, there was a pause in Dan-
ish initiatives to reform legislation for same-sex couples. In 2001 a conservative 
coalition Government consisting of the right-of-centre liberal Left Party and 
the Conservative People’s Party took power, with parliamentary support of the 
right-wing populist Danish People’s Party, which exerts an influence in Dan-
ish politics that by far exceeds its 12 percent of the electorate.27 The view of the 
present Government on gay rights is that they are well taken care of by existing 
legislation, and it has routinely turned down all proposals from the opposition 
to extend the rights of people living in registered partnership.
Every year from 2003, different combinations of opposition parties have pre-
sented proposals to diminish the difference between registered partnership and 
heterosexual marriage. On several occasions, opposition parties have proposed 
that the Church of Denmark should be allowed to perform registered partner-
ship ceremonies, but they have regularly been turned down.28 Likewise, propos-
als to allow stepchild adoption of a partner’s child from its birth, and not from 
the age of three months, were repeatedly turned down by the majority.29 
In 2008, the Radical Left Party presented a bill on a gender-neutral marriage 
law. Such a law would have two important consequences: allowing the church 
wedding of two persons of the same sex and making the rules of paternity in the 
Child Law applicable to children born of a woman married to another wom-
an.30 The Minister of Justice, Lene Espersen, from the Conservative People’s 
Party, declared that the Government could not support the proposal because 
it could force the Church of Denmark to recognise same-sex marriage and be-
cause it had not considered some important consequences of a gender-neutral 
marriage law, like the legal status of the father. It was important to uphold the 
regulation that one could adopt one’s partner’s child only three months after its 
birth, because if a man claimed paternity within this time, it should be granted 
to him, she said. In the case of assisted fertilisation, she agreed, the situation was 
different. In Denmark, sperm donors are anonymous, and no biological father 
could legally be tied to the child. The Government was prepared to reconsider 
its stand on this point. However, it was decidedly against external adoption for 
same-sex couples.31
Simon Emil Ammitzbøll, an openly gay MP from the Radical Left Party, 
declared his satisfaction that the Government would consider allowing step-
child adoption from the child’s birth, and he could not see any reason why it 
would then not allow external adoption.32 The right-wing Danish People’s Party, 
on the other hand, displayed the most determined opposition to full marriage 
rights for same-sex couples, and it was about more than the right to be married 
in church. It was about the recognition of same-sex couples as equivalent to dif-
ferent-sex couples. Søren Krarup, a former minister in the Church of Denmark, 
represents the Danish People’s Party in the Folketing and is one of its most in-
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fluential ideologists. He declared that the concept of marriage is reserved for a 
union of a man and a woman. At the end of the debate, the proposal was re-
ferred back to the Parliament’s Standing Legal Committee (Retsudvalget) in or-
der to investigate further the possibility of granting registered partners the right 
to adopt their partner’s children from their birth. 33
One year later Ammitzbøll, who by now had left the Radical Left Party and 
was an independent MP, put forth a new proposal that caused a more heated 
debate. This time, he wished to grant full adoption rights to same-sex couples, 
and a small group from the Left Party declared that they would support it, thus 
creating a small majority in its favour. The tone was considerably sharper than 
when gender-neutral marriage had been discussed a year earlier, and in the end, 
six MPs from the Left Party broke with their party line and voted for adoption, 
thus creating a slim majority for the proposal.34
Norwegian politics
Norway and Sweden both introduced gender-neutral marriage laws in 2009 
and thus opened up the institution of marriage for same-sex couples. At the 
same time, both countries abolished the law on registered partnership. Seem-
ingly parallel, gay rights politics in the two countries differ, however, in some 
important respects. Whereas Norway has based much of its gay rights debate 
on a broad survey of the life conditions for lesbians and gay men carried out in 
1999, the so-called NOVA report, Swedish policy-making has relied on a series 
of Government Commissions dealing with parenthood for same-sex couples.35 
The Norwegian NOVA report, named after the institute that published it, was 
commissioned by the Social Democratic Minister for Children and Family Af-
fairs Sylvia Brustad and published in January 1999. It was a survey based on 
a sample of lesbians and gay men, and showed that their overall life situation 
was difficult. Particularly one of the findings, that one out of four young lesbi-
ans and gay men had attempted suicide, was widely circulated and generated 
strong feelings that something had to be done quickly. Another finding from 
the report, that lesbians and gays suffered more in rural areas, was apt to influ-
ence parties with a rural electorate, parties that usually held conservative values 
in family politics.36 
In January 2000, two celebrities chose to come out of the closet, which 
slightly changed the political climate in Norway. The well-known author and 
former Social Democratic Minister of Justice Anne Holt registered a partner-
ship in the Norwegian Embassy in Stockholm and shortly afterwards informed 
the media. She had been a well-established author of crime novels for years, 
and her lesbian heroine Hanne Wilhelmsen had become a role model for thou-
sands of lesbians in Norway and abroad. The other celebrity to come out was 
Per-Kristian Foss, who declared that he was gay shortly before he was elected 
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chair of the Right Party’s Oslo District. Foss was elected unanimously and was 
warmly supported by his party fellows ‒ an attitude very different from the one 
that met Wenche Lowzow when she came out to the same Party in 1978. Foss 
lived in a long-term relationship with the CEO of one of Norway’s largest com-
panies, and when he later became Minister of Finance the possibility of con-
flicting interests was sometimes brought up for discussion. Many people agreed 
that the institution of registered partnership made it easier to handle the situa-
tion of conflicting interests.37 
In March 2000, the Christian Democratic coalition Government resigned 
after a defeat regarding energy politics and was succeeded by a Social-Demo-
cratic minority Government. One year later, the new Government presented 
a Message to Parliament (Stortingsmelding) in which it vowed to work for a 
number of concrete measures to improve the life situations for lesbians and gay 
men. In the parliamentary debate, all speakers agreed that something had to be 
done. The Christian People’s Party was again criticised for promoting homo-
phobia, but its representative repeated that he and his party respected homosex-
uals, even if they had differing views on child adoption and insemination. One 
thing in particular was debated: whether the Church of Norway should keep its 
right to refuse employing practicing homosexuals in so-called consecrated po-
sitions.38
The Labour Party lost the elections in 2001 and were again replaced by a 
Centre Right Government under Kjell Magne Bondevik from the Christian 
People’s Party in the fall of 2001. It was the beginning of a four-year period of 
conservative politics, which slowed down gay rights reform work, since the new 
Family Minister Valgerd Svarstad Haugland was opposed to gay adoption and 
lesbian insemination. In 2002 she caused a commotion in Norwegian media by 
publicly criticising Anne Holt and her partner Tine Kjær for having received an 
insemination abroad. “They know perfectly well what Norwegian law says, and 
they know perfectly well what they’ve done,” she told the press. Tine Kjær re-
plied angrily: “I perceive your attack on me as a pregnant woman as un-Chris-
tian and hateful . . . I hope that your statement, in which you insinuate that my 
pregnancy is unlawful, was a slip of the tongue. At any rate, I expect an unre-
served apology.” The Prime Minister defended his Family Minister, who did not 
issue any apology, but this affair again opened up the debate on insemination for 
lesbian couples, so, paradoxically, the anti-gay stance of the Government gave 
new life to the debate on gay marriage.39 
In 2003, Bondevik’s Government presented a proposal to implement the 
European Community directive on equal treatment in employment and educa-
tion. The law that resulted prohibited discrimination on grounds of sex, ethnic-
ity, sexuality, disability, and age, and all parties except the Progress Party were 
behind it.40 In the spring of 2005, an extensive Anti-Discrimination Law was 
enacted, again following the directives from the European Union. Norway is 
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not a member of the European Union, but since it has signed the EEA (Euro-
pean Economic Area) agreement it has chosen to implement most of the EU 
legislation.41 
After the 2005 elections, the new Centre Left coalition Government ener-
getically pushed for gay and lesbian rights. The leader of the Socialist Left Party, 
Kristin Halvorsen, had not forgotten her own commitment to gay marriage. It 
was, in fact, one of the headings in the “Soria Moria Declaration” ‒ named af-
ter the high-altitude hotel in which it was drawn up ‒ where the new coalition 
Government laid out its agenda. Among other things, it pledged to support les-
bian and gay organisations, actively follow up on lesbian and gay citizens’ liv-
ing conditions, and work for changes in the marriage law that would give the 
same rights to lesbian and gay couples as a marriage between two of the oppo-
site sex.42
When the bill of “joint marriage law” (felles ekteskapslov), as it was now 
called, was debated in the Lower House (Odelstinget) of the Storting on 11 June 
2008, the spectator stands were filled with gay and lesbian activists, and in the 
front row were Wenche Lowzow and her partner Kim Friele. It was the first 
time Lowzow was back in the Parliament building since she had been forced 
to leave politics by the generalised homophobia in the Right Party twenty-
three years earlier.43 The law proposal before the House had wide-ranging con-
sequences. It would automatically give same-sex couples the right to joint adop-
tion of children and assisted fertilisation with the same conditions as hetero-
sexual couples.44 The tone in the debate was entirely different from what it had 
been when registered partnership was discussed sixteen years earlier. There were 
no sweeping anti-gay remarks, and even the opponents to the new law repeat-
edly claimed that they respected lesbians and gays and that they were against 
discrimination. Many speakers took the opportunity to bring up the Christian 
People’s Party’s poor record in gay and lesbian rights issues. The party had been 
opposed to the decriminalisation of homosexuality in 1972, it had been against 
the anti-discrimination clause in 1981, and it voted against the law on registered 
partnership in 1993. Its representative Bjørg Tørresdal explicitly apologised for 
these past actions and wished that the debate would be about the present deci-
sion, not about things in the past:
I am not proud of everything the Christian People’s Party has said about homosex-
uals over the years. There are, without doubt, many who have been hurt. I am sorry 
for that. At the same time, one should respect the fact that the Christian People’s 
Party, like all other parties and society at large, has changed its views on both ho-
mosexuals as such and their right to live in binding relationships.45
The Christian People’s Party’s main argument against the new law was that 
existing laws regulating heterosexual and homosexual cohabitations were 
When the Joint Marriage Law had been carried by the Norwegian Parliament, the leader of the 
Socialist Left Party, Kristin Halvorsen, cut a giant wedding cake in front of the Storting building. 
Photo: Cornelius Poppe/SCANPIX.
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satisfactory. A joint marriage law for both kinds of relationships could bring 
ethical problems concerning the rights of children. Another speaker heckled 
Tørresdal for the fact that the Christian People’s Party, which had fiercely 
fought against the law on registered partnership in 1993, now was its staunchest 
defender. Tørresdal answered that “all parties in this House have had opinions 
about the partnership law. Those who have changed their opinion most are 
those who today claim that the partnership law is discriminatory. The Social 
Democrats said something completely different when the partnership law was 
adopted.”46
The opponents of the law were speaking for the record, to state their opposi-
tion to the law in a situation where it was clear that it would pass. The speakers 
from the Centre Party and the Right Party declared their respect for the minor-
ity in their party groups who were against the law for religious or other reasons. 
Those who spoke on behalf of these two parties were from the majority that 
supported the new law, and its opponents refrained from speaking. The speak-
ers elaborated on classical liberal arguments about equality before the law and 
the conservative argument that a joint marriage law would indeed strengthen 
the institution of the family. The Conservative spokesperson for the proposal, 
Olemic Thommessen, made an effort to appease the opposition within his own 
party, first by declaring his respect for their conviction, and then to present the 
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advantages of the new law in terms of its neutrality and of its stabilising effects. 
“It is my belief that through this adaptation to a new time we will strength-
en committed relationships and the family as a cornerstone in our society,” he 
said, and reminded the Storting that “the wish to build family relations, a fam-
ily framework for a life, is very, very important for the Right Party.” In the 2009 
debate, all speakers in favour of the joint marriage law, conservatives as well as 
liberals and socialists, used the argument that gay marriage strengthened the 
family.47
The liberal Left Party had presented its own proposal about a compulsory 
civil marriage that would solve the problem of the Church’s attitude. The Left’s 
spokesperson, Trine Skei Grande, knew well that there would be no majority for 
her party’s model, but she and her party group insisted on carrying it to a vote. 
(It received only eight votes.) Toward the end of her speech, she delivered an 
unusually clear statement of the normalising expectations that were an impor-
tant part of the reform, and it is worth quoting in its entirety:
I remember the first really open homosexual I got to know. I was seventeen or 
eighteen years old and I was active in the Young Liberals (Unge Venstre), which 
always had their quota of queers, and I remember that we discussed “Why does 
it become so exaggerated? Why do you become so different?” I remember that he 
said: “When you have to break with society and with your network, you are no lon-
ger bound by the norms of society.” It was a real epiphany.
What we will do this day is that we, in reality, will say that all should be treat-
ed equally, but it will also mean that we can expect that the community’s norms 
shall apply to all. The norms of our community say that now we expect that every-
one shall have the possibility to enter a binding commitment, but then we also ex-
pect that the community’s norms are there.
In reality, this statement was a way of saying that if society gives marriage rights 
to lesbians and gays, it has a right to expect them to behave. “Why does it be-
come so exaggerated? Why do you become so different?” were questions posed 
by a young liberal woman, presumably to an effeminate gay man, as she was 
provoked by his flamboyant manners or those of his fellow queers. Now, many 
years later, she used his answer to make the point that if society assimilates les-
bians and gays into its legislative framework, it can also expect a more normal 
behaviour. It was perhaps an argument that was aimed at the more conservative 
forces in the country, those who disapproved of the norm-breaking behaviour 
of queers, but in fact it confirmed one of the arguments that queer criticism had 
formulated against gay marriage.48
The voting on the new law was a complicated procedure, as there were many 
counter proposals and additional suggestions, but the law in its entirety was 
carried with 84 votes in favour and 41 votes against. The reading in the Upper 
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House (the Lagting) six days later was a pure formality, and the arguments put 
forth were the same as in the Lower House. It was carried by 26 votes in favour 
and 14 against, and thus sent to the King for signing.49 On 1 January 2009, the 
Norwegian joint marriage law became effective, making Norway the first Scan-
dinavian country and the sixth in the world to introduce a gender-neutral mar-
riage law. The initiative in marriage rights for gays and lesbians had obviously 
slipped out of Scandinavia and onto the global stage.50 
The question of church marriages, however, has been less favourably treat-
ed by the Church of Norway. Whereas different dioceses have different opin-
ions whether persons who have registered partnership or married someone of 
their own sex can be ordained priests, the unity of the church is preserved on 
the question of same-sex marriages in church. A same-sex couple can marry in 
the town hall and then go to church to have their union blessed, but the Church 
of Norway emphasises that a marriage and a blessing in church are different 
things.51
Swedish lobbying
In Sweden, the idea of gender-neutral marriage was discussed by a Government 
Commission, which delivered its report in 2007, suggesting that the law on reg-
istered partnership be abolished and the question of marriage in church be left 
to each congregation to decide.52 The RFSL protested, claiming that this would 
give religious congregations the right to discriminate against same-sex couples, 
but in reality they were prepared to accept the proposal. Important steps toward 
a gender-neutral marriage law were taken when one party after the other de-
cided to support the idea, and the lobbying efforts by RFSL were not negligible 
in that process.
In an interview in September 2009, when Sweden’s gender-neutral mar-
riage law had been in place for a little over two months, the chair of the RFSL, 
Sören Juvas, described how his organisation had worked for gay marriage over 
the years. Juvas himself and his partner Daniel had been married in an “illegal” 
ceremony in Visby on 10 July 2007, which was the year RFSL intensified its lob-
bying efforts.53 “It was an effort in which many were involved,” he said about the 
lobbying for the new law, and mentioned a number of gay-friendly politicians 
from different parties. “But you have to remember that such a person as Yvonne 
Andersson from the Christian Democrats was also very important for this work, 
since she, in a way, characterised the opposition, and made it very clear why it 
was important.”54 Most important, according to Juvas, was the lobbying effort 
toward the two largest parties, the Social Democrats and the Moderates. Small-
er parties such as the Environment Party, the liberal People’s Party, and the re-
formed socialist Left Party were already committed to the kind of gender-neu-
tral marriage law that RFSL wanted. 
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The Social Democrats have always been a very broad party, harbouring a 
wide number of opinions. During the interview, Juvas stressed the importance 
of appealing to the entire party, and he described how the RFSL had acted to 
influence the Social Democrats:
We wrote a member’s motion for the Social Democratic Party Congress and asked 
Urban Fransson to deliver it, since he was a local politician from [the far north dis-
trict of ] Arjeplog . . . It was important that it didn’t become a question for the big 
cities. He was a local government commissioner who was completely open about 
his sexual orientation, unbelievably popular within the party, and enjoyed lots of 
support in his home district.55
The RFSL had good contacts with openly gay and lesbian politicians with influ-
ence in all parties except the Christian Democrats. Some of them had been ac-
tivists in the RFSL before entering politics, and the number of openly gay and 
lesbian members of Parliament and various municipal assemblies grew. At the 
same time, the number of gay-friendly straight politicians grew year after year. 
But the situation within the right-of-centre coalition Government was delicate, 
since it depended on the support of the Christian Democrats. The question was 
whether the Christian Democrats would be prepared to leave the Government 
over this issue. From the RFSL’s perspective, it was important to get binding 
promises from all the other parties before the September elections of 2006. In 
August of that year all the party leaders were invited to a debate on LGBT is-
sues during the Stockholm Pride celebration. RFSL chair Sören Juvas described 
that particular debate as a decisive moment for the campaign: 56 
We did not accept anybody but the party leaders and promised that there would be 
an empty chair on the scene for those who didn’t show up. That was very annoying 
to the whole Social Democratic movement, because their party leader Göran Pers-
son refused to come, and when he refused, the whole opposition came running.57
The absence of Social Democratic party leader Göran Persson was, officially, 
because he was overworked and on vacation, but Sören Juvas did not believe it: 
“It was his own choice. They said that he was on a holiday and that he was to be 
pitied, but that was rubbish . . . He just didn’t want to come, that’s all.” The de-
bate among the party leaders was decisive, Juvas said, because it was then that 
the gay and lesbian movement got the necessary binding promises from the 
highest level.58
After the September elections, there was, in fact, a change of Government. 
Because of a number of binding resolutions from their party congresses, the 
Moderates, the Centre Party, and the Liberal People’s Party in the new Govern-
ment were committed to a gender-neutral marriage law, but to remain in power 
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they depended on the support of the Christian Democrats. The solution to keep 
the Government together was that it presented a proposal on a reformed mar-
riage law which did not include the possibility of marrying same-sex couples. 
The Moderates, the Centre Party, and the People’s Party then presented a joint 
party bill on a gender-neutral marriage law. Together with a number of mem-
bers’ bills from the other parties, the whole issue was referred to the Standing 
Committee on Civil Law (Civilutskottet), and its report back to the Riksdag be-
came the law proposal to vote on. It was an exceptional proceeding, which was, 
in fact, the same way the law on registered partnership had been dealt with fif-
teen years earlier.59
The parliamentary debate in Sweden was, in a way, less interesting than the 
one in Norway some months before. Since there was no right-wing populist 
party represented in the Swedish Parliament, the only party that consistently 
opposed the law was the Christian Democratic Party. Its speakers repeatedly 
expressed their respect for gay and lesbian citizens and for their right to choose 
their lifestyle. They supported the right of lesbians and gays to have their rela-
tionships recognised by the state, but they claimed that the existing partner-
ship law was satisfactory. Like the Norwegian Left Party, the Swedish Chris-
tian Democrats proposed a compulsory civil union. They wanted the Church 
to relinquish its marriage right, and to let each religious congregation decide 
whether they wanted to perform blessings and ceremonies without legal con-
sequences. By this proposal, the Christian Democrats wanted to keep the word 
“marriage” for heterosexual couples by simply weeding it out of civil legislation. 
The State would thus not recognise same-sex unions as marriages. 
Another important difference between the Norwegian and the Swedish de-
bate was that the rights to insemination, assisted fertilisation, and adoption 
were already granted to same-sex couples in Sweden by separate laws. In Nor-
way, the interest of the child was brought up in the Storting debate, whereas in 
the Swedish Riksdag it was pointed out several times that these questions had 
already been dealt with. The only addresses that diverged from the general con-
sensus were those of the Christian Democrats, arguing for a separate cohabita-
tion law and civil marriage, and those of the Left Party wishing that the reli-
gious congregations’ right to refuse to marry would not have been inscribed in 
the law. A short debate between the Left Party and the Christian Democrats 
ensued, in which the Christian Democrats predicted that a leftist Government 
in the future might take away the right to refuse to marry. But otherwise the 
consensus was overwhelming. The situation in the Riksdag was unusual: six out 
of seven parties agreed on the proposal, and at the final vote, only 21 Christian 
Democrats and one representative from the Centre Party voted against it. There 
were 261 votes in favour from the other six parties, and 16 abstentions, one from 
the Christian Democrats and the rest from the Moderates.60
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On 1 May 2009, the Swedish gender-neutral marriage law took effect, and 
the law on registered partnership was abolished. After that date, those living 
in registered partnership had the choice of converting their registered partner-
ship into a full marriage or to continue living as registered partners, but no new 
partnership would be registered. Thus the marital status “registered partner” will 
gradually vanish from Swedish society. A small group of people will probably 
choose to continue to be registered partners, a vestige of the brief historical pe-
riod, 1995–2008, in which same-sex couples had an exceptional status in Swed-
ish civil law.61 The only aspect of full recognition of same-sex couples that was 
unresolved was the question of church marriage. The political solution was to 
put the Church of Sweden on equal footing with the other forty congregations 
enjoying the right to perform legally binding marriages in Sweden and let it 
decide for itself. On 22 October 2009, the Church of Sweden decided to allow 
same-sex marriages in church. The decision was made by the Church Meeting 
after intense discussions over more than a decade, but since the new marriage 
law took effect the question had become pressing. The decision was to allow in-
dividual priests the choice of refusing to marry same-sex couples, but the rector 
then had to appoint another priest to perform the ceremony. It was carried by 
178 votes in favour and 68 against, with only three abstentions.62
Consensus in Iceland
In Iceland, the gay marriage law went through swiftly and without any opposi-
tion. The law from 2008 that for all practical purposes had made the existing law 
on registered partnership equal to marriage had prepared for the reform. Dur-
ing the first reading of the proposal, speakers from all political parties offered 
their support to a joint marriage law, and some took the opportunity to remind 
the Alþingi of the history behind it, complaining that the joint marriage law had 
not come earlier. The only reservation was voiced by the conservative Independ-
ence Party, which insisted that nobody should be forced to perform same-sex 
wedding ceremonies against their conviction. 
One particular trait of the Icelandic political process in these matters has 
been the broad support behind all the steps toward gay marriage. Activists and 
politicians were keen on avoiding a polarised debate, and they did not allow 
one party to monopolise the question. All spoke respectfully of the Church and 
some thanked it for an open and constructive dialogue. At the second reading of 
the proposal the spokesperson of the majority in the Standing Committee that 
had prepared it, made it clear that they intended to respect individual priests’ 
right to refuse to marry same-sex couples. The stand of the Icelandic Church 
is still not resolved, but individual priests are free to perform legally binding 
church weddings, and others are free to refuse. At the third reading the law was 
voted through with 49 votes to zero, and 14 abstentions. The positive mode in 
Hinsegin dagar, or Queer Days, in Reykjavík 2007. This event annually attracts tens of thousands 
of people. Photo: Jens Rydström.
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Parliament was perhaps best expressed by Margrét Tryggvadóttir, a representa-
tive from the small party “The Movement” (Hreyfingin), as she stood up to vote: 
“Mrs. Speaker, I say yes with sunshine in my heart. I think Iceland and the 
world are better today than yesterday.” The new marriage law became effective 
on Christopher Street Day, 27 June 2010.63
Thus, in a few decades, Scandinavia has seen the emergence of exception-
al laws for homosexual citizens, granting legal recognition to same-sex couples 
but defining them as life companionships without children. For those couples 
who already had children, the legislators were at first at a loss how to grant legal 
safety to a child without recognising homosexuals as parents, but step by step 
they were forced by a changing popular opinion and by lesbian, gay, and bisexual 
activism to accept the combination of a homosexual lifestyle with parenthood. 
As the factual differences between registered partnership and “real” marriage 
diminished, the logical next step was to have the same marriage law for both 
same-sex and different-sex couples. 
Three of the Scandinavian countries, Norway, Sweden, and Iceland, have 
now rewritten their marriage laws in order to allow same-sex couples to marry 
on the same terms as different-sex couples, and the Church of Sweden has de-
cided to marry same-sex couples. Indications are that legislation in Denmark 
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and Finland will eventually go the same way. The laws on registered partner-
ship, once hailed as ground-breaking and revolutionary, have proved to be a pa-
renthesis in history, and the recognition of the rights of same-sex couples seems 
consolidated in these countries. The price that same-sex couples have to pay for 
state recognition is that the majority now expects them to act according to the 
norms of society. Whether this will impoverish queer culture, or the minority 
culture of those who choose different sexualities, is yet to be seen.
Conclusions
After witnessing this rapid legal and discursive change, two questions beg for 
answers. First, how could public opinion change so quickly in Norway and Swe-
den between 1990 and 2009 that the laws on gender-neutral marriage passed 
almost without political opposition? (In Iceland there had been no dramat-
ic change. The joint marriage law was carried by the same spirit of national 
pride and of general consensus as the partnership law fourteen years earlier.) 
In all Scandinavian countries except Iceland, the laws on registered partner-
ship passed, in their time, with comparatively narrow majorities, a massive me-
dia debate, and concerted opposition from Christian, conservative, and rural in-
terests. But in 2005–2008 the gender-neutral marriage laws were prepared and 
passed in Norway and Sweden with a minimum of political opposition, which 
in this new situation brought about a defence of the partnership laws. The sec-
ond question is, how did children come to be part of the image of the gay and 
lesbian couple? How did the rainbow family appear on the political scene, de-
manding and achieving state recognition in less than a decade? 
In one sense, it was the culmination of the post-Stonewall gay movement’s 
politics of openness in the 1990s that paved the way for the gender-neutral 
marriage, but that is not a sufficient explanation. The gay liberation movement 
of the 1970s had claimed a minority status that strove for minority protection. 
Anti-discrimination laws, ombudsmen, and laws on registered partnership were 
results of gay minority politics in Scandinavia. The claims for full marital equal-
ity including church marriage, adoption rights, and recognition as parents were 
there already in the 1980s, but were mostly considered far in the future and were 
not wanted by many. Lesbian feminism and radical criticism of the heterosex-
ual family were important factors in the 1970s and 1980s. This criticism against 
marriage faded away, both as a result of a general ideological shift after the end 
of the Cold War and of a political pragmatism that developed once the Danish 
law was in place. The question of how the opinion of the majority of the popula-
tion could swing so dramatically in the 1990s requires another answer. This rapid 
and far-reaching opinion shift can best be explained as a result of gay openness 
and assimilation, which in the small Scandinavian societies could exert consid-
erable influence on the majority. In a small and highly urbanised society such as 
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Iceland, the assimilation of gay culture in everyday society is most evident and is 
demonstrated at the gigantic Pride parade every year. For in spite of the leather 
and the whips and bare buttocks, the Icelandic queer days (hinsegin dagar), as 
they are called in Icelandic, are not primarily a manifestation of an exciting and 
raw subculture, but a mirror of the majority’s tolerance. The disciplined queers, 
waving from the floats, no longer threaten the children of the majority, which 
joins them in the celebration of their diversity. This is not a bad thing, consid-
ering that there was absolutely no sign of a gay or lesbian subculture in Iceland 
before, just a history of exile and frustration. The opposite pole of Icelandic so-
ciety would be Finland, which is much bigger and less urbanised. It is the Nor-
dic country that holds the strongest opposition to gay and lesbian emancipation 
and where rural and Christian conservative interests create a bulwark against 
diversity.64 The core countries of the Scandinavian region, Denmark, Norway, 
and Sweden, display a more pronounced willingness by the majority to embrace 
a disciplined and “tamed” queer community ‒ on the majority’s terms. As U.S. 
literary scholar Heather Love has expressed it: “Mainstream society has shown 
itself perfectly willing to take on particularly attractive, fun, or marketable as-
pects of the gay lifestyle.”65 
However, the commercial explanation, that the market forces have facilitated 
the mainstreaming of gay and lesbian culture, holds true only to a limited ex-
tent in Scandinavia. For various reasons, the “pink dollar” has remained largely 
illusory in the region, where commercial establishments have had a hard time 
surviving. With the exception of Copenhagen, where there was a continental 
tradition of small establishments that catered to the gay community, the Scan-
dinavian gay scene has always been very limited. Severe licensing laws are one 
reason Scandinavian lesbians and gays have preferred to socialise at home, and 
that the gay scene has until recently been diminutive in the other Nordic capi-
tals. It wasn’t until the 1990s that Stockholm, a city with one million inhabit-
ants, managed to have more than one gay disco at a time. As soon as a new dis-
co opened its doors, the old one quickly went bankrupt, since the flickering and 
faithless gay crowd would flock to the new and abandon the old. There were no 
gay bars, save the RFSL community centre, and only a handful of restaurants 
and cafés declared themselves gay friendly. In addition to this, mainstream firms 
became notorious for not placing ads in gay and lesbian publications. The fur-
niture company IKEA placed ads with gay themes in other countries, but not 
in its native Sweden. Now the situation has changed and there is indeed more 
than one gay disco in Stockholm, but the commercial scenes are still remarka-
bly small in Scandinavian cities. One Icelandic activist complained in 2005 that 
Reykjavík’s reputation as a gay Mecca caused U.S. gay men to go there and left 
them bitterly disappointed behind a cup of coffee in the town’s only gay café.66 
A better explanation for the embracement of a disciplined gay culture is the 
normalising force of the Scandinavian welfare state. Once let inside into the 
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warmth of the People’s Home, LGBT people have to obey the house rules. The 
marginalisation of prostitution and pornography in Scandinavia and the radical 
feminists’ successful campaigns against “the sexualisation of public space” con-
tribute to the disciplining of the sexually deviant. In an interesting move, the 
Scandinavian s/m scene is now seeking recognition and seems to have had some 
success. In 2007, the heterosexual s/m association Sunrice managed to get ac-
ceptance for their demands that the RFSU, the Swedish sex reform movement, 
work for the abolition of sadomasochism as a sickness in the Swedish manual 
of diseases. The diagnosis was stricken from the manual, and the National Board 
of Health and Social Affairs vowed to lobby the WHO to do likewise. Ironi-
cally, the RFSL, the national association for lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-
gendered, was less benevolent to the demands of SLM, the Scandinavian gay 
s/m group.67
Some of the explanation of the quick deployment of gay marriage in Scan-
dinavia must also be sought in the cuckoo-in-the-nest effect. The readiness of 
Scandinavian Conservative parties, Centre parties, and Social Democrats to lis-
ten to gay and lesbian activists’ demands must to a certain extent be explained by 
the presence of openly gay and lesbian politicians in their ranks. When Wenche 
Lowzow from the Norwegian Right Party came out as lesbian in 1978, she was 
ostracised, but when Per Kristian Foss came out in 2000, the political landscape 
had changed and he could rise to the rank of Minister of Finance. It must be 
remembered, however, that Foss is a man and Lowzow a woman. The number 
of openly lesbian politicians in prominent positions is remarkably less than that 
of gay men. 
But why children? It is true that many people have combined a desire for 
members of their own sex ‒ and sometimes an extravagant love life ‒ with 
bearing, adopting, and fostering children since time began. But the very idea 
of modern homosexuality was not connected to having children until recent-
ly. It was indeed described as “sterility, barrenness, and death,” to quote Gunde 
Raneskog in the Swedish Riksdag in 1976. And in less than thirty years, Scan-
dinavian welfare societies have redefined this picture and conjured up “life, de-
velopment, and future” ‒ the same attributes Raneskog awarded the heterosex-
ual couple ‒ to fulfill the lives of their homosexual and bisexual citizens. Why 
is that?
It is to be noted that the demands for custody of children were on the agenda 
of the gay and lesbian movements already in the early 1980s when the legal reg-
ulation of same-sex relationships was first seriously discussed with mainstream 
politicians. In Iceland, the tradition with strong family ties led to the success-
ful implementation of Samtökin’s demand for joint custody over children in a 
same-sex relationship. In all other countries, however, these demands were con-
sciously sacrificed by the gay activists at the time in order to get the minority 
legislation of registered partnership. The laws on registered partnership were 
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passed in all Scandinavian countries except Finland within a few years between 
1989 and 1996, despite warnings from their opponents that this was just the first 
step, and that society had embarked upon a slippery slope that would end with 
full parental rights for same-sex couples. In the 1990s public opinion in all Scan-
dinavian countries was against child custody for same-sex couples. Yet adoption 
rights and full marital rights were granted ten to fifteen years later. What has to 
be explained is both why same-sex couples want children and why the welfare 
state is prepared to recognise their right to have them.
To begin with, it was a way to adapt legislation to reality. The lesbian baby 
boom, and the development of new assisted fertilisation techniques, gave les-
bian couples the upper hand in this struggle for discursive power. Their decision 
to go public with their family life toward the end of the 1990s meant a world 
of difference to public debate on same-sex couples and children. The transfor-
mation of lesbians and gays into child-rearing, law-abiding, good-sex citizens 
is largely a generational question. As the activists from the 1980s have come of 
age parallel with the publicity of lesbian mothers and the development of assist-
ed fertilisation techniques, child rearing has definitely become an option. Since 
that generation also has gained considerable political influence, their priori-
ties and demands have an impact on social change in Scandinavia. The younger 
queer generation, fighting for space in the mainstream gay and lesbian move-
ment, has managed to raise questions within the movement about transgender 
rights, polyamorous relationships, and political change. But among political de-
cision-makers or within the gay lobby their voices are seldom heard.
The child-rearing same-sex couple, with a place at the day-care centre, 
schooling problems, and family therapy, is a completely new concept in our so-
cieties. Their presence in the different institutions of the welfare state and in the 
mass media has contributed to a change of opinions that is merely an adapta-
tion to the existing reality. 
It is now time to sum up the contents of this book.

Summary and conclusions
There are three main focuses of this book: the internal discussions in the gay 
and lesbian movement, the reception of the ideas in mainstream politics, and 
the development of state recognition of same-sex couples from acceptance of 
childless couples to the recognition of rainbow families. Internal discussions 
had tended to oppose lesbian feminists and gay activists until the Danish law 
was adopted in 1989. After that, the other Scandinavian gay and lesbian move-
ments stood seemingly united in their demands for registered partnership. The 
willingness of the political parties to heed the demands of the gay and lesbian 
movement depended largely on the overall political context, but in some cases 
it was influenced by energetic and well-directed lobby campaigns. The AIDS 
epidemic played a crucial part in creating a better understanding of the gay and 
lesbian movement, but it also gave rise to a perceived need for the disciplining 
of gay men. 
Internal discussions
Prior to the introduction of the Danish law on registered partnership, on 1 Oc-
tober 1989, the discussions about gay marriage in the Scandinavian gay and les-
bian movements were characterised by many different opinions, but there was a 
clearly distinguishable difference between men’s and women’s standpoints. The 
idea of some sort of legal regulation of stable same-sex relationships had been 
formulated ‒ mainly by gay men ‒ since the end of the nineteenth century. Les-
bian thought, however, was nearly always linked to leftist feminist ideologi-
cal currents, based on a striving for independence from male dominance and 
for economic and political self-determination. Most forms of feminist ideology 
carry a consistent criticism of marriage as an institution, and the idea of marital 
arrangements for lesbian couples was far from the agenda of most lesbian activ-
ists. It may also be true that the economically stronger male couples had more 
assets to safeguard against their biological kin than women and therefore had a 
stronger interest in a legal regulation of their relationship. 
On the other hand, more lesbians than gay men raised children and would 
have an interest in creating an economically safe environment for them, as well 
as securing their right to foster their own children. For this reason, laws on reg-
istered partnership that excluded the custody of children were of less interest to 
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many women. The question of lesbians as child-raisers was almost always dealt 
with separately from the question of their legal status as life partners. Since tra-
dition presupposed that fathers took less responsibility for their children, the 
solution sought for almost always involved the mother. 
Per Kleis Bønnelykke worked in Denmark, but he was inspired by an article 
in a Swiss gay publication when he formulated the first draft proposal of a law 
on registered partnership in 1972. This indicates that the idea of a separate reg-
istration for homosexuals was not originally Scandinavian but was discussed in 
different European gay and lesbian movements in the 1960s. The law that was 
finally adopted does not differ in any significant way from Bønnelykke’s origi-
nal proposal. As noted before, the ideological parties like the liberals or the left 
socialists ‒ parties that lacked a well-defined class base ‒ were where ideas of 
gay emancipation could most easily find listeners in the 1970s. For this reason, 
gay activists tended to be of either liberal or socialist political conviction at that 
time. Bønnelykke was a member of the social-liberal Radical Left Party, for 
which he worked politically and at various times held office in the local coun-
cil of his home municipality. In Sweden, gay activist Stig-Åke Petersson was a 
member of the liberal People’s Party and founding father of the Gay Liberals 
in Sweden.
An important factor to explain both why gay marriage became a priority for 
the national lesbian and gay movements and why it had any chance to be ac-
cepted by mainstream society was the de-radicalisation of the movements. The 
decision to celebrate Christopher Street Day on June 27, rather than the Inter-
national Workers’ Day on May 1, that the Danish movement took in 1971, can 
stand as an early sign of the way they would go. It became at the same time more 
inclusive of different political views among its members, and more acceptable to 
majority politicians. The project of a registration for gays and straights and large 
families, first presented by the socialist parties as part of a plan to abolish tradi-
tional marriage, was replaced by a liberal rights discourse, claiming equal rights 
for same-sex couples. 
Toward the end of the 1980s it became easier for gay and lesbian politicians 
to come out of the closet, which sometimes led to a merger of party politics and 
activism. Jorma Hentilä in Finland was a prominent figure in the socialist Peo-
ple’s Alliance and also in the Finnish gay and lesbian movement. In the begin-
ning of the 1980s he openly combined gay activism and political work. Hentilä 
had to concentrate on AIDS prevention and did not work to promote the part-
nership law, but in the late 1980s a generation of Social Democratic politicians 
and activists, like Torben Lund in Denmark and Kjell Erik Øie in Norway, 
would take up the work for partnership. In Finland, Hannele Lehtikuusi, active 
within the Green Alliance, became a front figure for registered partnership and 
worked in tandem with Rainer Hiltunen from the conservative National Alli-
ance. In Iceland, a growing number of lesbian and gay activists entered main-
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stream politics, and in 2009 the country became first in the world to elect an 
openly lesbian Prime Minister, Social Democrat Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir. Thus 
we see a broadening of the spectrum of political convictions among the activ-
ists, which went hand in hand with an increase of the number of political par-
ties that would give attention to demands for gay rights. 
Scandinavian social democracy was “won for the cause” by initiatives ema-
nating from youth leagues or from gay and lesbian party members in the late 
1980s, but the conservative parties and agrarian centre parties, more reluctantly, 
turned to gay and lesbian rights issues only after the turn of the century. The 
Finnish and, to a lesser degree, the Norwegian agrarian centre parties still host 
some anti-gay sentiments, whereas the Swedish Centre Party has undergone a 
complete metamorphosis. This may in part be due to the Centre Party’s openly 
gay vice party leader Andreas Carlgren, but it is also an effect of an ideological 
reorientation of the party (which enables Carlgren to remain in it), involving a 
more EU-friendly attitude and a more open attitude concerning immigration. 
Ironically, the strengthening of the Christian Democratic parties in Norway 
and Sweden seems to have helped the work for gay rights. Many conservative 
Christians have left their original parties and have gathered in these parties, 
thus making it easier to work for gay rights in the other groups. 
Besides lesbian feminists, there were also many male activists who were op-
posed to gay marriage. The Danish Gay Men’s Liberation Front (Bøssernes Be-
frielses Front, BBF) was influential, even if its political strategy leaned more to 
the esthetical and intellectual. According to Bønnelykke, they were much more 
pragmatic than the lesbian feminists, and in the 1970s he made an effort to in-
tegrate them in the political work of The Society of 1948 by offering them posts 
on the board. The arguments of the BBF were not feminist but were decidedly 
anti-establishment. As a consequence, they did not actively lobby against gay 
marriage but regarded it as an utterly insignificant question. Among the wom-
en, there were those like the lesbians in Lesbian Front in Sweden, who argued 
in feminist terms against gay marriage, there were those like Terhi Saarinen 
in Finland who turned their backs on male-dominated gay politics, and there 
were those like Anna Mohr and Eva Ahlberg in Sweden, who worked with 
the men and to a certain extent downplayed feminist ideology. Lesbians who 
chose to organise in separate organisations lost their influence in mainstream 
politics, but they argued that they did not have much influence anyway in the 
male-dominated movement, and they thought it was worth it to be able to work 
alongside other feminists.
There was an interesting difference between lesbian activists like Else Slange, 
chair of The Society of 1948/LBL in Denmark, and Kim Friele, chair of The 
Norwegian Society of 1948 (DNF ’48). They were both of the opinion that the 
partnership law was a discriminatory law, since it did not include custody of 
children, which they regarded as important for lesbian women. Slange formu-
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lated her opposition to it in more feminist terms about independence during the 
interview, whereas Friele’s argument at the time had more to do with solidarity 
with those who lack the “ability, will, or possibility” to live in stable monoga-
mous pairs. There was also an important difference in their respective positions 
of power. Kim Friele was the leader of the Norwegian gay and lesbian move-
ment for over two decades and had a very strong position within Scandinavian 
gay and lesbian activism, whereas Else Slange was the chair of LBL 1989–1994, 
when the organisation faced a difficult period that ended in economic bank-
ruptcy. Whatever the reason, Slange could not or would not let her views on gay 
marriage determine the stand of her organisation. 
The AIDS epidemic struck Scandinavia at a time when national gay and 
lesbian organisations had entered a phase of professionalisation and it caused 
more money to be channelled into the organisations. It also coincided with a 
period of lesbian separatism in all Scandinavian countries. It is hard to deter-
mine in what ways the AIDS epidemic and its consequences affected the lesbi-
an separatism of the time. The plight of gay men and the many deaths generated 
sympathy, and also worked as an argument for the partnership law, since many 
widowed men suffered from the lack of public recognition of their relationship, 
as the families of origin of their deceased lovers claimed the inheritance. But on 
the other hand, many lesbians felt alienated by the focus on male sexuality. One 
combined effect of the professionalisation of the gay and lesbian movements 
and lesbian separatism was that the ideological resistance to gay marriage van-
ished from the national movements. In Norway, where criticism of gay mar-
riages had been included in the movement’s agenda from 1973, it did not hap-
pen until later, when the partnership law was introduced in Denmark, and a new 
generation in Norway began lobbying to get a law on registered partnership.
It would, however, be a mistake to interpret gay and lesbian resistance to 
gay marriage as solely a question of feminism and of women’s and men’s dif-
ferent needs and priorities. The criticism was also inspired by solidarity and the 
quest for alternative lifestyles. Since many lesbians and gay men had had to or-
ganise their lives outside the heteronormative community of the welfare state, 
they had developed a number of strategies to cope with their situation. Life in 
eternal catachresis, which Judith Butler has described, forced them ‒ or allowed 
them ‒ to build their own kinship systems. Before the openly gay politics of the 
1970s, the groups of gay men who formed upper-class coteries in the larger cit-
ies included both rich and poor, even if the rich set the rules. Circles of lesbians 
also began forming in the framework of the emerging club life. Marriages were 
arranged between women and between men, seeking recognition within the 
group, often with also a religious blessing, but without the state’s recognition. 
All in all, there was a strong sense of being outsiders and depending on the soli-
darity and love of the others in the groups. There were of course always couples 
who would split from the groups and live quiet lives, and they would sometimes 
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be accused of anxiously protecting the sanctity of their relationship against the 
demands of the collective. The idea of seeking public legitimacy from outside 
‒ recognition by the state ‒ could be seen as compromising the basic solidarity 
that was necessary to survive in a hostile environment.
Mainstream politics
Thus, the idea of gay marriage is old but highly controversial within the gay and 
lesbian community. The question remains when and why mainstream politicians 
began listening to gay and lesbian activists. The acceptance of the legitimacy of 
homosexuality has come gradually, beginning with women and young politi-
cians, and has slowly infiltrated political discourse on the national and local lev-
els in all Scandinavian countries. Certain historical factors have influenced the 
process and facilitated the integration of gays and lesbians in Scandinavian so-
ciety.
To begin with, there are strong centre-periphery dynamics within each coun-
try and within the Nordic region as a whole. Copenhagen has been described 
as the gay capital of Scandinavia for generations, and indeed it seems that its 
proximity to Continental Europe, its large port, and its liberal licensing laws 
were factors that contributed to the creation of a homosexual subculture long 
before that happened elsewhere in Scandinavia. The existence of a recognised 
homosexual centre caused people who sought same-sex pleasures to be drawn 
to it, and those who remained in the periphery often reacted with disdain at the 
thought of what was going on in the capital. We have seen that happen when 
conservative forces in the Faroe Islands, situated in the periphery of the Dan-
ish Realm, successfully opposed the introduction of the partnership law and de-
layed the introduction of a law against discrimination on grounds of sexual ori-
entation. And we have seen that centre-periphery dynamic at work between the 
other countries when the law spread over Scandinavia. Given the amount of in-
terest and the political situation in each country, it was to be expected that either 
Denmark or Sweden would be the first country to deal with same-sex relation-
ships. When Denmark broke the ice, it had a decisive influence on the other ju-
risdictions. The reticence within the gay and lesbian movement vanished when 
it became apparent that such a solution was politically possible, and the gay 
movements in Scandinavia began lobbying for the law. The lobbying efforts fur-
ther broke down resistance within their own ranks, and a seemingly united gay 
and lesbian movement finally managed to muster a majority in Parliament. The 
experience from Denmark, where the law did not cause any dramatic change in 
everyday life, may also have had a reassuring effect on those who were sceptical.
From Denmark, the idea of the law spread across Scandinavia, but some-
times in an unexpected order. It was a surprise to many that Norway intro-
duced the law before Sweden, both because of the explicit opposition to such a 
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law within the gay and lesbian movements in Norway, and the strong position 
of conservative Christian groups in Norwegian politics. However, it can serve 
as an example of the importance of historical actors. The generational shift in 
the Norwegian movement guaranteed a concerted lobbying effort, and the po-
larisation of the debate secured a gay-friendly majority in Parliament, as the 
opponents to the law increasingly were seen as extremists. The small jurisdic-
tions in Iceland and Greenland introduced the law rapidly and with virtually no 
political resistance, but the larger and more diverse Finnish society mobilised 
a stronger resistance to the law. The first attempt to introduce it, in 1993, was 
blocked, and it was not until 2001 that it was passed, becoming effective in 2002. 
The Finnish debate was polarised like the one in Norway, but the urban pro-gay 
groups underestimated the resistance to gay rights in rural Finland.
The second factor that facilitated the introduction of the partnership laws 
was a very clear generational shift in politics. The generation of men who came 
of age in the 1950s grew up during the worst homophobic campaign in recent 
history and were brought up to believe that homosexuality was a dreadful dis-
ease that threatened not only the young, but also the very foundations of society. 
It is fair to assume that only those in this group who had positive experiences of 
same-sex sexuality, either by themselves engaging in it or by having openly ho-
mosexual friends, would find it less problematic to give recognition to that par-
ticular lifestyle. In every Scandinavian country the first mainstream politicians 
who gave support to the laws on registered partnership were either women or 
young men. There were of course some exceptions, as, for instance, conservative 
MP Alf Wennerfors or socialist MP Jörn Svensson in Sweden, but the general 
trend was clear.1 
The third factor of importance for the success of the gay rights lobby was a 
gender shift. The number of women in Scandinavian party politics was small for 
most of the twentieth century, but in the 1990s more women entered the elected 
assemblies. It may be too soon to assess the impact of this “gender revolution” in 
politics, but one thing is certain: it has facilitated the introduction and imple-
mentation of partnership laws and gender-neutral marriage laws. Today (2009) 
women make up 47 percent of the Swedish Riksdag, 42 percent of the Finn-
ish Eduskunta, 38 percent of both Denmark’s Folketing and Norway’s Storting, 
and 32 percent of the Icelandic Alþingi. The number of women in the Faroese 
Løgting increased from 9 to 22 percent in the 2008 elections, which should in-
crease the chances of introducing pro-gay legislation in the future.2
From clowns to clones
When the laws of registered partnership were introduced in Scandinavia, it was 
clear to most people that they were just the first step of a development toward 
full legal recognition of same-sex relationships. Their opponents feared that the 
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next step would be granting gays and lesbians custody over children, something 
they perceived as a threat to the child’s best interests, as well as to the family 
and stable social conditions. Gay and lesbian activists made no secret of what 
they wanted. The practical issue of child custody and the highly symbolic one of 
church weddings were highest on their agenda. Of the two, child custody was 
easiest to comply with. There are many aspects to that issue but, step by step, 
same-sex couples have been granted the right to stepchild adoption and external 
adoption, as well as insemination and in vitro fertilisation.
There was a short period in the nineties when the Danish Folketing imposed 
increased restrictions on gay couples’ parenting, but after the 1997 Danish law 
that barred lesbians from insemination in state clinics (which was abolished in 
2007) all amendments to the partnership laws in Scandinavia have been in the 
direction of making registered partnership more and more like regular marriage. 
Stepchild adoption was the reform that came first, and that was also a reform 
that was given priority by the gay and lesbian movements. It was an efficient ar-
gument to point to the situation of children already living with two parents of 
the same sex, and there were concrete legal issues influencing the legal situation 
of children in such relations. If a person was opposed to stepchild adoption, they 
had to argue that it was worse to live with two mothers than to live with a single 
mother, and this was no longer a valid argument in the public debate. The pos-
sibility for registered partners to adopt their partner’s children was granted, first 
in Denmark (1999) and last in Finland (2009). This reform was generally per-
ceived as a reasonable adjustment, giving more legal security to children raised 
in same-sex relationships, but external adoption was discussed in completely 
different terms. Arguments against such a reform were, among others, that gay 
and lesbian couples for selfish reasons wanted to adopt children without regard 
to the fact that those children would suffer the double stigma of being adopted 
and having an unusual family situation. There was also opposition from vari-
ous adoption agencies, fearing that a law permitting gay and lesbian couples to 
apply for adoption would jeopardise the chances for other childless couples to 
adopt. There was, however, enough scientific evidence to demonstrate that the 
situation for children raised in same-sex relations differed in no significant way 
from that of children from “normal” homes. Moreover, the gay and lesbian lob-
by now enjoyed considerable support among centrally placed politicians from 
many different parties in all Scandinavian countries. 
Sweden was the first country in Scandinavia to grant full adoption rights to 
same-sex couples. The reform followed a Government commission’s report that 
found no valid reasons for preventing lesbians and gays from adopting chil-
dren. It deemed it necessary, however, to investigate further the matter in order 
to solve the legal problems concerning the custody of children born with the 
help of assisted reproduction techniques. Some voices were raised saying that 
the adoption question typically was solved first, since it was an issue that con-
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cerned both women and men. Insemination and in vitro fertilisation were issues 
that concerned primarily women, it was said, and thus were given less priority. 
In hindsight, it seems to be an unfair accusation. The legal problems in connec-
tion with parenthood when children are born without a social father are quite 
different from those concerning adoption. The Scandinavian welfare states had 
designed their family laws to ensure that every child should have a father. These 
laws were enacted when it was a political necessity to make fathers take respon-
sibility for their children. 
The general rule that the husband of a woman who gives birth is automati-
cally considered to be the father of the child until this presumption is chal-
lenged, is a rule which gives peace to many heterosexual families. To extend that 
rule to a female registered partner of a biological mother, however, went against 
the feelings of many policy-makers. This question is related to the one about 
whether a sperm donor should be able to remain anonymous to the child or not, 
i.e. whether the identity of a biological father should be regarded as so impor-
tant to the child at some point that the identity of the father be disclosed. The 
Scandinavian countries have chosen different paths here. After long discussions 
since the 1980s, the Swedish Law on genetic integrity (2006:351) ruled that the 
identity of the sperm donor must be kept on record, and that the child con-
ceived through sperm donation has the right to know who her or his biological 
father is at the age of eighteen.3 Denmark has the opposite policy. In Denmark 
all sperm donors to state-run clinics retain anonymity. Finland and Norway 
have eventually followed the Swedish way, with the result that there is a lack of 
sperm donors in all those countries, and women keep going to Denmark to be-
come inseminated.4
Possibilities of cloning human beings offer new perspectives. When will the 
first infant be born as a monozygotic twin of an already living person? The eth-
ical complications of such a development may seem staggering. On the other 
hand, the early discussions in the 1980s concerning in-vitro fertilisation con-
jured up science-fiction-like visions of “man playing God” and anticipated 
dreadful scenarios, and now it is a fully accepted medico-social practice. It is 
to be expected that human cloning will be offered in the not-so-distant future, 
and that the ethical problems surrounding it can be dealt with. Who could be 
more interested in that kind of service than gay men? Since lesbian women have 
made themselves fully independent of men with the development of assisted 
reproductive technology and the supply of sperm from anonymous donors, gay 
men are at a loss where to get children. Since only a small minority can actually 
adopt children, and only the most well-to-do can employ a surrogate mother ‒ 
which might backfire if she decided to claim her baby ‒ perhaps cloning would 
be cheaper and more reliable. The prospect of having one’s identical twin grow-
ing up with a thirty-to-forty-year delay seems frightening to most, but it may 
become something people get used to. 
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We don’t know much about possible ethical discussions in the future, or the 
kinds of checks and balances the legislators may want to impose on cloning, but 
we do know that it could become a prosperous business, since there would cer-
tainly be many gay men who would willingly go through hardship to get a child 
of their own. And we know that humans are a remarkably adaptable species.
The lessons of history
What lessons can we get from the history of registered partnership and gay 
marriage? Who was right? The lesbian feminists warning of a strengthening of 
patriarchy, or the middle-class gay men who claimed that the legal regulation of 
same-sex couples would lead to a more just and democratic society? As always, 
the answer depends on what perspective one applies.
From a white middle-class perspective, in a broad sense, the laws on regis-
tered partnership have without doubt meant more justice for gay and lesbian 
couples and improvement of the living conditions for many individuals. State 
recognition of same-sex couples on almost the same terms as different-sex cou-
ples was the beginning of a development that eventually led to their equality 
before the law in Norway, Iceland and Sweden. Moreover, state recognition of 
a homosexual lifestyle has made it easer for lesbians and gay men in Scandi-
navia to get recognition from their families, in their workplaces, and from their 
neighbours. The visibility of lesbians and gays in society has increased tremen-
dously in the last twenty-five years, which has lessened discrimination and per-
secution. The price for increased visibility is greater exposure to hate crimes, but 
most people seem to agree that the solution to that problem would not be to be-
come less open. State recognition of rainbow families, finally, has improved the 
conditions for children being raised by same-sex couples. When the existence 
and rights of children with parents of the same sex become acknowledged and 
talked about, the risk of harassment in schools and day-care centres diminish-
es. The formalities around parenthood mean less to children, but many teachers 
and staff seem to need a framework for new family constellations. These posi-
tive changes of course do not depend on the laws on registered partnership per 
se. Likewise, many of the improvements in the living conditions of gay and les-
bian citizens might have come about without state regulation of same-sex cou-
ples. But the process of recognising same-sex couples in the welfare state has 
had the important effect of revealing to the heterosexual majority the existence 
of same-sex desire on all levels and in all geographical regions in Scandinavia. 
The price for this is an adjustment of lesbian, gay, and bisexual lifestyles to the 
norms of matrimony.
From a queer and lesbian feminist perspective, the fear that the family ‒ the 
cornerstone of patriarchal society ‒ would be strengthened has proved right, at 
least within a small minority of lesbians and gay men. Ideas of fidelity and life-
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long commitment have apparently become stronger than they were before, and 
the quest for alternative lifestyles, extended households, and multi-partner rela-
tionships is less prevalent now in political discourse. Same-sex couples imitate 
many of the symbols of heterosexual patriarchal matrimony, as they stride up 
the aisle in long gowns and veils or tailcoats. But does the strengthening of the 
family in this sense necessarily strengthen patriarchy? The core idea of the dif-
ferent theories of patriarchy in the 1970s was that the exploitation of women’s 
unpaid work by men weakened women as a group and perpetuated their sub-
mission to men. The family was seen as the centre of gender-based exploitation, 
allowing individual men and men as a group firmly to dominate and discipline 
women. Patriarchal structures prevail in Scandinavia. Women are paid less than 
men and carry the bulk of the child-raising responsibility. But the emancipation 
of lesbians and gays has taken place parallel to an increase of women’s power in 
Scandinavian ‒ and global ‒ society. The presence of women in elected bodies 
has increased, and the visibility of women in the public sphere has grown. Para-
doxically, the strengthening of family values comes at the same time as an ex-
pansion of women’s role in politics and an incorporation of LGBT lifestyles in 
the welfare state. And the same-sex couple cannot be said to contain the same 
potential for gender exploitation as a heterosexual family. It may be a place of 
dominance and violence, but it does not build up patriarchal power. The imita-
tion of heterosexual marriage and its norms, on the other hand, has other effects 
that increase the obedient majority’s power over the disobeying few.
Strengthening of family values for same-sex couples has entailed a loss of 
variety in alternative lifestyles and a further marginalisation of “bad” sex. State 
recognition of the LGBT community has served to discipline a group which, 
before, moved beyond the boundaries of “decency.” Sexual practices that Gayle 
Rubin placed on the lower half of the sex hierarchy scale (“lesbians in the bar, 
promiscuous gay men at the baths or in the park, transvestites, transsexuals, fet-
ishists, sadomasochists, for money, cross-generational”) are still, or even more, 
excluded from “decent” society.5 Gay and lesbian couples, with or without chil-
dren, have obtained recognition, which has improved their quality of life, but 
the price is that they have been barred from the more contested, some would 
say more interesting, domain of “bad” sex. Now that lesbians and gays have ob-
tained full recognition, expressed both practically and symbolically through the 
laws on registered partnership and new marriage legislation, they are expected 
to observe the same rules that the majority is expected to follow.
This, however, need not mean that they “imitate” heterosexuality. For what 
is there to imitate? Heterosexuals are expected to marry, get children, and live 
happily ever after. But how many do that in reality? The difference is that now 
the same fantasy of matrimonial happiness applies to both same-sex and differ-
ent-sex couples.
177Summary and conclusions
Parallel to the mainstreaming of LGBT culture, a counter-movement has 
grown and become stronger. The Gay Pride celebration in Stockholm has been 
challenged by Gay Shame events. Young non-heterosexuals formulate new and 
unprecedented definitions of what sexuality and gender are, and with a grow-
ing awareness of the limitations of the majority’s rules, many queer people cre-
ate their own ways of living. Foucault’s claim that where there is power, there is 
also resistance, is corroborated by events in Scandinavia.6 The same inventive-
ness that characterised the homophiles who were barred from social recognition 
is now a trait of young generations of non-heterosexuals, who reserve the right 
to define themselves differently.
The “barren clowns” who opened this book have now become folded into 
life, by being conceptually included in the group of fertile child-rearing citizens. 
But behind these obedient, well-defined practisers of “good sex” lurks an army 
of disobedient lovers: the bisexuals, the crips, the polyamorous, the sadomaso-
chists, the transgendered, who are living and loving without asking for permis-
sion and without demanding official recognition, just the absence of harassment 
and persecution. 
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the situation for families when young gay men died of AIDS. Svensson 2007.
26 There were of course other, less ideological and more personal, reasons for lesbians to 
oppose the law on registered partnership already in the 1970s and 1980s. The wish to have 
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tuation i samhället. N. d. Vol. 18. YK 3719. Riksarkivet, Stockholm (RAS).
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mot -- döden . . . Interview Eddudóttir.
33 Cvetkovich 2003.
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det.” Interview Rosen.
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kan erinra mig några negativa kommentarer från förbipasserande . . . Männen log blygt och 
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tion is near” (Befrielsen är nära) was the lead song from the successful women’s lib musical 
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Eddudóttir.
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anderledes . . . Problemet er ikke, om vi ønsker at blive accepteret, det er nødvendigt for os. 
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anderledes kultur . . . bevare og udvikle vores bøsse/lesbiske kulturer.” Sanne Yde Schmidt, 
Copenhagen 1988. Askja 13. Samtökin ’78. Borgarskjalasafn Reykjavíkur (BR).
45 “Och alla organisationerna såvitt jag minns var enhälligt och utan ens att tänka på sa-
ken, för det fanns inte som alternativ, emot registrering i särskild ordning, utan det var äk-
tenskap eller intet. . . . Och det var ju självklart att vi inte skulle ha en särlagstiftning på 
något sätt.” Interview Mohr.
46 “Alternativet innebär de facto att ett särskilt regelsystem införs för den homosexuella 
samlevnaden, vilket måste uppfattas som direkt diskriminerande.” RFSL to Utredningen 
om de homosexuellas situation i samhället, 2 June 1981. Vol. 18. YK 3719. RAS.
47 “alla former av särlagstiftning för homosexuella . . . Vi tycker det är ohederligt när man 
beskriver registeräktenskapet som något annat än ett B-äktenskap, ett surrogat som kan 
bli bättre eller sämre beroende på hur välvillig lagstiftaren kan tänkas vara.” Homosexuella 
Socialister to Utredningen om de homosexuellas situation i samhället, 26 April 1981. Vol. 
18. YK 3719. RAS.
48 “anmälnings- eller registreringsförfarande . . . konservering av fördomar.” EKHO to 
Utredningen om de homosexuellas situation i samhället, 3 May 1981. Vol. 18. YK 3719. RAS.
49 “beroendeställning, passivitet, uppoffring och identitetslöshet . . . pressas in i äktenska-
pet.” Lesbiska feminister to Utredningen om homosexuellas situation i samhället. N. d. Vol. 
18. YK 3719. RAS.
50 “Det var ju naturligtvis för att få ut det mesta möjliga av något – en glädjefylld land-
vinning, men det har ju också en politisk taktisk finess så att säga. ‘De försöker kalla det 
här något diminutivt men vi kallar det att gifta oss’ . . . Nu skulle jag inte kalla det att vi får 
gifta oss. Nu kämpar vi ju för ett riktigt könsneutralt äktenskap.” Interview Wikström.
51 The interview with Þorvaldur Kristinsson was made in English, and the quotes are tak-
en verbatim from the tape recording. Both Kim Friele and Þorvaldur Kristinsson have had 
the opportunity to read and comment on this section. Þorvaldur has taken the opportunity 
to correct some minor factual errors, and also to correct some of the wording in his quotes.
52 Þorvaldur Kristinsson, e-mail correspondence, 9 November 2009.
53 Ibid.
54 Conference on gay marriage 1973. Friele’s Archive; Referat av generalforsamling 1973, 
Aa 0001, “Generalforsamling 1953–1982,” Det Norske Forbundet av 1948 (DNF ’48). Privat-
arkiv 1216. RAN; “Samliv i Norden,” PAN-bladet, no. 6 (1973).
55 “Mitt råd til landsstyret var at det vi burde jobbe for var lovregulering av homofilt og 
lesbisk samliv . . . Jeg syntes at når vi hadde så god tid på oss, burde vi kritisk vurdere om 
ekteskapsloven faktisk inneholder en del rettsvirkninger som er helt umulige for oss å ta 
sikte på.” Interview Friele.
56 “den tok ikke med barna . . . Jeg mente at vi måtte ikke være så giftekåte annet enn at vi 
skulle vente til vi hadde fått med oss ungene . . . I dag kalles partnerskapsloven av dem som 
stred den frem, for et B-ekteskap! Da jeg sa det samme i slutten av 80-årene og begynnel-
sen av 90-årene, ble jeg jo nesten skutt, ikke sant?” Interview Friele.
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57 “Så kan du si: skulle vi ha ventet i ti år? Nei vi skulle vel ikke ha ventet i ti år. Men vi 
skulle vært modige og redelige nok til å ha diskutert det godt og grundig i homobevegel-
sen.” Interview Friele.
58 “Jeg synes den norske homobevegelsen er litt ‘satt’ – med hus og puddel og hage og…
det er ingen virkelig brennbare homoideologiske politiske debatter lenger.” Interview Frie-
le.
59 The conflicts between Friele and the new leadership of the Norwegian gay and lesbian 
movement were not primarily about the law on registered partnership. Instead, they in-
volved Friele’s position as Secretary General of the movement, her leadership style, and a 
number of other things. In this context, however, I emphasise the differing opinions about 
the partnership law.
60 “Mange syntes vi var svikere. Mange syntes vi hadde sviktet dem ved å inngå partner-
skap – før barna var på plass . . . og mange andre brukte motsatt argument: Hvordan går det 
an at dere som var imot partnerskapsloven er så freidige at dere inngår partnerskap? Og vi 
svarte: ‘Sånn er det. Vi har ingen barn, men vi har gjeld og hus’ . . . Vi gjør dette. Nå skal vi 
ta vare på kjærligheten – og det har vi gjort.” Interview Friele.
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Notes summary and conclusions
1 Wennerfors agreed to present a private member’s bill to the Riksdag in 1971, calling for 
the abolition of the higher age of consent for homosexual relations. Rydström 2007b, 205. 
Jörn Svensson was the MP who most consistently worked for lesbian and gay rights in the 
Swedish Parliament during the 1970s.
2 http://www.norden.org/da/fakta-om-norden/politikk. Viewed 22 April 2010.
3 Lag (2006:351) om genetisk integritet m.m. 6 kap. 5 §. 
4 Assisted reproduction 2006.
5 Rubin 1993 (1984), 13.
6 “là, où il y a pouvoir, il y a résistance.” Foucault 1976, 125.
Appendix: Political parties and 
gay and lesbian rights groups in 
Scandinavia
Political parties
This list of political parties is meant to help the reader find more easily her or 
his way through the jungle of political parties in the Scandinavian countries. It 
does not pretend to be a complete account of Scandinavia’s political history, and 
for practical reasons, much information about shifting names and party splits 
has been omitted. For a more comprehensive account of the Scandinavian party 
system, see Grofman and Lijphart 2002.
Denmark
Socialist parties
Centre Democrats (Centrumdemokraterne, CD). Founded in 1973 by right-wing Social 
Democrats. Dismantled in 2008. Represented in the Folketing 1973–2001.
Left Socialist Party (Venstresocialisterne, VS). Founded in 1967. Dismantled in 1998. Rep-
resented in the Folketing 1968–1971, 1975–1987.
Red-Green Alliance (Enhedslisten ‒ De Rød-Grønne). Founded in 1989. Represented 
in the Folketing since 1994. Merger of the Danish Communist Party, The Left So-
cialist Party, and the Socialist Worker’s Party. LGBT issues and diversity high on 
the agenda.
Socialist People’s Party (SF ‒ Socialistisk Folkeparti). Founded as a splinter group from 
the Danish Communist Party in 1958, in protest against the DCP’s close contacts 
with Moscow. Represented in the Folketing since 1958.
Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterne). Founded in 1871. Represented in the Folket-
ing since 1884.
214 Odd Couples
Liberal parties
Radical Left Party (Radikale Venstre, RV). Left-of-centre liberals. Founded in 1905 as 
a splinter group from the Left Party over the issue of defence spendings. Repre-
sented in the Folketing since 1905.
Centre parties
Left Party, Denmark’s Liberal Party (Venstre, Danmarks liberale parti), right-of-centre 
liberals. Founded in 1870. Represented in the Folketing since 1870.
Conservative parties
Conservative People’s Party (Konservative Folkeparti). Founded in 1915. Represented 
in the Folketing since 1915.
Christian democratic parties
Christian Democratic Party (Kristendemokraterne, KD, before 2003 Kristeligt Folkepar-
ti). Founded in 1970. Represented in the Folketing 1973–1994, 1998–2005.
Right-wing populist parties
Progress Party (Fremskridtspartiet, FrP). Founded in 1972. Represented in the Folket-
ing 1973–1999.
Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti). Founded in 1995 by Progress Party MPs. Rep-
resented in the Folketing since 1995. 
The Faroe Islands
Socialist parties
Social Democratic Party (Javnaðarflokkurin). Founded in 1926. Represented in the 
Løgting since 1928.
Republican Party (Tjóðveldisflokkurin, from 2007 Tjóðveldi). Socialist party working for 
independence. Founded in 1948. Represented in the Løgting since 1950.
Liberal parties
Independence Party (Sjálfstýrisflokkurin). Centre liberal party working for indepen-
dence. Formally founded in 1909. Represented in the Løgting since 1906.
Unionist Party (Sambandsflokkurin). Liberal party in favour of tight bonds with Den-
mark. Founded in 1906. Represented in the Løgting since 1906.
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Conservative parties
Centre Party (Miðflokkurin). Christian party working for traditional values. Founded 
in 1992. Represented in the Løgting since 1992.
People’s Party (Fólkaflokkurin). Conservative party. Founded in 1939. Represented in 
the Løgting since 1939.
Finland
Socialist parties
Finnish Communist Party (Suomen Kommunistinen Puolue / Finlands Kommunistiska 
Parti) 1918–1990. Illegal until 1945, then worked in close cooperation with the Finn-
ish People’s Democratic Alliance until both parties were dismantled in 1990 and 
their work was carried on by the Left Alliance.
Finnish People’s Democratic Alliance (Suomen Kansan Demokraattinen Liitto / Demo-
kratiska Förbundet för Finlands Folk, SKDL/DFFF), 1944–1990. Also known as the 
People’s Democrats (Kansandemokraatit / Folkdemokraterna). Leftist socialist um-
brella organisation for political forces to the left of the Social Democrats.
Left Alliance (Vasemmistoliitto / Vänsterförbundet), 1990–
Social Democratic Party (Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue, SDP / Finlands Social-
demokratiska Parti). 1899–
Liberal parties
Finnish People’s Party (Suomen Kansanpuolue / Finska Folkpartiet). Liberal People’s Par-
ty created after a party split. 1951–1965.
Freethinkers’ League (Vapaamielisten Liitto / Frisinnade Förbundet). Liberal party cre-
ated after a party split. 1951–1965.
Liberal People’s Party (Liberaalinen Kansanpuolue / Liberala Folkpartiet, LKP/LFP after 
2000 Liberaalit / Liberalerna, LKP/LFP). Created as a merger between the Finn-
ish People’s Party and the Freethinkers’ League. 1965–
Swedish People’s Party (Ruotsalainen Kansanpuolue / Svenska Folkpartiet, RKP/SFP). Lib-
eral party with its electorate among the Swedish-speaking minority in Finland. 1906–
Environmentalist parties
Green Alliance (Vihreä Liitto / Gröna Förbundet). Liberal-left environmentalist par-
ty. 1987–
Centre parties
Centre Party (Suomen Keskusta / Centern i Finland, before 1965 the Agrarian League, 
Maalaisliitto / Agrarförbundet). 1906–
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Conservative parties
National Coalition (Kansallinen Kokoomus / Samlingspartiet). Conservative party. 1918–
Christian democratic parties
Christian Democrats (Kristillisdemokraatit / Kristdemokraterna i Finland). Founded by 
Christian former members of the National Coalition. 1958–
Right-wing populist parties
Finnish Countryside Party (Suomen Maaseudun Puolue / Finlands Landsbygdsparti). 
Right-wing populist party. 1959–1995.
True Finns (Perussuomalaiset / Sannfinländarna). Right-wing populist party. 1995–
Greenland
Socialist parties
Social Democratic Party (Siumut, lit. “Forward”). The continuation of a movement 
against Danish colonialism. 1977–
Socialist Party (Inuit Ataqatigiit, or IA, lit. Human [or Greenlandic] Solidarity). So-
cialist party working for increased Greenlandic self-governance. 1978–
Liberal parties
Greenland’s Democrats (Kalaallit Nunaani Demokraatit). Social liberal party. 2005–
Conservative parties
Liberal-Conservative Party (Atassut, lit. “Connection”). Sister party to the Danish party 
Venstre and can be characterised as an economically liberal party with a tradition-
alist value ground. Emphasises the common grounds of Danish and Greenland-
ic values. 1978–
Iceland
Socialist parties
United Left Party (Samfylkingin). A fusion of the Social Democratic Party, the Wom-
en’s List, and the People’s Alliance. 2000– 
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Left-Green Party (Vinstrihreyfingin–Grænt framboð). Splinter group from the People’s 
Alliance when it abandoned its opposition to NATO. 1999–
Socialist Alliance (Bandalag jafnaðarmanna). Short-lived socialist party that got four 
seats in Parliament in the 1985 elections. The next year, three of these joined the 
Social Democratic Party, and the fourth became an independent MP. 1985–1986.
People’s Alliance (Alþýðubandalagið). Created after a fusion of the Icelandic Commu-
nist Party and another splinter group from the Social Democrats. Merged with So-
cial Democrats and formed United Left Party. 1956–1998.
Social Democratic Party (Alþýðuflokkurinn). Merged with People’s Alliance and Wom-
en’s List and formed United Left Party. 1916–1998.
Feminist parties
Women’s List (Kvennalistinn) 1983–1998.
Centre parties
Progressive Party (Framsóknarflokkurin). Centre liberal. 1916–
Conservative parties
Independence Party (Sjálfstæðisflokkurin). Moderately conservative. 1907–
Parties of Discontent
Citizens’ Movement (Borgarahreyfingin). Created in connection with the financial cri-
sis in 2009, and obtained four seats in Parliament in the 2009 elections.
The Movement (Hreyfingin). Splinter party from the Citizens’ Movement from Sep-
tember 2009. Three seats in Parliament.
Norway
Socialist parties
Marxist-Leninist Workers Communist Party (Arbeidernes Kommunistiske Parti [mar-
xist-leninistene], AKP [m-l]). 1973–2007. Gay-friendly, revolutionary party with a 
marginal political influence but with a large influence on Norwegian intellectuals 
in the 1970s and 1980s.
Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet, AP). 1887–
Socialist Left Party (Sosialistisk Venstreparti, SV). Created after a fusion of Norway’s 
Communist Party, Democratic Socialists, and some independent socialists. 1975–
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Liberal parties
Left Party (Venstre). Classical social-liberal party with an urban electorate. 1884–
Centre parties
Centre Party (Senterpartiet. Before 1959 Norsk Bondelag, or Norwegian Farmers’ Union). 
Rural party with a strong Christian constituency, but increasingly liberal. 1920–
Conservative parties
Right Party (Høyre). 1884–
Christian democratic parties
Christian People’s Party (Kristelig Folkeparti). Founded as a reaction to liberal abor-
tion laws. 1933–
Right-wing populist parties
Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet). Right-wing populist party. 1973–
Sweden
Socialist parties
Left Party (Vänsterpartiet) 1917–. Earlier names were Sweden’s Social Democratic Left 
Party (Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Vänsterparti) 1917–1921, Sweden’s Communist Par-
ty (Sveriges Kommunistiska Parti) 1921–1967, Left Communist Party (Vänsterpartiet 
Kommunisterna, VPK) 1967–1990.
Social Democratic Party (Socialdemokratiska Arbetarpartiet, SAP). 1889–
Liberal parties
People’s Party the Liberals (Folkpartiet liberalerna). Classical liberal party, traditionally 
with internal tensions between urban social-liberals and rural Christian voters. 1902–
Centre parties
Centre Party (Centerpartiet, before 1957 Farmers’ League [Bondeförbundet]). Agrari-
an party. 1913–
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Environmentalist parties
Environment Party (Miljöpartiet de gröna). Left-liberal environmentalist party. 1981–
Feminist parties
Feminist Initiative (Feministiskt Initiativ, Fi). Feminist party led by former Left Party 
leader Gudrun Schyman. Not represented in Parliament but with considerable in-
fluence in the public debate. 2006–
Conservative parties
Moderates (Moderaterna, or Moderata Samlingspartiet, before 1969 Högerpartiet, or the 
Right Party). Moderately Conservative party. 1904–
Christian democratic parties
Christian Democrats (Kristdemokraterna). Founded as a protest against the liberalisa-
tion of abortion laws. 1964–
Right-wing populist parties
New Democracy (Ny Demokrati). Right-wing populist party, in Parliament 1991–1994.
Gay and lesbian movements: National organisations
The list includes only the national organisations. Lesbian groups, students’ organisa-
tions, gay and lesbian s/m organisations, and gay parents’ associations (both for lesbian 
and gay parents and for parents of lesbians and gays) have played important parts for 
lesbian and gay rights in all Scandinavian countries. However, the large, national lesbi-
an and gay organisations were traditionally seen as a kind of “trade unions” for lesbians 
and gay men. In recent years, most of them have broadened their mandate to include 
bisexuals and transgendered people, which is obvious in a number of name changes.
Denmark
Kredsen af 1948 (The Circle of 1948). 1948.
Forbundet af 1948 (The Society of 1948). 1949–1982.
Landsforeningen for Bøsser og Lesbiske, Forbundet af 1948 (National Union for Gays 
and Lesbians, The Society of 1948), LBL. 1982–2009.
LGBT Danmark – Landsforeningen for bøsser, lesbiske, biseksuelle og transperson-
er (LGBT Denmark ‒ National Union for Gays, Lesbians, Bisexuals and Trans-
gendered). 2009–
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The Faroe Islands
Ælabogin (The Rainbow). 2003.
Friðarbogin, felag fyri sam- og tvíkyndar føroyingar (The Peace Bow, Association for 
Homo- and Bisexual Faroese). 2003–
Finland
Keskusteluseura Psyke / Diskussionsklubben Psyke (Discussion Club Psyche). 1968–1988.
Seksuaalinen Tasavertaisuus / Sexuellt Likaberättigande, SETA (Sexual Equality). 1974–
Greenland
Qaamaneq (The Light). 2002–2007.
Iceland
Samtökin ’78 ‒ félag lesbía og homma á Íslandi (The Society of ’78 ‒ The Lesbian and 
Gay Organisation of Iceland). 1978–2009.
Samtökin ’78 ‒ félag hinsegin fólks á Íslandi (The Society of ’78 ‒ Queer People’s Or-
ganisation of Iceland). 2009–
Norway
Det Norske Forbund av 1948 (The Norwegian Society of 1948), DNF ’48. 1950–1992.
Fellesrådet for Homofile Organisasjoner ( Joint Council for Homophile Organisa-
tions), FHO. The FHO consisted of a number of local organisations, among which 
was the Oslo-based group Arbeidsgrupper for Homofil Frigjøring, AHF (Work-
ing Groups for Homosexual Liberation), and the Bergen-based Homofil Bevegelse 
i Bergen, HBB (Homosexual Movement in Bergen). 1979–1992.
Landsforeningen for Lesbisk og Homofil Frigjøring (National Union for Lesbian and 
Gay Liberation), LLH. 1992–2008.
LLH ‒ Landsforeningen for lesbiske, homofile, bifile og transpersoner (LLH ‒ Na-
tional Union for Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals, and Transgendered Persons). 2008–
The national gay and lesbian movements in Norway were separate from 1979 till 1992, 
when the two organisations merged.
Sweden
Förbundet av 1948 ‒ Svenska sektionen (The Swedish Section of The Society of 1948). 
1950–1952.
Riksförbundet för Sexuellt Likaberättigande (National Union for Sexual Equality), 
RFSL. 1952–2007.
RFSL ‒ Riksförbundet för homosexuellas, bisexuellas och transpersoners rättigheter 
(RFSL ‒ National Union for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Rights). 2007–
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